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Abstract 
 
The thesis looks at Robert S. McNamaraʼs support for withdrawal from 
Vietnam between 1962 and 1964, during the John F. Kennedy 
administration and during the transition to the Lyndon B. Johnson 
presidency. It offers a reassessment of McNamaraʼs role as one of the 
primary architects of the Vietnam War. From a methodological point of 
view, it approaches McNamaraʼs recommendations on Vietnam from the 
bureaucratic perspective of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 
explaining the evolution of the office and the balance of civil-military 
relations during his tenure.  
Through a bureaucratic lens, McNamaraʼs support for a policy aimed 
at disengagement from Vietnam is logical. First, the withdrawal plans – 
the Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam (CPSVN) – supported a 
strategy informed by the counterinsurgency thinking of the Kennedy 
administration. McNamaraʼs changes at the OSD were designed to align 
defense tools to civilian strategy. As a result, as Kennedy and 
McNamaraʼs counterinsurgency advisers suggested, the CPSVN put the 
onus on self-help (i.e. the South Vietnamese doing the fighting 
themselves), clear-and-hold strategies and the strategic hamlet program 
that was buttressed by paramilitary, rather than traditional military, forces. 
Secondly, the CPSVN dovetailed with McNamaraʼs economic priorities 
for the OSD, both mitigating the departmentʼs impact on the nagging 
balance of payments deficit and, in the nearer term, the impact of South 
Vietnamese operations on the Military Assistance Program. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The mistakes I made: Robert McNamaraʼs OSD and 
planning for Vietnam 
 
 
McNamara, the day before we left for Greece, remarked to Tim Hoopes and 
me that “weʼve made mistakes in Vietnam…Iʼve made mistakes. But the 
mistakes I made are not the ones they say I made.” I said, “I know.” The fact 
is that he believes we never should have gotten into the combat role out there. 
John T. McNaughton diary, Monday February 28, 1966  
 
Building on new material on McNamara, this research aims to fill gaps and 
omissions in the otherwise rich historiography on the Vietnam War and 
McNamaraʼs role therein. In so doing, its conclusions may contribute to 
recasting his role in “McNamaraʼs War”. Rather than look at McNamaraʼs 
recommendations on Vietnam throughout the war, the thesis focuses primarily 
on McNamaraʼs approach to Vietnam during the period of planning for 
withdrawal from the spring of 1962 until the spring of 1964 in the Johnson 
administration when the path to escalation had become, as one historian 
described it, “probable” rather than just “possible”.1 
The researchʼs objective is to live up to Gaddisʼs suggestion that 
historians should aim to recreate an “ecological view” of history, recreating 
reality in all its complexity.2 In this instance, the thesis attempts to recreate 
McNamaraʼs reality from the vantage point of his office in order to explain why 
he led plans for disengagement from Vietnam in the period between 1962 and 
1963. Central to this has been the need to understand how McNamara 
defined his job and, in so doing, reconcile two historiographies that have 
                                                
1 Andrew Preston, “The Soft Hawks' Dilemma in Vietnam: Michael V. Forrestal at the National 
Security Council, 1962-1964,” The International History Review 25:1 (March 2003), pp. 66. 
2 John Lewis Gaddis, The landscape of history: how historians map the past (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 55. 
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largely been treated as discrete, namely the history of the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) with the history of McNamara in Vietnam.  
Andrew Prestonʼs work on the National Security Council under 
McGeorge Bundy provided the template: he described his work as a 
“bureaucratic history of the changes in presidential decision-making and a 
diplomatic history of the origins of the Vietnam War.”3 To paraphrase Preston, 
this thesis is a “bureaucratic history of the changes in the OSD and a 
diplomatic history of withdrawal from the Vietnam War.”  
In taking this bureaucratic approach, a central point emerges about 
McNamara and about the OSD: the OSD was the leading advocate for 
withdrawal whenever the option was on the table. At first glance, this seems 
counterintuitive, as one would assume that wars were the raison dʼêtre for the 
OSD. However, this thesis will show that the OSD was designed to be, and 
operated as, a fundamentally inward-looking agency. As such, it was among 
the first offices to recognize the gap between the countryʼs strategic 
ambitions, as laid out in the White House, the National Security Council (NSC) 
and the State Department, and its internal constraints.  
 
Viewed through the lens of the OSD, the thesis uses McNamaraʼs 
recommendations on Vietnam as a case study for broader themes about civil-
military relations. When McNamara joined the Kennedy administration as 
Secretary of Defense, he came into a young office in flux and in the process of 
defining the proper place of the new defense establishment in national 
security decision-making and more generally, the place of military force in 
U.S. foreign policy. As the Prologue shows, the officeʼs evolution until 1960 
had been one of progressive centralization of power into the Secretaryʼs 
hands in parallel to the gradual reduction of military voices at the highest 
levels of national security decision-making. This evolution had occurred to 
reinforce civilian control of U.S. national security policy. The Prologue traces 
                                                
3 Andrew Preston, The War Council: McGeorge Bundy, the NSC, and Vietnam (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp. 10. 
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the history of the OSD and in so doing, explains the intellectual and 
bureaucratic context in which McNamara entered in 1961. 
As Part I shows, under McNamaraʼs stewardship, and as anticipated in 
successive waves of reforms at the Department of Defense, McNamara 
matched military tools and plans to a strategy designed in the State 
Department and the White House. In the 1962-1963 period, although 
McNamara led the implementation of Vietnam policy, the underlying strategy 
was designed in the State Department and in a number of cross-government 
agencies including the Special Group on Counterinsurgency. President 
Kennedy and key advisers, of whom Roger Hilsman at the State Department 
was one, had taken a keen interest in counterinsurgency strategies for the 
developing world and Vietnam had become their testing ground, a laboratory 
for the administrationʼs efforts to design alternative forms of intervention. The 
withdrawal plans were, from a strategic point of view, designed to short-circuit 
what these advisors saw as a growing militarization of policy on Vietnam. In 
essence, Part I explains the intellectual, political and bureaucratic context in 
which the notion of withdrawal from Vietnam emerged and was encouraged. 
In addition, as Part II describes, McNamaraʼs choice as Secretary of 
Defense was made on the understanding that his role would be a primarily 
managerial one, focused on rationalizing and controlling a swelling defense 
budget and weighing the United Statesʼ growing international obligations 
against the need for a healthy economy. If McNamara embraced 
counterinsurgency it was also because it provided a cheaper strategy in the 
face of a worsening balance of payments deficit and because a strategy 
premised on the disengagement of large-scale troops would pre-empt 
criticism from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) which 
oversaw funding for operations in Vietnam through the administrationʼs 
Military Assistance Program. As Secretary of Defense but also as an 
economist and managerial expert by training, a large part of McNamaraʼs 
“reality” was shaped by economic and fiscal concerns. Part II details the 
economic and fiscal contexts that explain McNamaraʼs enthusiastic support of 
the withdrawal plans. 
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The two dimensions of civilian control, namely civilian articulation of 
both strategy and budgetary prerogatives provide the threads around which 
this thesis is organized. Rather than treat McNamaraʼs recommendation on 
Vietnam in a chronological way, the thesis will use the dimensions of civilian 
control to explain how they fit into his definition of his job as Secretary of 
Defense. Looking at McNamaraʼs recommendations through the lens of 
civilian control as he defined it helps to explain his transition to the Johnson 
administration and especially, the fairly rapid end to planning for withdrawal. 
As McNamara correctly suggested, the strategy changed under Johnsonʼs 
leadership and with it, so did the underlying logic for the plans.4 
Ultimately, liberal criticism of McNamara that he was an increasingly 
hawkish advisor fails to appreciate his restrictive definition of his job, namely 
to “comment on the military implications”5 of policy rather than to design 
strategy. Paradoxically, it was a liberal philosophy of civil-military relations that 
inspired his more limited understanding of the role of the Secretary of 
Defense. Cast in this light, the “mistakes” McNamara made on Vietnam were 
perhaps not so much that he recommended escalation but rather that he 
defined his job too narrowly. As the final, transition chapter shows, even 
though McNamara was quick to recognize that the Johnson administration 
lacked an overarching strategy, he did not step in to fill the void.  
On a deeper level, as Andrew Preston has also noted, the “false 
dichotomy between 'hawks' and 'doves' characteristic of works on U.S. 
involvement in Vietnam is unhelpful and does not capture the complexity of 
advisers.6 Rather than think about McNamara in binary terms, along an 
artificial but conceptually clear ʻhawkʼ or ʻdoveʼ divide, this thesis situates him 
                                                
4 In oral history, McNamara explained, “Those statements and recommendations were 
associated with the strategy we were then following in Vietnam. That strategy was 
subsequently changed; and when it changed, the statements and recommendations made 
with respect to that strategy were no longer valid.” Robert S. McNamara OH No. 1. by Walt 
W. Rostow, January 8, 1975, LBJL. 
5 In another interview, McNamara explained that the Secretary of Defense was a “servant of 
the foreign policy of the country” that his job was to “comment on the military implications” of 
the State Departmentʼs policies. Robert S. McNamara OH Interview by OSD Historical Office, 
April 23, 1986, Folder: OSD OH 1, Box I:109, RSM Papers, LoC. 
6 Preston, “The Soft Hawkʼs Dilemma,” pp. 67. 
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in his bureaucratic place. This approach arguably provides a richer and more 
nuanced understanding of his positions on Vietnam. 
Finally, by analyzing the decisions for Vietnam through the lens of the 
OSD, different lessons emerge about the “mistakes” made. McNamaraʼs 
eventual disillusionment with the war and his advisors post-mortem 
conclusions about the process that led to the war are revealing. While 
McNamaraʼs reforms had been designed primarily to provide a “checks and 
balances” function, they had also strengthened the Department of Defense so 
that it had become a more flexible, well-run, well-funded and “active” 
organization in contrast to the State Department, which had a “talking shop” 
role. In so doing, the OSD produced what McNamaraʼs Special Assistant 
Adam Yarmolinsky called “centrifugal tendencies”, where military solutions to 
international problems were available and easier to deploy. In the end, the 
same factors that had, until 1963, coalesced into a policy for disengagement 
from Vietnam made escalation more likely under the Johnson administration. 
 In some respects, McNamara was a victim of his own success. His 
ability to implement policy loyally and efficiently and to execute the Presidentʼs 
chosen policy faithfully made him the ideal agent for potentially delicate 
policies. In one presidential recording, President Johnson can be heard 
saying, “I thought youʼd done the best job Iʼve ever seen done. I hope you go 
on and brag yourself to your wife. I know you wonʼt do it to anyone else.”7 
McNamara echoed this theme when he was asked in an oral history why he 
had become involved in economic issues that were only tangentially relevant 
to his role as Secretary of Defense. He explained, “I was loyal to the point that 
he had complete assurance that I would carry through those tactics; and [that 
I was] skilful and tough enough that there was a high degree of probability that 
I would carry them out successfully.”8 
 
 
 
                                                
7 MC LBJ Presidential Recordings: January 2, 1964. WH 6401.03, Conversation 1149. 
8 Robert S. McNamara OH No. 1. by Walt W. Rostow, January 8, 1975, LBJL. 
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McNamara, from iconic hawk to the Fog of War 
In keeping with trends in U.S. foreign policy history more broadly, the 
historiography of the Vietnam War has gone through a number of waves.9 
Robert Divine has identified three general periods: first, the contemporary 
phase marked by a “strong distaste” for the U.S. intervention; second, a rather 
more favorable period in the 1970s and 1980s with the rise of conservative 
interpretations of the war, culminating in a third, and final period of “synthesis” 
in the 1990s during which the historical consensus was relatively more 
sympathetic to the decision-makers who were seen largely as “victims of 
ignorance and circumstances beyond their control.”10 By contrast, John 
Dumbrell sees two main movements: an initial, critical reading of the 
circumstances leading to the war then a new revisionism across several 
axes.11 
 For the most part, across these groups and waves, McNamara has 
been described as one of the warʼs “villains” albeit for different reasons. 
                                                
9 Craig, for instance, describes three typical stages of historiography in U.S. foreign policy 
and on the Kennedy administration: an “orthodox” stage that reflects the “political mood of the 
day” when a President leaves office and that typically relies by journalistic accounts and 
memoirs, followed by a “revisionist” stage as new sources appear, concluding in a more 
nuanced stage with “mature literature” that is “refined by relatively full access to the archival 
record.” Campbell Craig, “Kennedyʼs international legacy, fifty years on,” International Affairs 
89:6 (2013), pp. 1367.; See also, Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson (ed.), Explaining 
the History of American Foreign Relations 2nd Edition (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004.) for a comprehensive account of the waves in the historiography of U.S. foreign 
policy, as historians have transitioned along orthodox-revisionist-post-revisionist lines as well 
as along methodological choices, from realist historians that focused relatively more on 
nationalist dimensions of foreign policy towards multi-archival, gender and cultural history. 
Similar critical historiographical reviews include: Michael J. Hogan and Frank Costigliola, 
America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013.).; John Lewis Gaddis, “The Emerging 
Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War,” Diplomatic History 7 (Summer 
1983), pp. 171-90.; Thomas W. Zeiler, “The Diplomatic History Bandwagon: A State of the 
Field,” The Journal of American History 95:4 (March 2009), pp. 1053-1073.; Peter Novick, 
That noble dream: the objectivity question and the American historical profession 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988), Part 4. 
10 Robert A. Divine, “Vietnam reconsidered,” Diplomatic History 12:1 (1988), pp. 92. See also: 
Mark Philip Bradley and Marilyn B. Young, Making Sense of the Vietnam Wars: Local, 
National and Transnational Perspectives (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008).; Gary 
R. Hess, “The Unending Debate: Historians and the Vietnam War,” Diplomatic History 2 
(Spring 1994), pp. 239-264. 
11 For Dumbrell, the orthodox-revisionist dichotomy essentially falls between those who, from 
various angles implied that the war was unnecessary or unjustified on the one hand and those 
that defended the war as either winnable, justified or necessary on the other. John Dumbrell, 
Rethinking the Vietnam War (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 5-21. 
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Where military authors criticize him for putting far too many restraints on his 
military advisors12, others insist on his role in silencing voices of dissent, 
especially in the Johnson administration.13 One possible reason for this 
consensus among unlikely allies is that McNamara was an iconic figure of the 
war; the images of his press conference deeply ingrained in the collective 
memory of the war.14 As a case in point, Deborah Shapleyʼs leading 
biography of McNamara is dedicated: “to the millions who, like me, were born 
as World War II ended and the cold war began, and whose lives were 
changed by this one life.”15 A similar, more mournful, interpretation of 
McNamaraʼs trajectory pervades Hendricksonʼs The Living and the Dead.16 
As time has passed and the polarizing memory of McNamara as the 
architect of Vietnam has either faded or been replaced by the image of the 
reflective, aging man in Errol Morrisʼs The Fog of War, a different 
interpretation seems to be emerging. In areas outside of history, and 
particularly in business management from where McNamara came, he has 
gone through something of a revival.17 This sympathetic literature harks back 
                                                
12 On this type of criticism, see especially: H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon 
Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that led to Vietnam (New 
York, NY: HarperCollins, 1997).; Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in 
Retrospect (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978).; William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier 
Reports (New York: NY: Doubleday, 1976).; David R. Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet: 
U.S.-Vietnam in Perspective (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978).; Harry G. Summers, On 
Strategy: the Vietnam War in Context (Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific, 2003).; 
Shelby L. Stanton, The rise and fall of the American Army: U.S. ground forces in Vietnam, 
1965-1973 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995).; Douglas Kinnard, The War Managers 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007).; Gary R. Hess, “The Military Perspective on 
Strategy in Vietnam,” Diplomatic History 10:1 (January 1986), pp. 91-106. 
13 This was very much Hilsmanʼs line, not least in: Roger Hilsman OH Interview No. 1, Paige 
E. Mulhollan, May 15, 1969, LBJL. George Ball recalled McNamaraʼs anger at dissent over 
the administrationʼs policies, that a memo that he wrote in September 1964 questioning the 
administrationʼs policy on Vietnam was greeted with hostility: “McNamara, in particular, was 
absolutely horrified. He treated it like a poisonous snake. The idea that people would put 
these kinds of things down on paper!” George Ball OH Interview No. 1 by Paige E. Mulhollan, 
July 8, 1971, LBJL. 
14 For recent scholarship on the “collective memory” of the Vietnam War, see for instance, 
David Ryan, US Collective Memory, Intervention and Vietnam: The Cultural Politics of US 
foreign Policy since 1969 (London, UK: Routledge, 2014).  
15 Deborah Shapley, Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara (New 
York, NY: Little Brown & Co, 1993), Dedication. 16	  Hendrickson, The Living and the Dead: Robert McNamara and the five lives of a lost war 
(New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1996).	  
17 Phil Rosenzweig, “Robert S. McNamara and the Evolution of Modern Management,” 
Harvard Business Review (December 2010), pp. 87-93. 
	   16 
to McNamaraʼs early years before Vietnam when his revolutionary leadership 
was widely applauded.18  
The goal of this research is not to try to redeem McNamara in the 
history of the Vietnam War but to treat his early contributions without the 
benefit of hindsight and without the need to fit him into a “hawk” or “dove” 
dichotomy. At a minimum, the thesis contributes to answering Shapleyʼs 
question, “was his choice of war an aberration in his character and career? Or 
was it inevitable, given his nature?”19 and to disproving statements such as 
Douglas Brinkleyʼs that “it is a painful irony that a the man who preached the 
gospel of cost-effectiveness for the nuts and bolts of military hardware failed 
to comprehend that the Vietnam intervention would become the least effective 
and most costly military venture in American history.”20 On the contrary, 
shaped by his own lessons from the Korean commitment especially21, 
McNamara led the withdrawal plans in 1962-1963 precisely because he saw 
the cost implications of another international commitment in Asia. 
 
The history of the OSD 
Rather than focus on McNamara as an individual, the thesis evaluates his role 
as Secretary of Defense and situates him at the end of a historical process for 
that office, a young agency still being shaped by incumbent Secretaries. Also, 
where the historiography of the Vietnam War tends to treat the Pentagon as a 
unitary organization, or at best, as an uncertain union between the OSD and 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) separately, this thesis goes a little deeper in 
                                                
18 R.J. Sutherland, “Cost-Effectiveness and Defense Management; Mr. McNamaraʼs 
Pentagon” (Paper presented at the ORD Informal Paper, Ottawa, 1966).; Thomas Norris, “A 
Giant of Management” (Paper presented at the 38th Annual Meeting of the Academy for 
Management, undated).; Henry Brandon, “Kennedy Fights the Generals,” The Sunday Times 
(May 27, 1962).; William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York, NY: Harper & 
Row, Publishers, 1964).; Theodore H. White, “Revolution in the Pentagon,” Look Magazine 
(April 23, 1963). 
19 Shapley, Promise and Power, pp. 291. 
20 Douglas Brinkley, “The Stain of Vietnam: Robert McNamara, Redemption Denied,” Foreign 
Affairs (1993). 
21 The Korean analogy is used here in a different way than that proposed by Khong: instead 
of an analogy per se, what is meant is that the experience with the Korean commitment, an 
intractable and “stuck” commitment, formed McNamaraʼs views on Vietnam and new 
commitments in Asia. Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu 
and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992). 
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identifying the key centers of power within the OSD for Vietnam decision-
making. It traces the key offices that McNamara created to enforce civilian 
control and how these were distinct, if not in outright opposition, to the military 
services. Many of the offices that were either created or elevated in 
importance during McNamaraʼs tenure, for instance Systems Analysis or the 
International Security Advisorʼs office, were specifically designed to undercut 
the Chiefsʼ budgetary and policy-making roles. 
Some diplomatic and military historians, such as Buzzanco, 
Krepinevich and McMaster have contributed to disaggregating the OSD and 
the JCS on the historiography of Vietnam. However, Buzzanco focuses on the 
dissent of individual military officials rather than the services as a whole while 
Krepinevich focuses on the Armyʼs relationship with civilian authorities.22 
Neither has gone as far as to contribute a structural understanding of how the 
different military and OSD positions interacted and competed for policy space 
on the Vietnam War.  
McMasterʼs work, in many ways the most impressive work of the three, 
adds most to this research project. Many of its findings complement or mirror 
those in this thesis. For instance, he suggests that the evolving policy for 
Vietnam was a product of the interaction between bureaucratic priorities and 
Presidential personalities and, just as this thesis does, he describes the 
gradual alienation of the JCS, which was helped along by their inability to 
transcend inter-service rivalries. However, McMasterʼs focus is on the JCS 
whereas this research focuses on the OSD and he comes to different 
conclusions about McNamara. McMaster has fostered the idea that 
McNamara was the principal architect of the war, not least by inaccurately 
assuming that it was McNamaraʼs responsibility to define the strategy for 
Vietnam and stating that McNamara “refused to consider the consequences of 
his recommendations.”23 However, the most important distinction between 
                                                
22Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 1986).; Robert Buzzanco, Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in 
the Vietnam Era (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996).; McMaster, Dereliction 
of Duty. 
23 McMaster, Dereliction of Duty, pp. 327. 
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McMasterʼs research and this one is that his focus is primarily on the services 
and the JCS rather than on the OSD.  
Moreover, one existing attempt to map McNamaraʼs priorities at the 
OSD with his recommendations on Vietnam - Palmerʼs The McNamara 
Strategy and the Vietnam War - was written too close to events to draw on 
primary source material and was colored by military resentment about 
McNamaraʼs domineering personality. In a less than objective manner, the 
writer complains about McNamaraʼs “intolerance of tradition and authority” 
and his “attack on the citadel of democratic decision-making.”24 
The research has relied heavily on histories of the OSD. These works 
give relatively more weight to the innovations that McNamara implemented 
and that endure today and to the important precedents that he created for the 
unification of the services and for positioning the Secretary of Defense as a 
pivot in national security decision-making.25 In so doing, the revolutionary 
aspects of McNamaraʼs time at the OSD are made clearer as is the 
importance of the economics of defense – its contribution to the balance of 
payments deficit at the time and its wastefulness – to him. 
 
Vietnam War historians as diplomatic historians 
Diplomatic historians of the Vietnam War have arguably tended to 
overemphasize the diplomatic and military aspects of decision-making. As a 
result, the existing historiography has relied heavily on archival collections 
that are more narrowly relevant to Vietnam without placing those decisions in 
their economic context.26 This tendency is particularly problematic with 
                                                
24 Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet, pp. 2, 24. 
25 Douglas T. Stuart, Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law That 
Transformed America (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008).; Lawrence 
S. Kaplan et al., The McNamara Ascendancy: 1961-1965, Vol. V, History of the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006).; Douglas 
Kinnard, The Secretary of Defense (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1980).; 
Steven L. Rearden, The Formative Years: 1947-1950, Vol. I, History of the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (Washington D.C.: OSD Historical Office, 1984). 
26 The “economic context” is understood to mean the prevailing domestic economic conditions 
that existed during McNamaraʼs tenure at the OSD, rather than the global economic context 
as understood by more left-wing historians such as Gabriel Kolko. For this body of literature, 
see especially: Gabriel Kolko, Vietnam: anatomy of war, 1940-1975 (London, UK: Allen & 
Unwin, 1986). 
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McNamara since he was the first to acknowledge that he had very little 
knowledge of foreign policy coming into his role as Secretary of Defense. His 
focus was on the second dimension of civilian control, namely controlling the 
economic and fiscal aspects of defense. 
In this regard, this thesis builds on Francis Gavinʼs work on the 
Kennedy administration, which places greater onus on issues such as the 
balance of payments and gold outflow.27 The secondary literature on the 
economic history of the 1960s, and especially Barry Eichengreenʼs work, has 
also been useful in challenging the conventional wisdom that balance of 
payments concerns only became salient later in the 1960s.28 Ultimately, the 
economic concerns that Gavin has emphasized for Europe were, in fact, 
especially significant on Vietnam and specifically on determining the timing 
and shape of withdrawal plans from 1962 to 1963. The change in strategy 
from the Kennedy to the Johnson administration also hinged on the two 
Presidentsʼ different appreciation of economic issues and specifically on 
Johnsonʼs judgment, which he shared with more liberal economic advisors, 
that Kennedy had been too fiscally conservative. 
Moreover, in emphasizing the economic dimensions of the Kennedy 
administration as it pertains to defense, the thesis connects rather more to 
earlier histories of that administration. While some see a “hagiography” or 
“worshipful” approach in the “Camelot School” of books produced by 
Kennedyʼs advisors such as Sorensen or Schlesinger in the years 
immediately after the assassination29, these books are also interesting 
because they dedicate far more pages to the economic troubles that faced the 
President than to issues such as Vietnam, which has tended to be the focus 
of later histories. For instance, while Robert Dallek spends only one chapter 
on the economic situation of the early 1960s, and intertwines that discussion 
                                                
27 Francis J. Gavin, Gold, dollars, and power: the politics of international monetary relations, 
1958-1971 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004). 
28 Barry Eichengreen, “From Benign Neglect to Malignant Preoccupation: U.S. Balance-of-
Payments Policy in the 1960s,” in George L. Perry and James Tobin (eds.) Economic events, 
ideas, and policies: The 1960s and after (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 
2000). 
29 Campbell Craig, “Kennedyʼs international legacy,” pp. 1368. 
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with domestic issues more broadly, Sorensen dedicated five chapters to the 
same issues.30 
 
History and neat trajectories 
In addition, the thesis challenges the tendency to depict a relatively neat 
upward trajectory in the United Statesʼ commitment to Vietnam. Miller has 
described this trajectory most vividly in stating that “decisions by Kennedy 
served to move U.S. policy forward in a straight line from those taken by the 
Truman and Eisenhower administrations; they progressively burdened the 
United States with ever-greater responsibility for the fate of South Vietnam, 
thereby correspondingly reducing South Vietnamʼs incentives for shaping its 
own future itself. Failure became inevitable.”31 Similarly, and in less stark 
terms, the Pentagon Papers describe the 1962-1963 period of planning for 
withdrawal as follows: “In retrospect, this experience falls into place as a more 
or less isolated episode of secondary importance; eventually abortive, it had 
little impact on the evolution of the Vietnam War.”32 
While these same historians recognize that 1965 was a watershed 
moment, they nevertheless rely on statistics of ever-increasing troop 
numbers, even if they were “just” advisers in the early years, to describe an 
almost inexorable process towards the full-scale American war in Vietnam. 
However, what these troop numbers belie is that a period of planning for 
withdrawal led by McNamara in 1962-1963, and underpinned by a strategy for 
counterinsurgency rather than for conventional war, punctuated this process.  
In part, this conventional narrative has been reproduced because 
historians have often relied heavily on two flawed studies: first, on 
Halberstamʼs early analysis of both Kennedyʼs withdrawal plans and of 
                                                
30 Robert Dallek, John F. Kennedy: an unfinished life, 1917-1963 (London, UK: Allen Lane, 
2003).; Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House 
(New York, NY: Greenwich House, 1983).; Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York, NY: 
Smithmark Publishers, 1995). 
31 Robert H. Miller, “Vietnam: Folly, Quagmire, or Inevitability?,” Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 15 (April 1992), pp. 114. 
32 Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Vol. 2., (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1971), Chapter 3. 
Retrieved online December 12, 2014 Mt Holyoke: 
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/pent5.htm. See below for additional, 
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McNamara himself and second, on the Pentagon Papers.33 Halberstamʼs 
seminal book was contemporaneous to events in Vietnam while the Pentagon 
Papers relied solely on written documents that came through the OSD rather 
than a range of documents, including presidential recordings, which are 
arguably more important to understanding why and when key decisions were 
made in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. 
Despite these inherent flaws, both works have served as key reference 
points for discussions on Kennedyʼs withdrawal plans. For instance, Stanley 
Karnowʼs otherwise thorough history of the Vietnam War only dedicates one 
sentence to Kennedyʼs withdrawal plans. He dismisses the announcement of 
a 1965 end date as “prophecy evidently made for domestic political 
consumption at Kennedyʼs insistence” and adds nothing else.34 Karnow 
references Halberstamʼs work and the Pentagon Papers; he does not rely on 
any primary sources to support his argument while his suggestion that 
Kennedy “insisted” on a public announcement is, as the tapes demonstrate, 
inaccurate. Similarly, Krepinevich calls the withdrawal plans “victory plans” 
and restates the idea that McNamara was stubbornly optimistic in noting that 
a “sunny portrait of the warʼs progress shone through McNamaraʼs Honolulu 
Conference in May” (the moment when he instructed the Chiefs to begin 
planning for withdrawal).35 Again, he references Halberstam, the Pentagon 
Papers as well as Roger Hilsmanʼs To Move a Nation, which General Maxwell 
Taylor described as “largely fiction”36. Krepinevich does not make allowances 
for the fact that a public display of optimism may have been a calculated 
posture on McNamaraʼs part.  
This thesis may contribute to challenging the argument, most clearly 
put forward by George Herring in his seminal work on Vietnam that, “The 
extent to which Kennedy was committed to withdrawal remains quite unclear, 
and there is not a shred of evidence to support the notion of a secret plan for 
                                                
33 Ibid.; David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 
1972). 
34 Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1991), pp. 307. 
35 Krepinevich. The Army and Vietnam, pp. 76, 86. 
36 General Maxwell Taylor OH Interview No. 2. By L. J. Hackman, November 13, 1969, Robert 
F. Kennedy OH Collection. JFKL.  
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extrication.”37 As the thesis will show, there was in fact no secret plan; it was 
publicly announced in October 1963 after almost 18 months of planning by the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff under pressure from McNamara. The plans were known 
within the bureaucracy, budgeted for and, in October 1963, publicly 
announced in a carefully worded press statement. 
If historians may be inclined to favor neat trajectories and perhaps look 
on the early years with the benefit of hindsight, they are also uncomfortable 
with counterfactual reasoning, which seem to be an inevitable outgrowth of 
studies on Kennedyʼs Vietnam policies. More often than not, studies that have 
focused on Kennedyʼs withdrawal plans are answering the question: “what 
would he have done?” rather than explore explicitly “why”. In addition, as later 
sections describe, they tend to focus on Kennedy rather than McNamara. 
Perhaps the most obvious example of this approach is the book Virtual JFK, a 
discussion hosted by Blight, Lang and Welch where they asked historians and 
former decision-makers to engage in what Niall Ferguson has called “virtual” 
history, namely counterfactual history.38 This kind of speculation is tempting 
and the conclusions of this thesis might inform this debate, but it will not be 
the focus of the research. Instead, the thesis looks at what did happen on 
withdrawal from Vietnam and why.39  
 
This research as diplomatic and bureaucratic history: methodological 
families 
Despite its approach, whereby the thesis focuses relatively more on the OSD 
and the dimensions of civilian control, it also makes a contribution to the 
diplomatic history of the Vietnam War. The latter can be grouped into three 
methodological families: histories that focus on agency, or individual decision-
makers; those that focus on structure or the underlying ideology of the Cold 
                                                
37 Herring, Americaʼs Longest War, pp. 114. 
38 James G. Blight et al., Virtual JFK: Vietnam if Kennedy Had Lived (New York, NY: Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009). 
39 For a critique of Virtual JFK, see especially Andrew Preston, “Review: Virtual JFK: Vietnam 
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War; and those, like this thesis, that take a bureaucratic approach to 
understanding the Vietnam War.40 
Also, setting aside the group of authors who either identify solutions 
(what could have been done differently) or overlooked gains in the war41, most 
of the literature on Vietnam has focused on what was wired within the U.S. 
and its national security decision-making process to produce this seemingly 
inexorable tragedy. Even if they may also draw lessons, these authors focus 
primarily on describing factors that led to the war. The current thesis will be 
within this group, but turned on its head, namely: instead of looking at what 
factors led to war, it will look at what factors played into staying out, or getting 
out, of the war.  
The literature on the Vietnam War and on withdrawal can be grouped 
into three methodological families even if they often overlap. First, there is the 
literature that focuses on personalities or individual characters. Perhaps the 
                                                
40 A caveat, the thesis is relatively narrow, eschewing international dimensions and instead 
focusing on the war from the perspective of the United States and specifically from the OSD. 
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2013). 
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Johnson, and U.S. Grant Sharp, the former Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC), have 
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Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War (Lawrence, KS: 
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best example of the individual or personality-focused approach is 
Halberstamʼs The Best and the Brightest in which he goes into some detail 
about each of the key decision-makers, describing their strengths and biases, 
to explain the escalation of American involvement in Vietnam. The problem 
with Halberstamʼs work and this approach more generally, is that it favors 
internal consistency – i.e. McNamara was the “can-do man in the can-do 
society in the can-do era”42 – over the documentary evidence. Halberstam 
overlooks the withdrawal plans in order to preserve a simplified narrative on 
the U.S. role in Vietnam and on McNamara. 
More often than not, this literature overlaps closely with the 
bureaucratic approach but its focus remains on individual characteristics 
rather than the underlying institutional interests and agendas of each 
government unit. The personality-focused histories reject the schematic 
approach that is inherent to bureaucratic histories. For example, McMaster 
ends his book stating that the war was lost not as a “result of impersonal 
forces but a uniquely human failure, the responsibility for which was shared by 
President Johnson and his principal military and civilian advisers. The failings 
were many and reinforcing: arrogance, weakness, lying in the pursuit of self-
interest, and, above all, the abdication of responsibility to the American 
people."43 For him, it was not the impersonal forces of bureaucratic interests 
that were decisive in shaping the war decisions but instead individual agency. 
As applied to the issue of withdrawal, this methodological family tends 
to focus on the power of the President and his own vision. In other words, the 
President (his vision and interests) determined whether or not there were 
withdrawal plans and how prominent they were. With the Kennedy 
administration, a body of literature argues that while it is unclear whether or 
not Kennedy would have withdrawn, his particular perspective and vision 
would have prevented the escalation that occurred under Johnson. The 
historians David Kaiser, Fredrik Logevall, Robert Dallek and Richard Reeves 
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have each written a version of this argument.44 It is also implicit or explicit in 
Townsend Hoopes, Theodore Sorenson and in Arthur Schlesingerʼs 
recollections of their time in office. Since the policy derived from Kennedy, this 
view explains why the roughly same set of advisers produced prima facie 
different policies in the next administration.45  
Going a step further, many of Kennedyʼs advisors or confidants – 
including Senator Mansfield; McNamaraʼs deputy, Roswell Gilpatric; and 
Kenneth OʼDonnell and David Powers - have written or stated in oral histories 
that Kennedy was determined to withdraw and had instructed McNamara to 
begin this process on the eve of his death.46 Building on this, historians like 
Howard Jones have argued that the “decision to withdraw was unconditional, 
for [Kennedy] approved a calendar of events that did not necessitate a 
victory.”47 For them, Kennedy had begun a momentum that would lead to 
withdrawal from Vietnam after he was re-elected in 1964 irrespective of the 
situation on the ground.  
Although Howard Jones is right that Kennedy began a momentum 
towards withdrawal that was not pegged against victory, he overlooks the key 
role McNamara played and the way in which Kennedyʼs views converged with 
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the OSDʼs bureaucratic interests. By focusing too narrowly on Kennedyʼs 
personal vision, Jones overlooks bureaucratic factors and fails to 
acknowledge the central role played by McNamara in pushing these 
withdrawal plans through the bureaucracy. 
John Newman has perhaps gone the furthest in this President-focused 
direction by arguing that Kennedy was not only planning to withdraw from 
Vietnam after his re-election but also that he successfully manipulated the 
whole bureaucracy along the way. In a somewhat conspiracy theorist vein, he 
argues that Kennedy neutralized his more hawkish advisors and was planning 
to use his military advisorsʼ overly-optimistic reporting against them by getting 
them to publicly commit to an irreversible withdrawal timetable. He calls this a 
“deception within a deception”.48 Newman improves on Jonesʼ work by giving 
a more prominent role to McNamara: he suggests that there was a secret 
arrangement between Kennedy and McNamara to implement their 
“deception”. 
Indirectly, Kinnard also takes this President and individual-focused 
approach in his study of the Secretary of Defense when he argues that 
McNamara committed to withdrawal because on the one hand, his optimism 
blinded him to contradicting information, and especially, because he took on 
Kennedyʼs political judgment and worldview because he had none of his 
own.49 Again, it is from the Presidentʼs overarching vision that the policy of 
withdrawal flows. 
While it may be tempting to frame Kennedy in this positive light, as the 
President who would have avoided the tragedy that became Vietnam, this 
thesis also tries to interpret the events and policies of the time in their own 
context without hindsight. The Camelot mythology has a strong influence on 
the interpretation of Vietnam policies in the period until 1963. However, in 
portraying Kennedy as an isolated clairvoyant, these authors have a tendency 
to gloss over, or entirely disregard, McNamaraʼs role in the withdrawal plans. 
They fail to identify the powerful interests he had in pushing for withdrawal 
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and, in painting a picture of McNamara as a mere “implementer” as Kinnard 
does, they overlook his ability to learn on the job and to seek out experts, in 
particular on issues like counterinsurgency. Although their approach makes 
for a consistent reading of McNamaraʼs place in the Vietnam War – as a hawk 
until later in the Johnson administration – it is at odds with new documentary 
evidence. 
Furthermore, although Newmanʼs detailed work is very helpful in 
understanding the militaryʼs perspective (both their institutional foot-dragging 
and General Harkinsʼ genuine optimism), he also underestimates McNamara. 
The withdrawal plans were not hidden as Newman would have it, but instead 
fully above board. In many ways, in assuming that McNamara and Kennedy 
would have to hide a withdrawal agenda, Newman underestimates 
McNamaraʼs ability to bully advisors, and his military advisors in particular, 
into adopting his policy. 
The next and second methodological family focuses on American 
ideology and the “system” as a whole. Perhaps the most famous example is 
George Herringʼs work where he argues that the war was a logical 
culmination, and misapplication, of the strategy of containment. For him, the 
“obsession with containment” led to blindness about the local specificities of 
the situation in Vietnam and to misreading the United Statesʼ national 
interests there.50 Gelb and Betts have bridged this approach with the 
bureaucratic one, arguing that containment produced suffocating constraints 
(externally, as well as domestically, in the need to placate the “right”) and so 
the bureaucracy played “only a subsidiary role in setting the basic American 
commitment in Vietnam but a central role in shaping the war itself.”51 
Several policy-makers from the time have also encouraged this line of 
thinking, perhaps to absolve themselves of responsibility. In other words, if 
they as individuals or representatives of agencies and departments could do 
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nothing to prevent the escalation into this losing war, it was because 
something was wrong with the system as a whole. Most notably, McNamara 
writes in his Memoirs: “We of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations who 
participated in the decisions on Vietnam acted according to what we thought 
were the principles and traditions of this nation. We made our decisions in 
light of those values."52 Similarly, Townsend Hoopes, who became Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in 1965 (a 
position he tellingly describes as “not at the center of policy, but on the near 
periphery”), indicates that it was the blind spots born of the Cold War that 
made them overlook Vietnamʼs specificities. He notes, "We were propelled by 
our sense of Great Power responsibility to our conception of world order, by 
the dynamics of our internal politics, and by an innate belief in American 
omnipotence."53 
Hoopesʼ words, if not his perspective as a whole, were probably 
borrowed from Senator Fulbright whose series of lectures, which were 
subsequently published as a book, The Arrogance of Power, made a similar 
argument. Fulbright wrote of the Americaʼs “confus[ion] of power with wisdom” 
and its misplaced “idea of being responsible for the whole world [which] 
seems to have dazzled us, or what the French, perhaps more aptly, call 'le 
vertige de puissance', by which they mean a kind of dizziness or giddiness 
inspired by the possession of great power." For Fulbright, this dizziness about 
U.S. power and responsibility explained the intervention and escalation in 
Vietnam.54 
Within this perspective, withdrawal was simply not possible. More than 
any other approach, it is concerned with factors that led to war. The system 
and its underlying ideology were wired for war and made abandoning the U.S. 
commitment to Vietnam inconceivable. It is precisely because, to quote 
Kissinger, the “consensus that had sustained [the U.S.ʼ] post-war foreign 
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policy had evaporated”55 that Nixon could withdraw as he did in the 1970s.56 
However, this narrative glosses over or disregards the 1962-1963 period 
during which McNamara planned for withdrawal. A more careful analysis of 
this period shows that a homogenous understanding of the United Statesʼ role 
in the world did not exist. 
A sub-section of this literature is primarily concerned with the military 
and explains its own particular brand of blindness and ideology – its inability 
to see the war in Vietnam on its own terms and to adjust military doctrine 
accordingly. For Krepinevich, for instance, counterinsurgency was not fully 
incorporated into the military planning; even the Army, that most benefited 
from this new thinking, paid mere lip service to it. Ultimately, the dictum that 
the military is trained to fight the last war (a conventional war) proved true and 
explains the loss in Vietnam.57 In contrast to the military, Krepinevich shows 
how intellectually engaged Kennedy, as well as a number of his key advisors, 
were with counterinsurgency theory. However, he does not see the withdrawal 
plans as stemming from this particular understanding of counterinsurgency 
but instead from McNamaraʼs confidence that the war could be brought to an 
early conclusion.  
Krepinevichʼs description of the doctrinal gap between civilians and the 
military provides an important backdrop for this researchʼs conclusions about 
the Kennedy years. However, the thesis will show that this doctrinal gap was 
not a separate issue from withdrawal. Instead, the two were intrinsically 
connected: Kennedyʼs civilian advisorsʼ sense that there was an irreconcilable 
doctrinal gap explains why they sought to demilitarize the situation in Vietnam. 
The final methodological family, where this research falls, looks at 
bureaucratic politics to explain Vietnam policy. This borrows from political 
science models – most famously Graham Allison and Philip Zelikowʼs study of 
the Cuban Missile Crisis – and assumes that “where you stand depends on 
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where you sit.”58 The research will look at the OSD and see to what extent 
“where McNamara sat” had an effect on “where he stood” on Vietnam. 
But first, it is worth going over some of the existing contributions to a 
bureaucratic history of the Vietnam War. Stavins, Barnet and Raskin have 
looked at the issue of institutional momentum as a self-reinforcing process: on 
Vietnam, bureaucrats developed a stake in the solution and found it difficult to 
admit past failure.59 This is also Isaacsʼ60 and Schlesingerʼs position who both 
described the process of the U.S. entry into the Vietnam War as policy by 
inadvertence, of incremental steps and momentum.61 Barnet also adds that 
within this process, there was a tendency to favor “tough” responses, thus 
encouraging hawkish policy responses.62 Each of these studies overlaps, to a 
greater or lesser extent, with the other methodological families described 
before. 
The most structured application of a bureaucratic approach to the 
history of the Vietnam War is Robert Gallucciʼs Neither Peace Nor Honor in 
which he argues that, by taking a bureaucratic perspective, “We move to a 
lower level of analysis where, for example, the policy of the United States in 
Southeast Asia is accounted for in terms other than the pursuit of the national 
interest or the protection of national security.”63 He also identifies a number of 
“key issues” that will guide the current research as well.  
The most relevant points are first, that the President is more than just a 
“first among equals”, that he can skew recommendations but that the 
implementation will necessarily be a product of organizational issues and 
procedures. Second, that individuals do not necessarily consciously take a 
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bureaucratic position but become imbued with a sense that what is good for 
their office is good for national security. Third, that organizational processes 
tend to be conservative in the sense that they avoid uncertainty and adhere to 
acquired knowledge. Finally, that the bureaucratic bargaining process needs 
to be understood in a broader context where there is give-and-take across a 
range of issues, where actors will deliberately pick their battles, and where 
competition is implicit on any policy.64 However, Gallucci does not apply his 
methodology to Kennedyʼs withdrawal plans; his focus is on the transition to 
Johnson and his changes in decision-making processes. 
Gallucciʼs framework is implicit in Marc Selverstoneʼs work on 
withdrawal plans in the Kennedy administration. Selverstone notes that while 
Kennedy may have inspired the actual withdrawal plans, they were closely 
aligned to McNamaraʼs own priorities for the Department of Defense (DoD) 
and that he was their main architect. From a bureaucratic perspective, they 
were “conditioned by the demands of the budgetary process” that McNamara 
was implementing within the DoD and reflected the broader attempts to 
“systematize and rationalize government planning and expenditures” which 
McNamara and his team of “whiz kids” were inspiring across government.65 
This effort to align the bureaucratic interest of the OSD with resulting policies 
is exactly what this research will try to do. In many ways, the current research 
builds on Selverstoneʼs work but narrows it, by focusing specifically on the 
OSD and civil-military relations. Instead of focusing on the Kennedy 
administration as a whole, as Selverstone does, it focuses instead on 
McNamara and treats the administrationʼs priorities and concerns only insofar 
as they impinged on the OSDʼs planning. By focusing on McNamara alone, 
the research sheds new light on the people and bureaucratic forces that 
shaped and influenced his positions on Vietnam. 
Other studies that address withdrawal under the Kennedy 
administration from a bureaucratic perspective have tended to emphasize that 
the escalatory momentum was already too strong. At best, the withdrawal 
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plans presented by McNamara were allowed because Kennedy had created a 
decision-making style where as many options as possible were kept open. As 
such, these plans did not represent a fundamental shift in policy and it was 
unlikely that the OSD, even if it did have an interest in withdrawing, would 
have managed to push them through the rest of the national security 
bureaucracy.66 
 
Challenges, existing debates and the transition to the Johnson 
administration 
The current research confronts and offers its own interpretation on debates 
about whether withdrawal plans were real rather than theoretical, as well as 
why a roughly same set of advisors, and McNamara in particular, produced 
such different policies under Johnson. For the Kennedy administration, the 
debate hinges on whether he was in fact set on withdrawal, whether the plans 
were real or “cosmetic”.67 As discussed, for some, it was clear that he wanted 
to withdraw as soon as he was re-elected. Others have argued that he would 
not have withdrawn but would not have allowed combat troops to be deployed 
either. And for others, Kennedy would not have strayed significantly from 
Johnsonʼs policies because the escalation was primarily a product of changed 
circumstances on the ground instead of Washington-based factors.68 While 
historians cannot know with certainty what Kennedy would have done with the 
plans in the after-Diem period in Vietnam, it is possible to study the existing 
withdrawal plans and ascertain what they included and why. In so doing, 
Kennedyʼs thinking on counterinsurgency becomes clearer as well as 
McNamaraʼs obsession with the economic impact of the OSDʼs activities. 
In the end, most historians discount the significance of Kennedyʼs 
withdrawal plans by remarking that the same set of advisors stayed on under 
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Johnson and, after December 1963, argued for escalation. Alternatively, they 
point to the fact that the situation on the ground unraveled after Kennedyʼs 
assassination thus forcing an escalation that even Kennedy could not have 
avoided. Even Howard Jones, who acknowledges that Kennedy did have 
credible withdrawal plans on the eve of his death, argues that escalation in 
Vietnam became inevitable because of Diemʼs assassination and the internal 
collapse of South Vietnam.69 However, these arguments are incomplete. 
Conspiracy theories or over-elaborate stories of secret meetings between 
Kennedy and McNamara are not necessary to argue that Kennedy attached a 
seriousness to the withdrawal plans that Johnson did not.  
Moreover, a more detailed analysis of Kennedyʼs withdrawal plans, and 
McNamaraʼs role therein, recasts the decisions during the transition. By 
relying more heavily on the presidential recordings during the early months of 
the Johnson administration, the thesis challenges VanDeMarkʼs assertion that 
Johnson was “scrupulous in continuing” Kennedyʼs Vietnam policy.70 Instead, 
during the transition, Johnson knowingly changed strategy, abandoning the 
counterinsurgency strategy that was central to Kennedyʼs approach to 
Vietnam and to his withdrawal plans.  
Unlike Johnson, Kennedy was deeply immersed in counterinsurgency 
theory and was surrounded by formal and informal experts on the issue, most 
of whom were isolated, pushed out or left under Johnson, notably Roger 
Hilsman and Robert Kennedy.71 As McNamara explained, “[The] statements 
and recommendations [about the 1965 end date] were associated with the 
strategy we were then following in Vietnam. That strategy was subsequently 
changed; and when it changed, the statements and recommendations made 
with respect to that strategy were no longer valid.”72 In other words, the 
withdrawal plans under Kennedy relied on his understanding of 
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counterinsurgency: when the counterinsurgency strategy was dropped, so too 
were the withdrawal plans. 
Johnsonʼs starker views on Vietnam underpinned the shift in strategy. 
He believed in falling dominos more strongly than Kennedy did and was 
against the idea of withdrawal in any situation short of victory from the outset. 
There had been two lowest common denominators in government under 
Kennedy (policies that could garner broad administration agreement albeit for 
conflicting reasons as this thesis will show): one was withdrawal and the other 
was the introduction of troops. Kennedy expressly rejected the latter. Unlike 
Johnson, he had a somewhat blasé attitude to recommendations for the 
introduction of troops.73 By contrast, very early on, Johnson felt that the “sky 
was the limit” for U.S. support to Vietnam and sought out military advice more 
often than McNamara himself was inclined to do.74  
In addition, as this thesis will also show, Kennedy and McNamara 
placed Vietnam in a broader context of the U.S. commitments around the 
world and were concerned about its impact on the balance of payments. As 
such, withdrawal from Vietnam did not imply the abandonment of Vietnam, 
only the creation of a new model of influence around the world – one that 
need not rely on military tools or a heavy U.S. troop presence. Both Kennedy 
and McNamara shifted the administrationʼs definition of the problem in 
Vietnam in a way that would facilitate this view: instead of being external, it 
was internal; and instead of being “our” war it was “their” war. These broader 
considerations did not weigh on Johnson in the same way. Instead, and 
ironically, he seemed more willing to “bear any burden” and criticized his 
predecessorsʼ concern for balanced budgets as he, in contrast, embraced 
neo-Keynesianism in the Great Society programs. McNamara, who was 
reluctant to identify any divergences between his views and those of the 
President he served, later admitted that he and Johnson did not see eye-to-
eye on the costs inherent to escalation in Vietnam.  
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When the transition is cast into the two dimensions of civilian control 
that guide this thesis – namely aligning military tools to civilian-designed 
strategy and weighing the defense budget against internal constraints, and 
primarily a sound economic base - McNamara was remarkably consistent 
from the Kennedy to the Johnson administration. In both administrations, 
McNamara did not design strategy but instead brought the most cost-efficient 
program to support the Presidentʼs chosen strategy. Also, McNamara had 
embraced Kennedyʼs policy because it promised to reduce the balance of 
payments deficit and could deal with the SFRCʼs attack on the Military 
Assistance Program that funded Vietnam operations. In the Johnson 
administration, he pressed harder to reduce defense outlays to compensate 
for the increase in costs on Vietnam while urging the President to repeal the 
tax cut that he had inherited from Kennedy. Crucially, as McNamara 
recognized that the program for Vietnam would become increasingly 
expensive and militarized, he moved funding for Vietnam to the services 
budget, which came under the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) 
oversight. In this way, he removed a key, budgetary constraint on operations 
on Vietnam. In other words, his role in identifying the internal constraints 
remained, only now he served a President who wasnʼt “obsessed” either with 
the gold outflow as Kennedy had been75 or with balanced budgets.  
McNamara was especially consistent in allowing the Presidents he 
served to make him the public face of a policy that was not his alone: out of a 
sense of loyalty to the Presidency, he became the public face of the 
withdrawal plans and then for escalation. As the thesis shows, this was a 
deliberate decision by both Presidents and by McNamara himself. McNamara 
sought to protect the Presidents he served because he understood the 
reputational damages that could be incurred if their policy was unsuccessful. 
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New material 
In a classified oral history for the Historical Office of the OSD undertaken in 
1986, McNamara explained why, in office, he had asked his International 
Security Advisor John McNaughton, to compile United States – Vietnam 
Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense or 
what would become more commonly known as the Pentagon Papers. He 
recounted that he told McNaughton: “This is a damn mess. We must insure 
that those who at some point will wish to study the action and draw lessons 
from it will have all the raw materials they need. So collect all the raw 
materials and be sure they are available to historians.” He wanted “historians, 
political scientists, and military experts [to] examine the mistakes in 
judgment.”76  
Although the Pentagon Papers are an important resource for any 
research on the OSD in Vietnam, especially since they now have been 
declassified in full, they also have flaws as a source for historians. First, its 
authors did not have access to “all the raw materials”: they only drew only on 
documents that were both directly relevant to Vietnam and that came through 
the OSD. In addition, the Pentagon Papers are essentially a curated selection 
of documents that are framed in analysis rather than the raw material per se. 
Their analysis, this thesis suggests, especially for the Kennedy years, is 
shaped by biases and therefore, sometimes off the mark. Daniel Ellsberg was 
responsible for the Kennedy chapters and perhaps because he had no 
contact with Vietnam in those early years, may have overlooked collections or 
factors that were equally, if not more, relevant to understanding decisions on 
Vietnam. In the Pentagon Papers, Ellsberg dismissed Kennedyʼs withdrawal 
plans as premised on optimism and primarily designed for budgetary 
projections not operational realities. However, in later years, in light of new 
documents, he revisited that conclusion.77 Finally, the Papers only relied on 
the written record and in this, were at a major disadvantage to histories today 
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that have a far richer set of primary documents to draw from, especially the 
presidential recordings.  
On the issue of relying on the written record, McNamaraʼs Special 
Assistant and later Deputy to McNaughton, Adam Yarmolinsky explained, 
“The written record more and more, and even in those days, tends to be 
defensive and it provides rationalizations rather than reasons. The written 
record is that – you know, McNamara, the DPMs – they were drafts until they 
were promulgated so that it could never be said that there was disagreement 
between the Pentagon or the Secretary and the President.” When asked 
specifically what was not on the written record, Yarmolinsky replied, “Probably 
everything. Almost everything.” He also added, “I think [McNamara] realized 
early on than the record shows that it was a mistake. And he tried in ways that 
are not apparent to disentangle.”78 
In trying to recreate an “ecological view” of McNamaraʼs reality, the 
research has relied on a broader set of second literature, and was as much, if 
not more, influenced by economic history and the histories of the OSD, as by 
the historiography on Vietnam. In addition, the research has greatly benefited 
from a number of new documents that have recently been declassified and to 
private materials that are not openly available to researchers. 
First and foremost, since 2010, Robert McNamaraʼs personal papers 
have been accessible at the Library of Congress. These contain a number of 
important notes by McNamara as he researched his own Memoirs, his 
heretofore classified oral histories for the OSD Office of the Historian as well 
as his personal correspondence. In addition, his papers contain his calendar 
as Secretary of Defense, which has proven invaluable in terms of identifying 
the people McNamara spoke to as he turned to a policy of disengagement 
from Vietnam, most notably the British counterinsurgency expert Robert 
Thompson and the economist John Kenneth Galbraith.  
Second, John Newman, who wrote the most comprehensive account of 
Kennedyʼs withdrawal plans, has made his material available to researchers 
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at the Kennedy Library.79 His papers provide an invaluable shortcut as they 
contain much of the material that has been declassified on withdrawal in 
archives around the U.S., including many of the military archives that are less 
accessible to researchers.  
Also, building on Marc Selverstoneʼs work, the Miller Center has posted 
a number of transcribed tapes online that provide fascinating insight into the 
discussions on withdrawal during the Kennedy administration and on 
McNamara in particular. In those tapes, more than anywhere else, McNamara 
is heard dominating discussions on Vietnam and it emerges that he 
understood that he was going against the current for escalation instead of 
leading it. Similarly, the Lyndon B. Johnson Library online collection of 
presidential recordings has been key to contextualizing and explaining the 
written record during the transition. For the reasons described by 
Yarmolinsky, these recordings provide the backbone of the transition chapter. 
In addition, this research has drawn on oral histories, primarily at the 
Presidential Libraries, to understand the context in which recommendations 
were made and the relationships between people and agencies. Despite their 
inherent problems, the oral histories on McNamara and his tenure as 
Secretary of Defense during the Kennedy years provide an interesting 
perspective into his management style, his relationship with his military 
advisors and those whom he consulted on Vietnam. In addition, McNamaraʼs 
oral histories for the Office of the Historian at the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, which were declassified in 2010, offer a fresh perspective on the 
Kennedy administrationʼs withdrawal plans as McNamara is unusually candid 
in them. Those oral histories are the only place, for instance, where 
McNamara unambiguously admits that he was fired by President Johnson. 
Also, because this research tries to place the Vietnam War in its 
broader bureaucratic context, it has drawn on the papers of a larger swathe of 
advisors, not just those directly concerned with Vietnam and national security 
issues, but also advisors that dealt with economic issues (e.g. Carl Kaysen 
and Douglas Dillon) and organizational issues (e.g. Adam Yarmolinsky) to see 
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how they perceived Vietnam. For the economic dimensions, a number of 
online archives, in particular the Federal Reserve Archive, were also helpful. 
Finally, the research has benefited from access to collections and 
documents that are not widely available to researchers. In particular, Alex 
McNaughton, through Thomas Paullin, the author of a blog on McNaughton, 
kindly provided a copy of his father John McNaughtonʼs private diary, which 
gives an unparalleled and unfiltered view onto the private thoughts of 
McNamara and his closest confidants during the 1966-1967 period. Also, 
Errol Morris has kindly provided support and insight from his off-the-record 
conversations with McNamara. 
McNamaraʼs papers and Errol Morrisʼs research materials have been 
especially important because, as the chapter on the transition to Johnson 
explains, the early drafts for In Retrospect contained a lot more material on 
Kennedyʼs withdrawal plans and the premise for withdrawal. In 1986, 
McNamara asked: “Why arenʼt there dissertations or thoughtful, definitive 
studies of the process and the lessons to be learned from it? Thatʼs what 
needs to be done.” In part, this was probably McNamaraʼs objective in In 
Retrospect but key points on the issue of withdrawal were removed, often 
because Brian VanDeMark argued that that there was a shortage of 
documentary evidence to support them. Whereas the research material for In 
Retrospect comprised mostly written documents from the FRUS volumes, 
Errol Morrisʼs research on The Fog of War had a broader range of materials 
and especially revealed key tapes that shed light on the transition from the 
Kennedy to the Johnson administrations. 
 
Conclusion 
While it may be tempting to frame decisions for withdrawal and subsequently, 
for escalation, within the context of the personal qualities or the geopolitical 
vision or lack thereof of individuals, it is at least conceivable that something 
less glamorous, namely bureaucratic processes, had a role to play. Moreover, 
bureaucratic operators sometimes have conflicting objectives that produce 
unlikely or unintended outcomes. Paradoxically, McNamaraʼs efforts to 
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consolidate civilian control both in strategic and economic terms away from 
military advisors also contributed to escalation. Although the current research 
only focuses on the period until 1964, it provides a new way of interpreting 
McNamara and specifically his restraining influence on early Vietnam 
decisions and, as a result, it may spur a reassessment of his later years in 
office.  
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PROLOGUE – THE HISTORY OF THE OSD, 1947-1961 
 
When Robert McNamara accepted President Kennedyʼs offer to serve as the 
United Statesʼ eighth Secretary of Defense, the role was still new, a barely 
decade-old innovation emanating from the Second World War. As a young 
agency, the OSD was still defining its place in the national security decision-
making landscape and, in so doing, trying to find the appropriate balance of 
power between civilian and military authorities. President Eisenhower had left 
the new administration with the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, a 
congressionally mandated program for change at the Department of Defense. 
McNamara recognized its sweeping potential to pave the way for his 
bureaucratic revolutions as the longest-serving Secretary of Defense.80 
Overall, 1960 was a propitious moment in the officeʼs history and for a man 
who by personality as well as professional and intellectual inclination was 
predisposed to pushing organizational change and centralizing authority 
around himself.  
The chapter reviews both the history of the OSD and McNamaraʼs 
predecessors to provide a framework in which to consider civil-military 
relations at the time and ultimately, to understand McNamaraʼs 
recommendations for Vietnam. The suggested framework breaks with existing 
literature that has tended to consider civilian control in terms of cultural, 
sociological or organizational relationships with the military. Instead, building 
loosely on Samuel Huntingtonʼs model, the thesis suggests that the history of 
civilian control by the OSD until 1960 was essentially the history of two trends: 
strategic and operational control on the one hand, “resource allocation” on the 
other.81  
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First, civilian control of strategy and of operational decisions has been 
the traditional focus of civil-military relations literature and concentrates on the 
changing relationships and power dynamics between the OSD, the President, 
State Department, NSC and military services in the articulation of national 
strategy. The progression of civilian control before McNamaraʼs arrival at the 
OSD was steady and was coupled by the gradual reduction of military voices 
in the upper echelons of decision-making, a process that each incumbent 
Secretary basically supported. 
The second dimension is the economic one or what Huntington called 
“resource allocation”: civilian control was also about defining the appropriate 
level of fiscal commitment to military expenditures and balancing defense 
spending with other domestic or civilian needs. Here, the evolution had been 
more fitful and controversial. Senator Kennedy had campaigned aggressively 
for increased defense spending and criticized his opponentʼs thriftiness. 
However, despite his campaign rhetoric, Kennedyʼs transition team recruited a 
Secretary of Defense with the managerial skills to control the ballooning 
defense establishment and its costs. Although the defense budget expanded 
during the Kennedy years and McNamaraʼs tenure, the reforms they 
engineered were specifically designed to reduce defense expenditures in the 
long term.82 
Prima facie, withdrawal from Vietnam or elsewhere appears to be a 
paradoxical policy for McNamara to support; as a man whom the 
historiography largely remembers as a principal architect of the war in 
Vietnam and as a bureaucrat at the helm of an organization designed to 
mobilize resources for the application of military force, it makes little sense. 
However, it is precisely at a bureaucratic level that McNamaraʼs 
recommendation to begin the process of leaving Vietnam in 1962 makes the 
most sense. An analysis of McNamaraʼs policy recommendations that 
considers this prism rather than the binary, hawk-dove lines that the Vietnam 
War historiography typically provides may be more revelatory.  
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Intellectual and cultural resistance to a defense establishment 
Each Secretary of Defense from the first incumbent James Forrestal to 
McNamara had to face an in-built cultural ambivalence in the United States 
about anything that could be construed as extending the reach of the federal 
government in general and of military authorities specifically. Americans were 
uncomfortable with the military establishment that they had inherited from the 
Second World War. The Pentagon building itself was erected hastily between 
1941 and 1942 to coordinate the war but with a stipulation from Congress that 
it was a temporary structure and that it would be converted into a veteranʼs 
hospital “after peace is restored and the army no longer needs the room.”83  
As Ernest May observed, although the U.S. federal government and its 
military structures were among the “longer-lasting artifacts of the Cold War”, 
they were not preordained in a culture that had resisted permanent structures 
to organize the countryʼs relations with the world.84 Instead, the Defense 
Department was a product of necessity, born of battlefield imperatives during 
the war rather than from deliberate design. All previous and subsequent 
attempts to centralize and organize a standing military force faced in-built 
resistance as it raised the specter of a Prussian-style General Staff.85  
After the attack on Pearl Harbor and the United Statesʼ entry into the 
war, the Roosevelt administration recognized that existing structures were 
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inadequate for a world war and especially for joint operations with British 
Allies. As a result, in February 1942, “quickly and without great fanfare”, the 
existing, more loosely-organized Joint Boards between the Army and Navy 
were replaced with what would become known as the Joint Chiefs of Staff.86 
The latter mirrored the British armed forces as a way to streamline 
coordination of the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff that oversaw 
allied operations. To provide a counterpart to the British Royal Air Force 
(RAF), and in recognition of the growing role of air power in this new conflict, 
the Armyʼs Air Force was given co-equal status to the Army and Navy and 
eventually became a third, independent service.87  
The organizational changes to the services challenged the previous 
segregation of the Army and Navy which, on the basis of “elemental 
distinction” between land and sea, had jealously guarded their independence 
until that point, going so far as to produce separate war plans. Now, the war 
experience offered a case for the unification of the services. In spite of these 
operational realities, unification did not occur. The Navy, under the 
stewardship of James Forrestal attacked the plans. In addition to 
philosophical fears associated with a centralized, military command, the Navy 
felt that it had the most to lose with unification: it could lose its air power to the 
newly-created Air Force that seemed destined to play a leading role in the 
command of atomic weapons, and its Marine Corps could be subordinated to 
the Army to leave the Navy with a much-reduced role.88 By contrast, the Army 
welcomed and even encouraged the wholesale merger of the armed 
services.89 
In addition to debates on the merits of unification, the new national 
security infrastructure spawned a debate about the appropriate balance 
between respecting and protecting military expertise on the one hand, and 
ensuring civilian control on the other. Reflecting this climate, in 1957, Samuel 
                                                
86 At first, as agreed upon in January 1942, the organization was called the Organization of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS). Rearden, The Formative Years, pp. 17. 
87 Ibid., pp. 388. 
88 Ibid., pp. 314-16, 391. 
89 For an account of the unification debate, see: Stuart, Creating the National Security State, 
pp. 74-106. 
	   45 
Huntington produced his groundbreaking work on civil-military relations, The 
Soldier and the State.90 Huntington later described the book as an 
“unabashed defense of the professional military ethic and rejection of 
traditional liberalism [which] was in itself evidence of this intellectual debate.”91  
In the book, Huntington described how the increased complexity of 
warfare and technology in the nuclear age and the attendant need for 
specialized military expertise required “institutional autonomy”. Washingtonʼs 
civilian leaders should resist the temptation to civilianize the military or 
interfere with its conduct – what he termed “subjective control” – and instead 
encourage independent military professionalism, or “objective control”. For 
Huntington, the “requisite for military security [was] a shift in basic American 
values from liberalism to conservatism”, that society itself could be enriched 
by military values rather than vice-versa. Ultimately, Huntingtonʼs work was a 
product of and reaction to the debates of the times and was born of a 
concern, which was also distinctly American, that overbearing control of the 
military was a distinguishing characteristic of dictatorial regimes.92 
Huntington juxtaposed two types of actors – civilian and military – in a 
neat dichotomy around which the battle lines of civil-military relations would be 
drawn. Barring emblematic civil-military clashes such as the MacArthur 
controversy over the Truman administrationʼs policies in Korea, the situation 
in practice was more complicated. Also, Huntington assumed that military 
institutions were or could be apolitical, which ignored the fact that from the 
1940s onwards, military authorities had become political as they became 
more savvy at competing for resources and influence in Washington.93 
Instead of a battle between two sets of actors, the creation of the 
national security infrastructure had created tensions across several, 
interlocking axes, including between services themselves, between 
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coordinating bodies such as the NSC and the State Department, between the 
legislative and executive branches94, as well as between the JCS and the 
OSD. As the Defense Departmentʼs budget expanded, many were concerned 
about the growing focus of military power on the projection of U.S. power 
abroad and the OSDʼs growing prominence over the State Department. The 
relationship between the State and Defense Departments and between the 
Secretaries in defining national security strategy troubled each incumbent 
pair; more often than not the issues were resolved through personal rapport 
rather than any enduring bureaucratic solution.  
The JCS/OSD axis was equally salient because it hinged on who 
should be the leading military advisor to the President, the Commander-in-
Chief. For General Taylor, Eisenhowerʼs Army Chief and later Kennedyʼs 
Chairman of the JCS, the JCS should be a non-political body that could 
transcend agency needs and provide advice on the best way of fulfilling 
civilian-set objectives.95 At the same time, he agreed with two of McNamaraʼs 
civilian advisors who later suggested that “meaningful professional advice” 
from the JCS was “difficult” if not impossible because of the individual Chiefsʼ 
“channelized thinking”. As he noted, each Chief was still embedded in their 
service and as a result, the JCSʼs advice was “largely the product of 
bargaining” between the services.96  
The manner in which each President defined the JCSʼs role had a 
direct bearing on the type of Secretary of Defense he sought, namely in 
determining if the Secretaryʼs role should be a policy-making one or a 
managerial one primarily concerned with organizing the budgetary process.97 
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During these key decades, the OSD expanded its responsibilities along both 
lines, often to the detriment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  
 
Defense spending, in millions, as share of federal budget and Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP)98 
 
 
 
Defense spending (in 
millions) 
National Defense as % 
federal outlays 
National Defense as % 
GDP 
1940 1,660 17.5 1.7 
1941 6,435 47.1 5.6 
1942 25,658 73 17.8 
1943 66,699 84.9 37 
1944 79,143 86.7 37.8 
1945 82,681 89.5 37.5 
1946 42,681 77.2 19.2 
1947 12,808 37.1 5.5 
1948 9,105 30.6 3.5 
1949 13,150 33.9 4.8 
1950 13,724 32.2 5 
1951 23,566 51.8 7.4 
1952 46,089 68.1 13.2 
1953 52,802 69.4 14.2 
1954 49,266 69.5 13.1 
1955 42,729 62.4 10.8 
1956 42,523 60.2 10 
1957 45,430 59.3 10.1 
1958 46,815 56.8 10.2 
1959 49,015 53.2 10 
1960 48,130 52.2 9.3 
1961 49,601 50.8 9.4 
1962 52,345 49 9.2 
1963 53,400 48 8.9 
1964 54,757 46.2 8.5 
1965 50,620 42.8 7.4 
 
The Truman administration 
The first President to grapple with these bureaucratic and intellectual 
challenges was Harry S. Truman. Thrust into the role of President in the 
closing years of the war, he oversaw the defining moments of the Cold War. 
During the last months of the war, the Truman administration also faced the 
challenging task of demobilization. However, confronted with new threats and 
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international obligations, not least of which was the occupation of Germany 
and Japan, the United States retained a force that was four times that which 
had existed in 1939. This was the first time that the United States had a 
substantial military force in a time of peace. With it, came a five-fold increase 
in defense allocations from 1.8 billion in 1940 to 10 billion in 1948, 
representing 14% of the U.S. GDP by the end of the Truman administration.99 
Events including the Berlin airlift in Europe, McCarthyism at home and 
above all the Korean War, dashed Trumanʼs earlier hopes to reap a “peace 
dividend” or a major reduction in this new defense budget. Instead, the rivalry 
between the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the defining 
characteristic of international relations. Responding to new international 
realities and responsibilities, Truman presided over the expansion of the 
national security state. His four Secretaries of Defense - James Forrestal, 
Louis Johnson, George Marshall and Robert Lovett – each grappled with the 
Presidentʼs inclination to compromise among stakeholders, to “satisfice” in 
setting up often flawed national security structures and to give them 
contradictory objectives. In particular, President Truman urged each of his 
Secretaries of Defense to keep the military budget down even while he 
expanded the United Statesʼ worldwide commitments.100 
 
Landmark legislation 
The founding act for the Department of Defense, the “compromise National 
Security Act of 1947” as one scholar has called it, created most of the 
principal structures for national security decision-making without settling 
underlying issues that plagued inter-service relations and their relations with 
the civilian authorities.101 As Gaddis has critically noted, “preoccupied as they 
were with maintaining support for containment within the bureaucracy, the 
Congress, the informed public, and among allies overseas” the administration 
chose political expediency over efficiency: the “price of administrative 
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effectiveness can be strategic shortsightedness” and, in this instance in 
particular, “process triumphed over policy”, where policies and structures that 
were feasible were chosen over those that were desirable.102 Moreover, many 
of the structures and especially the OSD were structurally weak, with a 
notable gap between their formal authority, which was relatively broad, and 
their substantive authority. 
Principally for economic reasons, Truman was initially favorable to the 
wholesale merger of the services. However, faced with congressional 
resistance, he compromised and proposed a program of legislative reform 
whose "overall purpose was to erect an integrated structure to formulate 
national security policy at the uppermost level of government."103 The National 
Security Act created the NSC, which was designed to advise the President on 
national security issues and provide strategic direction as the countryʼs 
international obligations expanded. The NSCʼs Chairman was the President 
and its members included the Secretary of State as well as representatives of 
three new agencies: the National Security Resources Board (NSRB), the 
Secretary of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA, the 
successor agency to another World War II innovation the Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS), became the NSCʼs main source of intelligence although other 
intelligence agencies scattered across government, including in the military 
services, continued to operate in parallel. Crucially, each of the Service 
Secretaries was on the NSC. As a result, defense representatives held four of 
the seven seats on the NSC in its founding years.104 
 In addition, the National Security Act created the OSD to oversee the 
National Military Establishment (NME) later renamed the Department of 
Defense. The Secretary of Defense was designated as the Presidentʼs 
principal advisor on military affairs and, as such, provided “general direction” 
to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and of the new Air Force. However, in 
practice, his supervisory responsibilities were limited and, more often than 
not, undermined by the President himself. Furthermore, the Act created three 
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civilian “special assistants” to support the Secretary. These included a 
Comptroller who was responsible for harmonizing the service budgets into 
one annual military budget.105 In addition, the Secretary oversaw two new 
boards that concerned all military services: the Munitions Board and the 
Research & Development (R&D) Board. 
Despite these reforms, the Service Secretaries retained most of their 
power, notably by keeping a direct line of communication to both the President 
and the Bureau of Budget. The position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff was a shallow one even if his announced responsibility was ambitious. 
Officially, he was charged with providing strategic direction to the military 
forces, preparing plans, establishing unified commands and reviewing 
materiel and training requirements. In practice however, he had no power over 
the Service Chiefs and instead acted primarily as a liaison with the White 
House. General Eisenhower was appointed as the first Chairman on a 
temporary basis in November 1948 but since he continued in his capacity as 
President of Columbia University, he spent scarce time on his JCS duties. It 
was not until August 1950, with the appointment of General Omar Bradley, 
that the JCS even had an official Chairman. Moreover, from the start, the 
Chairman of the Joints of Chiefs and the individual Chiefs were in an unhappy 
tension with the Secretary of Defense: although they reported to the Secretary 
of Defense, they were also rival military advisors to the President, the NSC, 
State Department and Congress.  
As a result, In August 1949, the Act was amended to clarify the 
respective roles of the Secretary of Defense and the JCS. The powers of the 
Comptroller were reinforced with a view to creating a first unified budget in 
Fiscal Year (FY) 50. Although the amendments strengthened the Secretary of 
Defenseʼs position on the budget, they weakened him by limiting his role to 
that of “principal assistant to the President in all matters related to the 
Department of Defense” rather than to defense policy more generally.106 
Similarly, since the Service Secretaries no longer chaired in the NSC, they 
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were forced to consolidate their views through one representative, the 
Chairman of the JCS. In so doing, the latterʼs role was strengthened. 
In addition, in a move that would frustrate successive administrations, 
the amendments allowed members of the JCS who were designated as the 
“principal military advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense” to 
disagree with the administrationʼs policy and to raise their disagreements in 
Congress “on [their] own initiative, after first informing the Secretary of 
Defense.”107 The Chiefs independent advisory role to Congress, to the 
President but also to the NSC and the State Department, further politicized 
them and arguably paved the way for public spats with each administration, 
most notably over the Truman administrationʼs strategy in Korea which 
culminated in the MacArthur controversy.108  
 
Trumanʼs Secretaries of Defense 
The first Secretary of Defense, in office from September 1947 to March 1949, 
was former Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal. At the Navy, Forrestal had 
been a leading opponent of President Trumanʼs plans to support the 
unification of the services. In his first week on the job, he wrote in his diaries, 
“My chief misgivings about unification derived from my fear that there would 
be a tendency toward overconcentration and reliance on one man or one-
group direction. In other words, too much central control.”109 As a result of his 
“misgivings”, Forrestal was more responsible than most for the compromises 
that had resulted in the OSDʼs structural weaknesses. Yet despite a personal 
relationship that would continue to be ambivalent, Truman chose him to be the 
first Secretary of Defense. 
Forrestal was given a near impossible task riddled, as it was, with 
conflicting goals and stakeholders. Truman extended the United Statesʼ 
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responsibilities but imposed low force and budgetary ceilings on Forrestal, 
which he then had to communicate and enforce on the Chiefs. In an effort to 
assuage inter-service issues, the administration insisted on balanced forces 
or an equal distribution of resources across the three services. This was 
counter-productive and resulted in heated debates about strategy between the 
services. The perceived unfairness of balanced forces played a part in the 
bitter battle between the Navy and the Air Force about who should be the 
custodian of atomic weapons.110 
The Secretaryʼs lack of executive power over the Chiefs was almost 
immediately apparent: the Chiefs ignored his suggested national strategic 
concept that was designed to guide their military assessments as well as 
Trumanʼs budgetary ceiling.111 Instead, they presented him with separate 
positions and budgets and the Chairmen of the JCS, Eisenhower and then 
Bradley sidestepped their official responsibility for coordinating the Chiefsʼ 
views. Truman further undermined Forrestalʼs authority by regularly bypassing 
him and reaching out to the Chiefs and the Service Secretaries directly. 
Perhaps the only relationship that was comparatively smooth during 
Forrestalʼs tenure was with the State Department where he benefited from his 
friendships with Secretary of State George Marshall and his Undersecretary, 
Robert Lovett. Their relationships did much to smooth collaboration between 
the two departments. 
Eventually the stresses of the office began to take their toll on 
Forrestal. Faced with his inability to bring the NME under control, he began to 
retreat into a state of increased isolation and paranoia. By reaching out to 
Thomas Dewey, Trumanʼs opponent in the 1948 election, he effectively ended 
his career. Within three months of resigning from office, Forrestal committed 
suicide, throwing himself from the window of his hospital room at Bethesda 
Naval Hospital where he was recovering from “nervous exhaustion” that his 
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doctors and friends traced back to the unification debate and to “excessive 
work during the war and post-war years.”112 
 
James Forrestalʼs experience would continue to cast a long shadow over 
each of his successors and on McNamaraʼs colleagues specifically, many of 
whom had begun their careers in government under him. For some, the 
relationship with Forrestal was especially personal. Michael Forrestal at the 
NSC was James Forrestalʼs son and was unofficially adopted by one of his 
fatherʼs closest friends, Averell Harriman at the State Department. Townsend 
Hoopes, a Forrestal mentee and later McNamaraʼs Deputy for International 
Security Affairs, wrote a biography of Forrestal in which he described the 
latterʼs death as “towering loss” and a “profound personal tragedy.”113 
Kennedyʼs Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillonʼs father had chosen 
Forrestal to succeed him at the head of his investment bank Dillon, Read & 
Co. where Forrestal also worked with the younger Dillon and Paul Nitze. In 
later years, Forrestal offered Dillon his first job in government.  
However, it was the legacy of Forrestalʼs failure to mould already 
entrenched service interests, or what Samuel Huntington termed 
“Servicism”114, and other resistances that most haunted his successors. 
McNamara kept a photo of Forrestal in his office and was informed by his 
example throughout his tenure. In one telling exchange with President 
Johnson after several years in the job, the President complimented 
McNamaraʼs ability to maintain a stronger team than had existed in “Jim 
Forrestalʼs time.” McNamara responded that, “He wouldnʼt have killed himself 
thatʼs for sure.”115 McNamaraʼs tight control and high expectations of loyalty 
from his subordinates was primed by Forrestalʼs failures to do the same. 
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In a similar vein, during McNamaraʼs confirmation hearings as 
Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the SASC, Richard Russell wryly 
commented: “In the past, there have been partly humorous suggestions that 
being named Secretary of Defense merits condolences instead of 
congratulations; and, of course, it is true that any person who successfully 
discharges the duties of this position needs all the cardinal virtues, a double 
portion of fortitude, and some others.”116  
 
The experience of Louis Johnson, Forrestalʼs immediate successor who 
served from March 1949 to September 1950, was hardly more encouraging. A 
lawyer by training, Johnson had been Assistant Secretary for War from 1937 
to 1940 during which time he oversaw the wartime industrial mobilization. 
After the war, he had been a major fundraiser for Truman. Promising to “knock 
a few heads together”, Johnson announced that he would succeed where 
Forrestal had failed particularly in achieving greater unification and keeping 
the budget in line with, if not below, the Presidentʼs wishes.117 
However, in trying to make his reputation as a “great economizer”, 
Johnson also made enemies who would subsequently make him the 
scapegoat for the Truman administrationʼs humiliation at being caught off-
guard and unprepared at the outbreak of the Korean War. His choice to focus 
relatively more on strategic air power, which he saw as cost-effective 
investment in security, alienated the Navy who staged a major protest that 
became known as the “Revolt of the Admirals”. In general, his tendency to 
ignore the advice of military colleagues meant that they remembered him as 
“probably the worst Secretary of Defense.”118 His relationship with the State 
Department was no better: he feuded with his counterpart, Dean Acheson, 
who described him as “mentally ill”.119 At first, he was philosophical about the 
criticisms aimed at him: “A public official, of course, must expect a good deal 
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of criticism, particularly when he must take a stand on a controversial 
issue.”120Still, he was eventually dismissed. 
Johnsonʼs discharge came at a time when NSC68, with President 
Trumanʼs approval, began to gain momentum across government and in the 
midst of the Korean crisis. Both created pressures for increased military 
spending. In particular, NSC68, the joint State-Defense document that had 
been primarily drafted by Paul Nitze, now at the Policy Planning Staff in the 
State Department, called for a “substantial increase” in military forces and in 
the massive investments to match the growing Soviet threat.  
Within two months of taking office as the third Secretary of Defense, 
George Marshall, the Army war hero and retired Secretary of State, 
championed a changed defense posture. In a nod to his predecessor, he 
explained that: 
“Always there has been a drive to find scapegoats to shoulder the 
blame. The basic error, however, has always been with the American 
people themselves. The fault has been with their refusal to sanction an 
enduring posture of defense that would discourage aggression, and, if 
war came, would reduce the causalities, the sacrifices, the excessive 
costs and the needless waste.” 
Echoing an argument James Forrestal had made, he criticized the “emotional 
instability” of the American people and their legislators to push for massive 
demobilization (a “violent dip”) after the war despite being “in the midst of a 
dangerous world.”121 
When Marshall left, he insisted that his Deputy, Robert Lovett, succeed 
him as Secretary of Defense. A banker before the war, Lovett had directed the 
buildup of U.S. air power during the war as Assistant Secretary for Air in the 
War Department after which he had worked on the Marshall Plan. He shared 
Marshallʼs view about the American tendency to neglect defense, explaining 
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that “we seem to have had only two throttle positions in the past: wide open 
when we are at war and tight shut when there is no shooting.”122  
Lovett oversaw the Korean buildup and, more than any Secretary of 
Defense, played a central part in raising the United Statesʼ level of military 
readiness to respond to the Cold War and the growing potential of limited war. 
Echoing a rhetoric that would become commonplace and that would justify a 
growing defense budget throughout the Cold War, he explained: “We must 
make an effort to get the only insurance that works – strength. We tried peace 
through weakness for generations, and it didnʼt work.”123 At the same time, as 
a progressive Democrat who understood that defense drew on finite 
governmental resources that could be instead earmarked for domestic issues, 
he explained how a longer-term level of preparedness would be cheaper in 
the longer term: that “less money annually, but steadily, can accomplish much 
more than huge sums today and nothing tomorrow.”124 
Although his tenure was relatively smooth and free of controversy, 
Lovett closed the Truman administrationʼs chapter for defense policy by 
raising concerns about the organizational arrangements for defense, warning 
his successor that the 1949 Amendments had not solved inherent tensions 
between the Secretary of Defense and the JCS, and that the budgetary 
process was still not efficient and economical enough. 
 
The Eisenhower administration 
At this critical juncture in the history of the OSD, General Eisenhower was 
elected as President, an exceptional presidency in many respects especially 
for defense policy. In addition to promising a prompt end to the Korean War, 
Eisenhower campaigned on the pledge to restore fiscal responsibility to 
government. As one of the most decorated generals in U.S. history and as the 
first Chairman of the JCS, Eisenhower had a keen interest in defense policy. 
Although he had three Secretaries of Defense during his two terms, in reality, 
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Eisenhower was his own Secretary. Moreover, as someone who had 
commanded or served with many of his Chiefs and senior military officers, 
Eisenhower was a special President and could more easily overrule his 
military advisors, something he did repeatedly. 
 Moreover, having been consulted at various points in the Defense 
Departmentʼs nascent years, Eisenhower was quick to identify and act on its 
structural problems. He was predisposed to support greater unification 
because of his experience as Supreme Allied Commander in the war and at 
NATO, while his fiscal conservatism moved him to act on more efficient 
budgeting practices. As he explained to a friend shortly before his 
inauguration in 1953, Eisenhowerʼs attitude to defense and to security was 
grounded in this attitude to federal spending: “The financial solvency and 
economic soundness of the United States constitute the first requisite to 
collective security in the free world. That comes before all else.”125 In practice, 
although he set up a number of structures and reforms aimed at reducing 
expenditures, his budgets “were never as austere as he made out.”126 
 Still, in a spirit of managerial reform, in his first year in office, 
Eisenhower asked the banker David Rockefeller to chair the “Committee on 
Methods of Reorganizing the Executive Branch for the Federal Government” 
that also included Robert Lovett and General Bradley. Among its 
recommendations, many of which would inform the administrationʼs 
congressional moves, the Committee suggested centralizing authority at the 
OSD with respect to research, logistics and procurement decisions, and at the 
level of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  
Perhaps Eisenhowerʼs most important innovation was to strengthen the 
NSC as a way of enforcing his fiscal discipline and bringing defense 
expenditures down. The NSC was expanded to include the Secretary of the 
Treasury and the Bureau of Budget who participated in spelling out a Basic 
National Security Policy that was meant to inform the military departmentʼs 
                                                
125 Quoted in Melvyn P. Leffler, “Defense on a Diet: How Budget Crises Have Improved U.S. 
Strategy,” Foreign Affairs (November/December 2013). Retrieved online November 2, 2014: 
http://fam.ag/132TXkn 
126 Ibid. 
	   58 
budgets within an overall budget ceiling although Eisenhower tactfully called 
them “targets” instead.127 
 
Eisenhowerʼs Secretaries of Defense 
If Trumanʼs last Secretaries of Defense lamented the lack of investment in 
defense, Eisenhowerʼs first Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson, swung the 
pendulum decidedly in the other direction. Coming from General Motors, 
which he had led for over a decade, Wilson controversially quipped during his 
confirmation hearings that, “Whatʼs good for General Motors is good for the 
country.” In addition to being the largest U.S. corporation at the time, General 
Motors had been a major supplier of military equipment during the war. The 
comments exacerbated criticism leveled against the Eisenhower 
administration that it was dominated by out-of-touch businessmen, or as one 
critic put it, that it was an administration with “seventeen millionaires and one 
plumber” with Secretary Wilson as the “businessman ne plus ultra.”128 
 However, Wilson ruffled the most feathers in his search for savings. He 
drastically cut appropriations without consulting the Chiefs as he presumed 
they would continue to ask for much more than could be realistically 
appropriated. Within his first four months in office, he cut 40,000 civilian 
employees in the Department. In addition, he designed the administrationʼs 
new strategy, “the New Look” with the NSC and not with JCS. The New Look 
focused heavily on nuclear weapons and thus prima facie favored the Air 
Force. The Army, who had historically supported unification, now, under the 
stewardship of Chief of Staff Maxwell Taylor, decidedly turned against it in a 
confrontation that the New York Times dubbed the “revolt of the colonels”.129 
All in all, in his steadfastness to achieve savings and his inability to 
communicate constructively with the Chiefs, Wilsonʼs tenure was one 
characterized by acrimony. 
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In October 1957, the industrialist and former President of Proctor & 
Gamble, Neil McElroy replaced Wilson. During his two years in office, and 
under the impetus of Eisenhower, McElroy oversaw the most important 
legislative reform of defense organization since the war: the Department of 
Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. The Act gave President Eisenhower 
virtually all he had asked Congress for and laid the groundwork for 
McNamaraʼs changes to the Department. It placed defense policy and the 
budget especially in civilian hands in order to balance each of the servicesʼ 
needs while keeping in mind administration-wide fiscal priorities. As the Act 
read, it aimed “to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and 
procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government 
relating to the national security.” Reflecting the administrationʼs concern about 
the role of the defense budget in federal spending, it sought “to provide more 
effective, efficient, and economical administration in the Department of 
Defense.”130 
Overall, the Secretary of Defenseʼs power was substantially increased. 
The Act “provide[d] a Department of Defense, including the three military 
Departments of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the United 
States Marine Corps), and the Air Force under the direction, authority and 
control of the Secretary of Defense” and increased the staff at the OSD and 
the JCS. The Chairman of the JCS was given voting rights on the JCS, 
changing his role to one with clearer executive responsibility. The services 
themselves were changed from being separately administered to departments 
that were now separately organized but under the authority of the Secretary of 
Defense. In other words, the services now reported to the President through 
the Secretary of Defense. However, over McElroyʼs objections, the Act 
preserved the right of the Service Secretaries and Chiefs to make 
recommendations and express independent opinions to Congress, the 
“legislated insubordination” that had troubled him and every other Secretary 
before and after. 
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Finally, As Eisenhower had suggested, the Act “provide[d] for the 
unified strategic direction of the combatant forces, for their operation under 
unified command, and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, 
and air forces.” By setting up a new system of unified commands under the 
direction of the Secretary of Defense and the President, the Act cut the Chiefs 
authority across horizontal lines as well.131  
 
The first Secretary of Defense to benefit from these changes, although he did 
not act on them in any significant way, was Thomas Gates. A former banker 
and Secretary of the Navy, Gates had hoped to return to banking until the 
untimely death of Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald A. Oarles, who was on 
track to replace McElroy, forced him to change his plans. In many ways, 
Gatesʼ tenure was a care-taking one but one during which the tone was set for 
the arrival of McNamara. Gates passed the Defense Reorganization Act and 
turned attention to the growing salience of limited wars in the nuclear age. 
 Building on an intellectual and legislative context that was open to 
questioning the Defense Departmentʼs position and structures, Eisenhower 
took two final steps before leaving office. First, in 1960, he appointed New 
York Governor Nelson Rockefeller to review the organization for defense and 
to present his findings before the Jackson Sub Committee on National Policy 
Machinery. In his report, Rockefeller recommended greater centralization 
around the office of the President and presented an ideal Secretary of 
Defense as a “management specialist” who could faithfully implement 
Presidential directives through “active management”.132 The report also 
suggested one of the reforms that would make McNamara famous, namely 
that the defense budget should be organized according to themes and 
defense functions rather than by services.133 Second, Eisenhowerʼs departure 
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speech was decidedly pedagogical and warned Americans of the dangers that 
their new defense establishment could represent to the countryʼs economic 
health. He reminded the public that the “conjunction of an immense military 
establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience” 
and had been “compelled”, and he warned of the “potential for the disastrous 
rise” of “unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought by the military-
industrial complex” in “the councils of government.”134 The speech went on to 
expand on a related theme, namely the danger that federal spending could 
increase to a point that it would crowd out private entrepreneurial efforts in 
science or in any field. He explained that, “It is the role of statesmanship to 
mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other forces, new and old, within 
the principles of our democratic system – ever aiming towards the supreme 
goals of our free society.”135 
 
Senator Kennedy campaign and transition 
Eisenhowerʼs successor, John F. Kennedy had demonstrated a lively interest 
in defense policy during his campaign. He had set up a Special Committee 
during the transition to study “how to strengthen the Defense Department and 
make it more responsive to the needs of our time” and chose Senator Stuart 
Symington as Chairman. A one-time competitor for the Democratic 
nomination, Symington converged with Kennedy on the issue of a possible 
“missile gap” that Eisenhower had allowed to open by emphasizing fiscal 
prudence over military strength.136 Symington, who had been the first 
Secretary of the Air Force under Forrestal, turned to his old friends and 
associates from the Truman administration.137 The Committeeʼs final report 
reiterated many of the same positions that Symington had championed since 
his days at the Air Force. These included recommending the unification of the 
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services under a single chief of staff and the wholesale reorganization of the 
armed services into functional commands, for instance with one concerned 
solely with nuclear weapons and another with limited war. The report was 
greeted with predictable hostility in the services and much of the Congress, 
and was privately deemed “not feasible” by the incoming administration.138 
Publicly, Kennedyʼs reaction to the 5,000-page report was more diplomatic: he 
told the waiting press that it was “an interesting and constructive study which I 
know will be carefully analyzed by the Congress and the incoming 
Administration.”139 
Within the transition team, Richard Neustadt, the famed political 
scientist of presidential power, echoing the Army and Secretary Gatesʼ 
response to the Symington report, wrote to the incumbent President that he 
should focus on the “far-reaching potential”140 of Eisenhowerʼs legislative 
legacy. He wrote that “27 months after the passage of the 1958 Act”, the 
Defense Department was in a “transitional period” and explained to the 
President that “steps towards unification have been made necessary” by two 
imperatives: “One, to bring better business management to the massive 
operations of the Defense Department and thereby to effect efficiencies and 
prevent waste in the activities that have come to consume more than half the 
Federal expenditures and, two, to accommodate military strategy and 
operations to the technological revolution in warfare that has marked the past 
two decades.” The challenge for the administration was to organize the 
defense establishment in the “most economical and efficient manner possible 
[…] in a framework of responsible civilian control.”  
Although Neustadt favored making the most of the 1958 Act as a first 
step, he nevertheless proposed a number of bureaucratic steps and changes 
which went well beyond the Act as a sort of menu for the incoming 
administration. These steps included converting Secretaries of the military 
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departments into Undersecretaries of Defense or abolishing them altogether, 
and getting rid of the Chiefs dual responsibilities to their departments and the 
JCS. Neustadt also reiterated many of Symingtonʼs recommendations, 
including “restructuring the military departments into functional organizations”, 
creating a single chief of staff even while he accepted that “this is the most 
controversial step” and the wholesale merger of the services “the most 
controversial of all […] a most extreme degree of unification.” All in all, 
although Neustadt and his colleagues in the transition team accepted that the 
1958 Act had established a framework for reforming the Defense Department, 
they did not exclude further and more aggressive moves. 
As far as staffing arrangements at the OSD were concerned, Neustadt 
explained, “The main present need is not further legal structural changes but 
improvements in the programming, budgeting, another decision-making 
processes and in the staff arrangements to get on top of the remaining difficult 
problems.” The administration needed a first-class manager of people and 
processes. He suggested to the new President that key bureaucratic changes 
were needed at the OSD whose “central defect” was the “lack of civilian 
advisors.” A Secretary of Defense aided by civilian advisors should work 
towards a “fundamental overhaul of the Departmentʼs budgetary processes to 
achieve a sound management framework.”141 
Robert Lovett, who had served as Trumanʼs last Secretary of Defense 
and who was initially offered the job but declined suggesting Robert 
McNamara in his place, echoed Neustadtʼs views. Together with Charles 
Wilson, Eisenhowerʼs first Secretary of Defense, Lovett counseled the 
transition team and described the ideal candidate. He argued that the 
Pentagon needed an “analytical statistician who can tear out the overlap, the 
empire building.”142 He later explained his choice of Robert McNamara to fill 
these shoes by saying that there “very few people who were competent to 
deal with the basic problems in the Pentagon which was getting into the 
unnecessary duplication and the over-layering which had grown up under our 
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system of operation. I felt that there should be a really careful analysis of the 
Department and that statistics should be developed which might help in 
pointing a way to a solution.”143  
 Both Neustadt and Lovettʼs remarks illustrate how ill-defined the role of 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense was and just how much in “transition” it 
was when McNamara came to Washington. As one of McNamaraʼs 
predecessors, Lovett had first-hand experience of the problems that would 
confront the new Secretary. The administration needed a candidate with the 
managerial and budgetary vision to implement Eisenhowerʼs reforms and to 
deal with the inevitable and ongoing bureaucratic resistance. 
Neustadt and Lovett also implied that achieving “civilian control” would 
depend on appointing a manager who could be completely loyal to the 
President and who could, in turn, inspire the loyalty of his own advisers. 
Moreover, the transition team counseled that the ideal Secretary would come 
from the private sector, bringing managerial experience, but without appearing 
to be part of the military-industrial complex that Eisenhower had spoken 
about. The Kennedy campaign latched onto criticism of the Eisenhower team, 
and his Secretaries of Defense in particular, as being an administration 
dominated by business people. In later years, McNamara was explicitly 
compared to his predecessors in this respect: one wrote, “Mr. McNamara is 
not subject to the family, socialite and public-figure consciousness of Neil 
McElroy (Secretary from October 1957 to December 1959). Nor is he subject 
to the Ivy League inhibitions and investment-trust dignity of Thomas Gates 
(December 1959 to January 1961). Mr. McNamara simply isnʼt susceptible to 
any pressures – social, military, intellectually, or editorial.”144  
As the British Foreign Office observed at the time, appointments in the 
Kennedy administration put a greater “emphasis on a professional or 
professorial background” with “strikingly few connections with big 
business.”145 Although McNamara came from the Ford Motor Co., he also 
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captured the spirit and tone of the New Frontier and became one of its iconic 
figures. As David Halberstam described, “Bob McNamara was a remarkable 
man in a remarkable era.”146 
Much has been made of McNamaraʼs intellectual qualities, in particular 
of his quantitative logic and “cold rationality”. While his statistical skills made 
him stand out to people like Robert Lovett, for John Kenneth Galbraith and 
Adam Yarmolinsky (who with Kennedyʼs brother-in-law Sargent Shriver led 
the staffing task force of the transition team), it was McNamaraʼs sense of 
public service that distinguished him most.147 On paper, McNamaraʼs 
professional journey was one that fit the stereotype of the quantitative-minded 
manager. However, his CV belied a greater degree of intellectualism and 
interest in public service. As Halberstam put it, “challenges fascinated him, but 
not worldly goods or profit as ends in themselves.”148  
Born in San Francisco to a modest family, McNamara attended public 
schools and Berkeley, the state university, before going on to Harvard 
Business School (HBS) for his MBA. After spending a year at Price 
Waterhouse accounting firm, he returned to HBS where he taught a course on 
planning and control from August 1940 until January 1942. Newly-married, 
McNamara described living in Cambridge ”more happily than we had ever 
dreamed possible.”149  
He left Harvard on unpaid leave to join the war effort and apply some of 
the statistical skills from academia to public purposes. He worked for Robert 
Lovett, then Assistant Secretary of War for Air, in the Armyʼs Department of 
Statistical Control under Charles B. “Tex” Thornton reviewing the Army Air 
Forceʼs bombing campaign, and eventually served under General Curtis 
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LeMay in the Eight Air Force in England.150 McNamara and his team of “whiz 
kids” applied statistical methods to strategic bombing and, in so doing, 
improved both the efficiency and lethality of the air strikes.  
After the war, McNamara hoped to return to Harvard and to the 
intellectual excitement that he had enjoyed there. However, when he and his 
wife Margaret contracted polio, their “very, very expensive”151 medical bills 
forced him to choose a more profitable path. Although he was not particularly 
drawn to business - in fact his first response to Thorntonʼs suggestion to go 
into the corporate world was an “unequivocal no”152 - the “whiz kids” including 
McNamara brought their skills to the Ford Motor Company and overhauled the 
company in the ensuing decade. Building on his course at HBS, McNamara 
became Director of Planning at the company.  
However, at Ford, McNamara chose a lifestyle that was more 
academic than it was corporate: he described himself as “a motor company 
executive who seemed an oddball for Detroit.”153 Whether or not his 
intellectualism was “self-conscious”154, the McNamaras chose to live in the 
university town of Ann Arbor rather than Detroit and preferred local book clubs 
to golf clubs. In his job as well, McNamara did not fit the typical model of the 
corporate leader: he was instrumental in improving the carsʼ security record 
and in pushing social responsibility measures at time when they were rare, as 
well as in building up the Ford Foundation in its formative years.155 
On November 9, 1960, the day after the election, McNamara was 
promoted to become the first President of the Ford Motor Company that was 
not a member of the Ford family. As McNamara later explained, he “was one 
of the highest paid industrial executives in the world, not wealthy, but in a 
position to become so.”156 Although he declined the administrationʼs first offer 
to serve as Secretary of the Treasury, it was not long before he accepted to 
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serve as Secretary of Defense even while he admitted that he only “followed 
defense matters in a rather superficial way through the press.”157 Despite his 
“deep loyalty to [the Ford family] and to the Ford Motor Company”, McNamara 
explained, “I could not let their interests outweigh my obligation to serve the 
nation when called upon.”158 
 
McNamaraʼs conditions 
In addition to providing a platform for public service, the OSD provided an 
intellectual challenge. McNamara told a New York Times reporter how: “I think 
each large organization goes through a period of evaluation when the patterns 
of the future are formed, when the intellectual framework for decisions is 
established, when the administrative techniques are sharpened, when the 
organization structure takes shape, I believe that the Department of Defense 
is in such a period today.”159 After successive leadersʼ attempts at “trimming”, 
McNamara was determined to press on with bottom-up reform.  
  McNamara accepted Kennedyʼs offer on two conditions, both of which 
were largely met. First, that he “would have the authority to organize and staff 
the Defense Department with the most competent men [he] could find without 
regard to political affiliation or obligation.” Barring some Service Secretary 
positions, this condition was largely upheld. McNamaraʼs second condition 
spoke to the campaign and transition teamʼs intellectual approach to the 
Department. Although McNamara agreed with “the premise” of Symingtonʼs 
report, he “felt that it was extremely unlikely that the report, or any significant 
part of it, could be implemented politically.”160 As a result, he asked that 
“during at least the early part of my term (i.e., approximately the first year), I 
would not be obligated to undertake a major reorganization of the Defense 
Department of the type recommended in the Symington Report.” 
 A final and implied third condition was his “belief that the Secretary of 
Defense, in order to succeed, must have the closest possible, personal 
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working relationship with the President and must receive the Presidentʼs full 
backing and support so long as he is carrying out the policies of the 
President.”161 Just as his success at the Ford Foundation rested on his 
personal loyalty to the Ford family, his efforts to bring military bureaucracies 
and power under civilian and Presidential control was determined by his 
loyalty to Kennedy. 
 The congressional leaders who had pushed through the 1958 Act 
welcomed the arrival of a Secretary who was prepared to deliver on its 
promise. Richard Russell, the Chairman of the SASC, applauded McNamaraʼs 
efforts, saying: “It is gratifying to note that the Secretary is making use of the 
authority the Congress has vested in him to streamline the Defense 
Establishment as it has been the position of this committee that the Secretary 
of Defense needs no additional authority to accomplish desirable changes but 
need only exercise the authority given him by the Congress. It is hoped that 
such changes as have been made and other yet to be accomplished will go 
far to eliminate many of the examples of wasteful duplication and competition 
between the services which have all too frequently come to the attention of 
the committee.”162  
In a similar vein, his counterpart in the House, Carl Vinson added, 
“Heʼs a genius, the best whoʼs ever held the job.”163 While both Chairmen 
were Democrats, admittedly southern conservative Democrats, McNamara 
also provided a measure of protection from Republicans. McNamara, who had 
been a nominal Republican although he had voted for Kennedy, was widely 
appreciated by even the most conservative members of the committees, 
including Barry Goldwater. Republicans were generally satisfied with his skills 
as a manager and only later became frustrated when he cut into R&D projects 
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in their constituencies or in ways that they felt could undermined the U.S. 
position vis-à-vis the Soviets.164  
Looking back on his arrival at the OSD, McNamara remarked that the 
two most pressing needs that he confronted were to align policy and strategy 
to force structure and to integrate the different parts of the Department. He 
recognized that his predecessor, Thomas Gates, had been moving in that 
direction “but the linkage between foreign policy and the defense budget was 
totally lacking.”165 Instead of following the rather more political avenues 
suggested by Symington, McNamara followed Neustadtʼs suggestion in 
capitalizing on Eisenhowerʼs reforms and centralizing authority around his 
office, notably through the budgetary process, as “a substitute for unification 
of the services and the establishment of a single chief of staff.”166  
 
As this brief history of the OSD has shown, by the time McNamara entered 
the Pentagon, the nature of civil-military relations had evolved on two fronts. 
First, civilians had progressively implemented greater control over their 
military counterparts in designing policy and strategy. Through various 
permutations, the power relationship between the JCS and the Secretary of 
Defense had become clearer and leaned decisively in the OSDʼs favor. 
Second, the defense establishment and its budget had become a central part 
of the federal government. Yet, the debate about “how much is enough” raged 
on, especially in determining the exact process by which civilian objectives 
and service budgets could be reconciled.167  
McNamaraʼs revolution at the OSD in the 1960s intensified this process 
on both fronts. In the spring of 1962, McNamara proudly submitted his first 
budget for FY63, the first budget that demonstrated his transformation of the 
budgetary process and that showcased his “tearing into” the inefficiencies at 
the Department of Defense. He could proudly look forward to cost savings in 
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the coming years. At about the same time, the issue of Vietnam landed on his 
desk as President Kennedy leaned on his “dynamo” of a Secretary to bring 
order to another messy challenge for the administration.  
Too often, historians have evaluated McNamaraʼs contributions to 
Vietnam through diplomatic and military lenses and in binary terms, along 
neat dove-hawk lines that obscure an arguably more informative lens, namely 
how Vietnam might have been perceived from the vantage point of his office 
at a special time in its history. The bureaucratic influences on McNamara 
worked in contradictory and at times paradoxical ways. However, as this 
thesis shows, McNamara favored withdrawal and minimizing the U.S. 
commitment to South Vietnam because, not in spite of, being Secretary of 
Defense. By mapping how McNamara defined his job, as this thesis does 
throughout, his policy recommendations on Vietnam begin to make much 
more sense. 
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PART I: CIVILIAN CONTROL OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
POLICY-MAKING 
 
 
CHAPTER 1. CIVILIAN CONTROL OF POLICY 
Since the end of the Second World War, the balance between civilian and 
military voices in the formulation of national security policy had decisively 
leaned in favor of the OSD and its civilian authorities. In its early years, 
military voices dominated the NSC but with the Defense Reorganization Act of 
1958 and then McNamaraʼs tenure, these voices became increasingly 
removed from the process of setting national security strategy. McNamara 
also reduced his own office to one primarily concerned with managing 
defense agencies and aligning military tools and resources to the Presidentʼs 
overarching strategy.  
McNamara positioned the office as a pivot for foreign policy in a way 
that derived from his particular conception of his job as Secretary of Defense 
and of what he considered to be the appropriate nature of civil-military 
relations. For him, the Secretary of Defense served the President and the 
services were there to provide tools and not policy guidance, in the execution 
of foreign policy. To use Samuel Huntingtonʼs labels, McNamara favored 
“subjective control” in implementing processes and rules that were designed 
to reinforce civilian authority.  
McNamaraʼs changes within the Defense Department came at a time 
when President Kennedy dismantled the structures of the NSC that his 
predecessor had built up and relied on for foreign and defense policy. 
Together with McNamaraʼs personal influence on the President, these 
changes paved the way for the OSD to become ubiquitous on many foreign 
policy issues and eventually on Vietnam. Paradoxically, although McNamaraʼs 
reforms were designed to limit the role of the Defense Department in national 
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policy formulation, they instead resulted in his office becoming far more 
influential. 
As this part of the thesis explains, in some respects, McNamara was 
the victim of his own success. He was made responsible for implementing the 
administrationʼs counterinsurgency agenda in its first major test case, 
Vietnam. The administrationʼs interest in counterinsurgency provided the 
intellectual bedrock for the Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam (CPSVN). 
In keeping with McNamaraʼs notions of civilian control of policy-making, the 
plan was predicated on a strategy coming from civilian advisors primarily at 
the State Department and he limited his role to aligning military resources to 
best serve this strategy. He did not comment on the strategyʼs substance but 
focused instead on the organizational and military requirements required to 
meet its objectives. McNamaraʼs priorities for the Department of Defense, and 
how these dovetailed and complemented the chosen counterinsurgency 
strategy, are treated in Part II of the thesis. 
 
Implementing the Defense Reorganization Act 
McNamara came to office with a reform agenda essentially already laid out for 
him by his predecessor, Thomas Gates. Above all else, the Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1958 had been concerned with centralizing power over 
strategy and operations in the hands of the President and his civilian advisers. 
In time, each of the Actʼs objectives were, albeit imperfectly, implemented 
through what became McNamaraʼs landmark reforms. As the Act had 
anticipated, McNamara and his Deputy, Roswell Gilpatric, centralized 
authority in their hands in an unprecedented manner.  
The Act also called for “integrated policies and procedures” in national 
security policy. To achieve this objective, McNamara introduced Draft 
Presidential Memoranda (DPMs) that provided strategic guidance upon which 
force levels were planned for. Finally, it called economies and efficiency 
gains. Here, McNamara introduced Systems Analysis and the Planning, 
Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) that “rationalized” the budgetary 
process in a groundbreaking way. 
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 Each of McNamaraʼs reforms was concerned with aligning civilian and 
military objectives. Much like Eisenhower before him, McNamara believed that 
in order to achieve this alignment, the administration needed a guiding grand 
strategy and civilian “security intellectuals”. The latter could inform defense 
policy in a way that allowed the Secretary of Defense to “avoid becoming a 
captive of the Chiefs and the Joint Staff and the Generals” or what McNamara 
saw as their parochial bureaucratic interests.168 McNamara acknowledged 
that while Eisenhower and Secretary Gates had made some progress in 
producing an overarching strategy, they had failed to produce a detailed 
strategy that could usefully serve as a basis for defense planning and 
budgeting.169  
Informed by the Defense Reorganization Act, McNamara also felt that 
the President should have greater control over the formulation of national 
security policy to the detriment of military voices. Charles J. Hitch, 
McNamaraʼs Comptroller and a leading “security intellectual” in his 
Department, recalled that “Robert S. McNamara made it clear from the 
beginning that he intended to be the kind of Secretary that President 
Eisenhower had in mind in 1958.”170 McNamara explained what this “kind of 
Secretary” was: “I believed, for example, that there must be a definite 
integration of defense policies and programs with State Department policies. 
Military strategy must be a derivative of foreign policy. Force structure is a 
derivative of military strategy. Budgets are a derivative of force structures. So 
in a very real sense, a defense budget, in all of its detail, is a function of the 
foreign policy of the nation.” McNamara was to be the civilian manager who 
executed this neat alignment.171  
 McNamara moved to cut back the Chiefsʼ power in designing national 
security policy in part because he sought neat alignment with foreign policy 
objectives but also because both he, and arguably the Kennedy 
administration as a whole, lacked respect for the Chiefs who were deemed out 
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of step with their times. Many of the administrationʼs senior advisors had also 
served in some capacity during the war and according to the in-house 
historian Arthur Schlesinger, "The war experience helped give the New 
Frontier generation its casual and laconic tone, its grim, puncturing humor and 
its mistrust of evangelism."172  
Although McNamara had served under General Curtis LeMay in the 
U.S. strategic bombing campaign during the war, once he came to office and 
with the General now Chief of Staff of the Air Force, whatever respect he had 
had seemed to evaporate. The young Secretary felt that neither of his 
Generals “got it” and seemed especially irritated with his old boss who needed 
a hearing aid and did not reflect the tenor of the New Frontier either physically 
or intellectually.173 For his part, the President mirrored this chasm: he always 
referred to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lyman Lemnitzer as 
“General” a mark, as one colleague remembered, “that he didnʼt like him.”174 
From almost the start of the administration, the Chiefsʼ views were not 
given a central role nor were their intellectual contributions valued. McNamara 
remembered that, “It never bothered me that I overruled the majority of the 
Chiefs, or even occasionally the unanimous recommendations of the Chiefs. It 
didnʼt bother me in the slightest.”175 McNamaraʼs will to impose his authority 
and his condescending attitude towards military institutions and leaders drove 
this attitude. For instance, McNamara refused to speak at military colleges, 
telling his friends, “These are not worthy academic institutions, and I will not 
lend my presence to them.”176 
 
Authority and efficiency 
From an organizational point of view, McNamara became dominant in the 
administration and loomed large across the board on Kennedyʼs foreign policy 
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but especially on Vietnam for a number of reasons. First and foremost, he 
centralized authority around his office. Making good on Eisenhowerʼs reforms, 
the JCS now reported to him rather than directly to the President. In turn, this 
centralization of authority meant that McNamara could come to the President 
with one, clear position for his department. Given Kennedyʼs dismantling of 
the NSC structures with the result that decision-making in the administration 
was somewhat chaotic, this clarity gave him enormous power. Finally, his 
personality and bullishness, if not authoritarianism, coupled with his personal 
connection to Kennedy gave him an advantage over other actors involved in 
national security decision-making. 
 McNamaraʼs changes to the budgetary process that are treated in the 
second part of this thesis reflected a move to impose “subjective control” over 
the Chiefs. This ultimately strained relations with congressional leaders as 
well. One flash point in these deteriorating relations occurred during what 
came to be called the “muzzling hearings”. McNamaraʼs Special Assistant, 
Adam Yarmolinsky had asked that all public statements made by senior 
military officials be sent to his office for clearance in order to remove “color 
words”. As McNamara later explained, the administration was “annoyed” that 
military leaders “were exaggerating the [Communist] threat, treating it as 
monolithic” whereas the administration did not feel “it should be simplified to 
the extent of an ideology.” He also added, “I wasnʼt an expert of the Soviet 
Union but I did recognize that a degree of paranoia existed in certain parts of 
our Republic.”177  
The administrationʼs directive led to a furor in Congress, which accused 
the OSD of attempting to “muzzle” the military and insidiously suggested that 
Yarmolinsky was a Communist infiltrator.178 McNamara, defending his 
assistant, insisted to the Chairman of the SASC Richard Russell, that while 
the Chiefs had a right to share their frank opinions with Congress “as provided 
by the National Security Act”, it was the “long-standing policy of the 
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Department [that] military and civilian personnel of the Department should not 
volunteer pronouncements at variance with established policy.”179  
Although these issues, in retrospect, may seem minor or 
inconsequential, in 1962 they contributed greatly to the souring of relations 
between McNamara, the services and key members of Congress. Writing in 
1963, a columnist noted how quickly McNamara had fallen from grace. 
Formerly “the greatest thing to come off the Ford assembly line since the 
Model T”, he was now decried as a “dictator and a bum.”180 McNamara 
persevered despite the many headlines – “Kennedy Fights the Generals” read 
one, for instance – and in spite of a climate of mutual distrust if not hostility.181 
Outside of the OSD, Kennedy made a move that further undermined 
the authority of the Chiefs. After the debacle over the failed Bay of Pigs 
invasion, Kennedy commissioned Maxwell Taylor to produce a report to 
identify what had gone wrong. Taylor had an impressive background, notably 
as Superintendent of West Point and as Eisenhowerʼs Army Chief of Staff. 
During the Eisenhower years, he had openly criticized the New Look strategy 
and published two best sellers that had contributed to the intellectual 
foundations of flexible response. He was widely respected as a soldier-
scholar and became very close to both Kennedy brothers.182 In his final report 
on the Bay of Pigs, Taylor was especially scathing about the Chiefs. When, 
Kennedy subsequently kept him on as his personal Military Representative, 
the Chiefs quietly seethed. The position was unprecedented and effectively 
went even further in cutting the Chiefs off from the President.  
In 1962, Taylor was promoted to become the Chairman of the JCS. On 
one level, this meant that Kennedy and McNamara had an “agent” within the 
Chiefs. Taylor explained that he informed McNamara that he “would never 
take a black snake whip to try to drive unanimity between the Chiefs” but then 
that, “It was amazing how few splits we had. Why? Because they knew that I 
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was very close to McNamara, that I would never bring a paper that the 
Secretary wouldnʼt support. So I had a great advantage versus the Chiefs.”183 
However, Taylorʼs was perhaps also tactfully pushed out as he began to show 
his “limits”. In the months leading up this “promotion”, Taylor had repeatedly 
taken hawkish stances on a range of issues, notably in suggesting the 
introduction of troops to Vietnam, leading to suspicions that, in practice, he 
really was more of a “soldier” than a “scholar”.184 
 
Roswell Gilpatric and International Security Affairs 
Two offices within the Defense Department were especially concerned with 
strategy. These were the Deputy Secretary of Defenseʼs office whose 
incumbent, Roswell Gilpatric, McNamara described as his “alter-ego” and the 
Office of International Security Affairs (ISA). A lawyer by training and protégé 
of former Secretary of Defense Lovett, Gilpatric had a long career in and 
around the Defense Department, including as Undersecretary of the Air Force 
and as a member of the Symington Committee. As for ISA, it became a 
central unit for adapting defense policy to the administrationʼs new thinking: 
McNamara described it as “one of the two or three most significant posts in 
the department.”185  
ISA was set up in the fall of 1949 to help administer the Mutual 
Assistance Program. Although the military aid program remained one of its 
core functions, during the Eisenhower administration, in a reflection of the 
United Statesʼ growing international responsibilities, it grew and became 
known as the “little State Department” as it was the principal vehicle through 
which the Department coordinated its policies with other agencies concerned 
with foreign policy, principally the State Department.186 Among its new and 
more visible responsibilities, ISA also oversaw NATO affairs.  
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However, the office really came into its own with the Kennedy 
administrationʼs expanded interest in the developing world and with 
McNamaraʼs efforts at aligning defense tools to foreign policy. As one Foreign 
Office report at the time put it: it was “one of the main instruments through 
which Mr. McNamara has affected his considerable changes in the 
Pentagon.”187 For McNamara, the Secretary of Defense was “a servant of the 
foreign policy of the country, and therefore I conceived Dean Rusk as superior 
to me.”188 This hierarchy was reflected in the budgetary changes with 
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS): the President and 
Secretary of State established missions and objectives, military strategy 
derived from this, force structures derived from military strategy and budgets 
derived from force structures.189 By definition, this meant that McNamara 
needed a team within the OSD that could develop security policy 
independently from military advice. ISA fulfilled this function and became the 
key unit for the implementation of flexible response and for a very broad set of 
foreign policy challenges including Vietnam. 
At the same time, ISAʼs growing role in coordinating policy did not 
necessarily mean that it favored “defense answers” to problems or even that it 
played a greater part in designing policy. McNamara slammed, and eventually 
removed, the first head of ISA, Paul Nitze, largely because he tried to fill in the 
policy void left by Dean Rusk and because he had advocated more 
aggressive steps during the 1961 Berlin Crisis and again during the 1962 
Cuba Missile Crisis. When Nitze overstepped his officeʼs prerogatives, 
McNamara angrily told him “just keep your sticky fingers out of foreign 
policy.”190 For McNamara, the head of ISA needed to align with foreign policy 
objectives set out elsewhere, not set the policy himself. McNamara 
“handpicked” each of its incumbents who were all men he trusted. They 
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included William Bundy, Paul Warnke and John McNaughton who became 
one of McNamaraʼs closest friends and a notable “dove” on Vietnam. 
 
Centers of power in the administration 
Ultimately, the centralization of authority within the Defense Department had 
important repercussions for the role of the OSD in national security decision-
making and in the administration as a whole. McNamara ran a tight ship and 
had gathered an impressive group of experts, most of whom reflected the 
Kennedy administrationʼs ethos. They were “men in the same age bracket as 
the President”, “tough and highly-trained specialists”191 who were impatient 
and decisive. McNamara described them as the “finest group of associates of 
any Cabinet member, possibly ever.”192 Collectively, they guaranteed that the 
Defense Department maintained one stance on all the key issues, however 
forced the consensus might be.  
In the New York Times in 1964, McNamara explained how he 
managed the potentially unruly defense structure: “It goes without saying, 
perhaps, that once a decision has been made, we all must close ranks and 
support it.”193 However authoritarian the process might have been, it meant 
that McNamara could report to the President with one “defense” position that 
fit into the Presidentʼs worldview. In this, he had a marked advantage over the 
State Department led at the time by the much softer Dean Rusk.  
Kennedy may have deliberately chosen a weak Secretary of State 
hoping to carve out a central role for himself in the articulation of the 
administrationʼs foreign policy, much like Eisenhower had done with his 
Secretary of Defense. However, the result was that, unlike the Defense 
Department, faced with a more improvised national security decision-making 
style, many junior State Department officials reported directly to the President. 
Even while this improvised decision-making process guaranteed access for 
some State Department officials, more often than not, it ensured that the 
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Defense Department took responsibility for many issues “by default, because 
neither the State Department nor AID seemed to zero in on the problem.”194  
Kennedyʼs decision to replace existing NSC working groups that had 
dominated decision-making under the Eisenhower administration with ad hoc 
interdepartmental Task Forces designed to address crises, favored the 
Defense Department. Defense Department staff, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric 
and Paul Nitze, led the first two task forces on Laos and Cuba respectively.195  
Part of the problem was also that the State Department was historically 
a “talking department” as opposed to the Defense Department, which was an 
“operating department”.196 As Arthur Schlesinger wrote that: “Other 
departments provided quick answers to presidential questions and quick 
action on presidential orders. It was a constant puzzle to Kennedy that the 
State Department remained so formless and impenetrable.” The State 
Department seemed riddled with “intellectual exhaustion” and seemed always 
to fall short of Kennedyʼs ambition to have it act as an “agent of 
coordination.”197  
Moreover, the same junior State Department officials that benefited 
from direct access to President complained that because Rusk did not defend 
them or a “State” position in NSC meetings, McNamara inevitably 
overpowered them. One of the staff members observed: “So it went by, with 
Rusk not taking a strong stand and McNamara interrupting anybody less than 
the President and the Secretary of State so there wasnʼt much I could do.”198 
The implication is that the Defense Department loomed large on national 
security decisions by the sheer force of McNamaraʼs personality, which 
contrasted starkly with Secretary of State Dean Ruskʼs more reserved 
demeanor. Roger Hilsman of the State Department, who played an important 
role in the Vietnam decisions, sarcastically described one NSC meeting where 
the Director of the CIA, McCone “got two sentences out and McNamara 
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interrupted him because Man Namara had been in that part of the world only 
15 hours before he knew more than the CIA by a long shot.”199  
 
Personal relationships 
Kennedyʼs more informal arrangements also tended to favor personal rapport. 
Here too, McNamara was at an advantage. He enjoyed a special relationship 
with the President who often remarked that McNamara was his “most versatile 
member of Cabinet.”200 Listening to the Kennedy presidential tapes, 
McNamara is the only official who ever interrupted the President. According to 
Robert Kennedy, “it was a more formal relationship than some but President 
Kennedy liked and admired him more than anybody else in the Cabinet”201 
while Jacqueline Kennedy recalled that “the McNamaras” were the only 
couple, aside from “the Dillons” (Secretary of the Treasury Dillon) that the 
President interacted with socially and added that the President “loved and 
admired” him.202 
 Aside from personal amity, President Kennedy appreciated 
McNamaraʼs proven loyalty, a core value in choosing associates for both the 
Kennedys and McNamara. Kennedyʼs associates recall how McNamara 
fought through Kennedyʼs projects as if they were his own: “Heʼs got his 
marching order and he doesnʼt walk away because heʼs being beaten on the 
head. Iʼve never seen a man more willing to take so much abuse, sometimes 
for a position I know heʼs already taken the opposite position for. He continues 
to be loyal beyond his congressional testimony, even into his most private 
remarks.”203 McNamara, explaining how he defined his role, made clear that 
he found the “concept of higher loyalty […] heretic, the idea that thereʼs a duty 
to serve the nation above the duty to serve the President, and that youʼre 
                                                
199 Ibid.  
200 Theodore H. White, “Revolution in the Pentagon,” Look Magazine (April 23, 1963). 
201 Brock Brower, “Robert S. McNamara Interview,” Life Magazine (May 10, 1968). 
202 Caroline Kennedy and Michael Beschloss, Jacqueline Kennedy: Historic Conversations on 
Life With John F. Kennedy (New York, NY: Hyperion Audiobooks, 2011), part 2. 
203 Brock Brower, “Robert S. McNamara Interview,” Life Magazine (May 10, 1968). 
	   82 
justified in doing so, will destroy democracy if itʼs followed. You have to 
subordinate a part of yourself, a part of your views.”204 
The concept of loyalty was central to the way that Kennedy managed 
his administration and that McNamara managed the OSD. The most loyal 
members of Kennedyʼs administration, men such as McNamara, were 
rewarded with the power of proximity to the President in a sometimes 
unstructured decision-making process. Loyalty provided organizational 
coherence and order by guaranteeing a unity of purpose: subordinates 
applied the directives of their bosses. Recalling the atmosphere at the OSD, 
Daniel Ellsberg described a “feudal concept of loyalty to the king”, that loyalty 
was “the number one value.” As McNamaraʼs himself suggested, it was a 
particular kind of loyalty: to the boss rather than to the country.205 
Each of McNamaraʼs policy decisions, and particularly those on 
Vietnam, need to be understood in the context of his loyalty to the President 
and not to his office per se and with his definition of the job of Secretary of 
Defense in mind. McNamara came to the issue of Vietnam, as he did with all 
issues, with his biases and blind spots, and with his particular understanding 
of what the role of Secretary of Defense should be. He changed the Defense 
Department to match the foreign policy direction laid out by the White House 
and in keeping with this, moved towards capabilities for counterinsurgency 
that played a central role in Vietnam during the Kennedy years. 
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CHAPTER 2: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 
 
Coming off the back of an electoral campaign, each new administration tends 
to overplay its “break” with its predecessors and to emphasize the aspects 
that represent change rather than continuity. In few transitions was this truer 
than when Kennedy replaced Eisenhower: the New Frontier and its youthful 
President, the first one born in the 20th century, replacing the “old” generation 
with a new vision for the projection and use of American power in the Cold 
War.206 Theodore White captured the mood of expectation in describing “an 
impatient world wait[ing] for miracles” from the new President who “had been 
able to recognize and distinguish between those great faceless forces that 
were changing his country and the individuals who influenced those forces. 
For if it is true that history is moved on by remorseless forces greater than any 
man, it is nonetheless true that individual men by individual decision can 
channel, or deftly guide, those impersonal forces either for the good or to 
disastrous collision.” 
However, for all its promise of change, many of the ideas that Kennedy 
had articulated for foreign policy in an “impatient world” predated his arrival to 
the Oval Office. Just as the bureaucratic “revolutions” undertaken by 
McNamara at the OSD fell within a lineage of change, a gradual process of 
bureaucratic change that preceded his tenure, so too did many of the 
Kennedy administrationʼs foreign policy ideas.  
Notwithstanding a high degree of continuity and the fact that President 
Kennedyʼs views on national security and defense policy evolved in office, the 
new administration did have a number philosophical threads that underpinned 
its defense policy and differed in emphasis from his predecessor. First and 
foremost, Kennedy set about shifting away from a policy defined by nuclear 
forces and towards “flexible response”. This was aimed at applying a broader 
foreign policy view and deploying a number of tools, both military and non-
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military, to allow cross-government, coordinated interventions on a broader 
spectrum of international situations, especially in the developing world. The 
administration pledged to experiment with new ways of projecting U.S. power 
after decades during which the projection of U.S. power in the aftermath of the 
Second World War had become increasingly defined in military terms.  
 
Kennedyʼs inaugural address  
Too often, historians have focused on the can-do spirit of the inaugural 
address and ignored the fact that it ended on a measured note, a message to 
other countries that they had to make sacrifices and share the burdens of 
protecting their freedom. Contrary to popular belief, the speech was not 
“bellicose and filled with soaring hubris”207 and when President Kennedy said 
that “we shall pay any price, bear any burden […] in order to assure the 
survival and success of liberty”, the operative we was not just the American 
people but also the people of the world.208 Although he suggested a clear 
focus on providing aid to the developing world and to the “peoples in the huts 
and villages of half the globe”, Kennedy also alerted that the administration 
would “help them help themselves.” Furthermore, while he accepted the logic 
of nuclear deterrence and mutual assured destruction, Kennedy also warned 
that both the Soviet Union and the United States were “overburdened by the 
costs of modern weapons” and threatened by the danger that “science [might] 
engulf all humanity in planned or accidental self-destruction.”209  
Nevertheless, the address established a revised intellectual framework, 
new priorities for and a redefinition of international security. As a result, it 
spurred drastic changes at the OSD as it moved to align defense capabilities 
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to meet the new objectives. Where Vietnam was concerned, this included the 
Special Group on Counterinsurgency, ISA at the OSD and McNamaraʼs 
private office. Each played a pre-eminent role in the articulation of Vietnam 
policy and eventually in the withdrawal plans initiated in the spring of 1962. 
If Kennedy was keen for Allies to pick up a greater share of the costs 
associated with their defense, it was also because he had set in motion a shift 
away from nuclear power that, in the short term, was inevitably very 
expensive. Paradoxically, as McNamaraʼs special assistant Adam 
Yarmolinsky later explained, it was precisely because the budget was 
expanding for a time that the administration could push through its necessary 
reforms. Cutting force levels and the budget at the same time was infeasible – 
it “tend[ed] to freeze attitudes and to heighten-institutional jealousies” – even 
if, in the longer-term, a significant budget cut was “highly desirable”.210 
Strategically, two ideas inspired the shift away from Eisenhowerʼs 
national security policy that was centered on nuclear deterrence. First, 
although they were reticent to make these ideas public, Kennedy and several 
of his closest colleagues believed that nuclear weapons and their use were 
inherently immoral. Second, reflecting the mood of the times, they felt nuclear 
deterrence, and the Cold War competition more generally, had created 
conditions where lower-level conflict had become more likely. In response, 
defense policy was overhauled to respond to a broader set of contingencies 
and especially situations of low-level, guerrilla-type conflict in newly 
independent states where the Communist threat seemed on the rise, notably 
in Laos and Congo. The Defense Department played a key role in 
coordinating relevant tools across government for these types of conflicts, 
particularly with the administrationʼs aid program, and in strengthening its own 
capabilities, including by reinforcing the Armyʼs Special Forces. 
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Moving away from the New Look 
From the outset, the administration adopted a moralistic tone about nuclear 
weapons.211 In September 1961, building on the rhetoric of his inaugural 
address, Kennedy addressed the issue of nuclear disarmament at the UN 
General Assembly, saying that nuclear weapons threatened to turn the “planet 
into a flaming funeral pyre” and that “weapons of war must be abolished 
before they abolish us.”212 At other times, when addressing the issue, 
religious undertones pervaded the speeches. For instance, in his June 1963 
American University Commencement address, he argued for a relaxation of 
the arms race, saying, “For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link 
is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all 
cherish our childrenʼs futures. And we are all mortal.” Using quasi-biblical 
language, he implicitly confronted the reluctance of the JCS to begin 
disarmament talks213, by adding: “Surely this goal is sufficiently important to 
require our steady pursuit, yielding neither to the temptation to give up the 
whole effort nor the temptation to give up our insistence on vital and 
responsible safeguards.”214 Privately, Kennedy held even stronger 
reservations, questioning whether nuclear weapons could ever be useful, if 
they could ever achieve what were ultimately political objectives.215  
Similarly, in April 1963, Alain Enthoven, McNamaraʼs Deputy Secretary 
of Defense for Systems Analysis, a key figure in the formulation of nuclear 
policy, wrote an article in a Jesuit publication describing how the 
                                                
211 Eisenhower too had made similar speeches, see for instance: President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, “Atoms for Peace” (speech, United Nations General Assembly, December 8, 
1953). Retrieved online November 2, 2014, Atomic Archive: 
http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/Atomsforpeace.shtml 
212 President John F. Kennedy, “Address to U.N. General Assembly” (speech, United Nations 
General Assembly, September 25, 1961), Folder: 48, Box 35, POL, JFKL.  
213 The JCS principal opposition to the Test Ban Treaty, which banned tests in the 
atmosphere, in the water and in space, was that verification systems were inadequate to 
ensure the Soviets did not resume testing. In return, they asked for a number of “safeguards”, 
including maintaining the existing program on “standby” should the treaty fall apart. 
“Statement of the Position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Three-Environment Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty”, August, 12 1963. Retrieved online November 4, 2014, GWU Online: 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB94/tb64.pdf. 
214 John F. Kennedy, Commencement Address at American University, Washington D.C., 
June 10, 1963, Folder: 2, Box 45, POF JFKL. 
215 White House Tapes: President Kennedy and Taylor, December 5, 1962. Retrieved online 
November 2, 2014, MC website: http://whitehousetapes.net/clip/john-kennedy-maxwell-taylor-
jfk-and-nuclear-strategy. 
	   87 
administrationʼs shift in policy fit within the moral codes of the just war 
tradition. Enthoven wrote: “Now, much more than in the recent past, our use 
of force is being carefully proportioned to the objectives being sought, and the 
objectives are being carefully limited to those which at the same time are 
necessary for our security and which do not pose the kind of unlimited threat 
to our opponent in the Cold War that would drive them to unleash nuclear 
war.”216 In other words, by developing a force structure that would be more 
flexible, the administration was laying the groundwork for a more proportional 
and discriminate response to political crises than a posture that relied 
primarily on nuclear weapons allowed. 
McNamara echoed the Presidentʼs views in his own speeches, but in a 
way that also reflected the practical steps that his department had undertaken 
to loosen the United Statesʼ reliance on nuclear weapons and his concerns 
that Allies, especially France, were increasing the likelihood of nuclear 
escalation by seeking their independent nuclear force. McNamara made two 
particularly controversial and landmark speeches: one on May 5, 1962 to the 
NATO Ministerial Meeting in Athens and a distilled version of the same 
speech the following month in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Both speeches outlined 
the administrationʼs general approach to nuclear strategy but, whereas the 
former was classified and only for NATO Defense Ministers, the latter was a 
public address aimed at “talking to [unresponsive] NATO Allies through the 
press.”217  
 At Ann Arbor, McNamara said, "Surely an Alliance with the wealth, 
talent, and experience that we possess can find a better way than extreme 
reliance on nuclear weapons to meet our common threat.” At the same time, 
he reiterated the inaugural addressʼ ideas that the project of U.S. power had 
to rely on more than military power, let alone nuclear power: he suggested 
that, “military strength is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the 
achievement of our foreign policy goals” and added "military security provides 
a base on which we can build free world strength through the economic 
                                                
216 Alain C. Enthoven, “Reason, Morality and Defense Policy,” America (April 13, 1963), pp. 
494. 
217 Adam Yarmolinsky OH Interview No. 2 by Daniel Ellsberg, November 28, 1964, JFKL. 
	   88 
advances and political reforms which are the object of the President's 
programmes, like the Alliance for Progress and the trade expansion 
legislation."218 
Moreover, one of the main ideas in McNamaraʼs speeches and in 
Enthovenʼs article was that the United States had enough, even perhaps too 
many, nuclear weapons.219 Although the administration, and the JCS in 
particular, had many reservations about the viability of disarmament talks and 
the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, McNamara nevertheless argued that it was 
important “to lay groundwork” and that the administration could “never know 
[how useful these initial steps would be] in future.”220  
 Speeches by McNamara and his colleagues were drafted in a way that 
reflected the delicate nature of the changes within the Defense Department 
and with an eye towards their inevitable international impact. According to his 
main speechwriter, “we began each talk of this kind by pointing out our 
enormous superiority” before moving on to potentially controversial policy 
changes.221 The primary purpose was not to reassure Allies but the Chiefs. 
The administration was declaring that in spite of the shift in policy, it would not 
cut their nuclear arsenal drastically. McNamaraʼs special assistant 
Yarmolinsky recalled that the Chiefs had framed “the terms of the debate” in 
such a way that such cuts were impossible.222  
Overall, as they did with many of McNamaraʼs reforms, the Chiefs 
lodged wholesale resistance to almost every aspect of the reforms to nuclear 
                                                
218 Robert S. McNamara, “Address at Michigan University” (speech, Ann Arbor, MI, June 18, 
1962), PREM 11/3709, National Archives, Kew. 
219 Although Kennedyʼs campaign alleged that Eisenhower had allowed a “missile gap” to 
widen between the United States and the Soviet Union, soon after coming to office, Gilpatric 
inadvertently made a public statement to the effect that there was none. The upheaval around 
his passing comment led to a Defense Department appraisal of relevant capabilities that 
essentially concluded that there never had been a gap and in the longer-term, to the creation 
of a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) that was designed to cross-check and centralize the 
services intelligence efforts since the services were the only bodies who held on to the belief 
a missile gap. “The Missile Gap Controversy”, McNamara to President Kennedy, March 3, 
1963, Folder: Statement file, Box I:100, RSM Papers, LoC. For his part, according to Maxwell 
Taylor, Kennedy never believed that there had been a missile gap.  Maxwell Taylor OH 
Interview No. 1 by Elspeth Rostow, April 12, 1964, JFKL. 
220 “Record of a Meeting Held At the White House", April 28, 1962, PREM 11/3648, National 
Archives, Kew. 
221 Adam Yarmolinsky OH Interview No. 2 by Daniel Ellsberg, November 28, 1964, JFKL.  
222 Ibid. 
	   89 
strategy. They resisted disarmament talks and the test ban treaty on the basis 
that they lacked adequate verification systems. More alarmingly, they refused 
to share their main nuclear contingency plan, the so-called Single Integrated 
Operational Plan, or SIOP 63, with Defense Department staff and even with 
the President himself, offering only to brief National Security Advisor 
McGeorge Bundy on its contents.223 They resisted Defense Department 
efforts to integrate flexible response thinking into their planning.224 Even 
Maxwell Taylor, one of the main thinkers behind flexible response225, resisted 
reform once he became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in October 1962. 
In a taped conversation with President Kennedy in December 1962, he stated, 
“As you know, in the past Iʼve always said, we probably have too much […] 
But sir, I would recommend staying with the program essentially as it is.”226 
 
Responding to “national wars of liberation” 
In their speeches, both President Eisenhower and Kennedy had expressed 
revulsion at the prospect of nuclear war. However, for Kennedy, this required 
reshaping defense policy and its tools so that the United States could respond 
to conflicts across the spectrum of violence from the lowest level to nuclear 
war. The idea that the United States should be prepared for lower level 
conflict, especially in the developed world, had intellectual precedents not 
least in the Eisenhower administration itself.227 Maxwell Taylor, who had been 
Eisenhowerʼs Chief of Staff of the Army, had fallen out with the administration 
over the New Look strategy and provided much of the intellectual foundation 
for flexible response in his book The Uncertain Trumpet.228 Within the 
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Eisenhower administration, others such as Undersecretary of State for 
Economic Affairs C. Douglas Dillon (later Kennedyʼs Secretary of the 
Treasury) recalled that, in the last two or three years of the administration, he 
and his State Department colleagues were “pushing hard” for limited war 
capabilities. However, he also accepted that an important shift occurred with 
Kennedyʼs election where his “minority view” now took center stage as the 
President himself adopted it.229 
The Kennedy administration was predisposed to take the contingency 
of U.S. involvement in lower level conflicts seriously but this gained a sense of 
urgency in January 1961. At that time, Chairman Khrushchev made his 
landmark “national wars of liberation” speech in which he predicted that local 
insurgencies in the developing world were more likely in a thermonuclear 
world and where he stated that Marxists had “a most positive” attitude towards 
“such uprisings.”230 Khrushchevʼs speech made a deep impression on the 
Kennedy administration: one joint State-Defense from December 1961, noted 
that the administration recognized “changing political conditions around the 
world, shifts in the nature and probability of threats” and especially the 
“likelihood of indirect aggression seems much greater during the 1960s than 
that overt local aggression.”231  
McNamara, in an address to the National Bar Association in February 
1962, described Khrushchevʼs speech as possibly “the most important 
statement made by a world leader in the decade of the 60ʼs.” In a lengthy 
analysis of Khrushchevʼs words, he explained: “What Chairman Khrushchev 
describes as wars of liberation and popular uprisings, I prefer to describe as 
subversion and covert aggression. We have learned to recognize the pattern 
of this attack. It feeds on conditions of poverty and unequal opportunity, and it 
distorts the legitimate aspirations of people just beginning to realize the reach 
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of the human potential. It is particularly dangerous to those nations that have 
not yet formulated the essential consensus of values, which a free society 
requires for survival.”232 
In responding to this threat, Kennedy argued that the United Statesʼ 
image abroad needed an overhaul and recommended a full set of strategies 
ranging from appropriate military interventions to well-designed aid and 
development efforts.233 To this end, delivering on a campaign promise, in 
March 1961 he established the Peace Corps under the leadership of his 
brother-in-law Sargent Shriver and, in October 1961 under David Bell, “one of 
his closest associates”234, the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) was established. Responding also to congressional 
criticism, USAID consolidated existing and scattered aid programs to 
encourage a longer-term and more strategic approach to existing aid efforts. 
The changes behind the creation of USAID also embodied the 
administrationʼs belief that “foreign aid [was] a relatively cheap way of 
preventing Communist encroachment.”235 
In keeping with these changes, before Congress McNamara argued 
that “a dollar of economic aid is as important as a dollar of military aid”236 and 
behind the scenes, he coordinated the Defense Departmentʼs overseas 
programs closely with USAID, notably in Vietnam, where their budgets were 
practically fused. Paradoxically, McNamaraʼs ability to think of his office within 
the larger scope of government rather than downwards to the military services 
and other bureaucratic interests meant that he weighed heavily on a number 
of relevant government-wide structures. 
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The Special Group on Counterinsurgency 
At the time, one of the most important cross-government office for the 
administrationʼs stated willingness to respond to “wars of national liberation” 
was the Special Group (CI). According to National Security Action 
Memorandum (NSAM) 124, which set up the Special Group in January 1962, 
its purpose was: “to ensure proper recognition throughout the U.S. 
government that subversive insurgency (“war of national liberation”) is a form 
of politico-military conflict equal in importance to conventional warfare” and to 
insure the “adequacy of resources” and “interdepartmental programs” to 
“prevent and defeat subversive insurgency.”237 
To this end, the group included a number of military, OSD, NSC and 
State Department representatives, the Director of the CIA and the Director of 
AID.238 Maxwell Taylor, first as the Presidentʼs Military Representative and 
then as Chairman of the JCS, together with Attorney General Robert 
Kennedy, headed the group. Although, from a bureaucratic perspective, the 
Attorney General was an unusual choice for this role, his selection was 
designed to send a strong signal that the President was the “driving force 
behind this effort.”239 Roswell Gilpatric, who usually represented the Defense 
Department on the Special Group (as it was not McNamaraʼs “dish of tea”) 
remembered that, “You know, [Kennedy had] read some Marine magazine 
about Green Beret type of activity, and he felt that when you got away from 
strictly conventional military or intelligence of State Department activities, 
there wasnʼt any well-coordinated, cohesive direction. And thatʼs when, I think 
he told his brother he wanted to get him into this thing.”240 
At any one time, the Group oversaw efforts in a dozen or so countries 
spread across Latin America, the Middle East, Africa and Asia.241 Asia had 
always been its first focus: Thailand, Laos and Vietnam had been founding 
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countries in its portfolio although Latin America superseded them by 1963.242 
For each of these countries, the Group prepared quarterly Internal Defense 
Plans: the plans were a kind of progress report on each countryʼs efforts to 
suppress domestic insurgencies or unrest. The group reviewed and assessed 
the work of relevant U.S. agenciesʼ work in each of the countries, usually AID, 
United States Information Agency (USIA) and civic action programs, which 
included efforts at building up local military and policing capabilities. Although 
the most visible aspects of the groupʼs work were on military and paramilitary 
capabilities, its focus was primarily on civic action programs. Civic action was 
a murkier aspect of U.S. foreign policy and had been “regarded as 
marginal”243 within government before the Kennedy administration. It involved 
projects on the boundaries of the different agencies. 
 The Special Group was particularly active throughout 1962 but by 
January 1963, after Taylorʼs move to the JCS,244 it seemed to fall into disuse, 
much to the chagrin of Robert Kennedy who complained that “there are a lot 
of things that could be done under the proper auspices” whereas “our present 
CI operation is most unsatisfactory.”245 His colleagues were even more 
pointed in their criticism and bemoaned that the State Department could not 
pick up Taylorʼs role. One wrote: “I assume that the Department of State is still 
not ready (I am not prepared to say unable) to assume this leadership role.”246  
Robert Komer, the NSCʼs representative to the Group247, was slightly 
more positive in his assessment and felt it “performed a real service in 
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pushing, needling, prodding and coordinating” counterinsurgency efforts 
across the administration.248 Yet by July 1962, he too became frustrated at 
the State Departmentʼs lack of leadership: “A case could be made that [the 
Special Group] has already performed its main service, i.e. to get the town 
moving on CI in the way JFK wants. But I fear that if we scratch the Group 
now everything will sink back into the usual bureaucratic rut. State, which 
should be monitoring the CI show, is simply not set up to do it.”249 
 
Counterinsurgency at the Defense Department 
The Kennedy administrationʼs counterinsurgency agenda had important 
budgetary and bureaucratic repercussions for the Defense Department and 
aggravated its strained relationship with the services. Marine Corps General 
Victor Krulak had the frustrating task of overseeing the servicesʼ progress on 
building counterinsurgency expertise and capabilities and in adjusting their 
doctrines. They reported to Krulak who was based out of the JCS Staff and 
he, in turn, reported to McNamara and occasionally to the President directly. 
He also participated in the Special Group CI, sometimes also sitting in for 
General Taylor or Gilpatric. Later he recalled that most of the time, despite 
impressive statistics and a service-wide Joint Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 
progress was “more volume than value” and “mostly they werenʼt doing 
much.”250 The services resented yet another OSD-led reform agenda yet were 
compelled to go along given the administrationʼs public commitment to 
counterinsurgency.  
Most senior military officials dismissed these efforts as “faddishness” 
and felt that they were more than prepared to respond to any contingency.251 
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In part, as far as the Navy and Air Force were concerned, resistance was also 
rooted in suspicions that the administrationʼs interest in counterinsurgency 
was essentially designed to strengthen the Army, who itself had initially 
resisted involvement in counterinsurgency operations.252 If Eisenhowerʼs New 
Look had favored the Air Force and to a lesser extent the Navy budget, it was 
clear that flexible response favored the Army. Both services regularly 
bemoaned the “Army bias” of the administration, particularly since the arrival 
of Maxwell Taylor, and were puzzled by the administrationʼs fascination with 
the Special Forces.  
In many ways, this early period of the Kennedy administrationʼs 
involvement in Vietnam was a “coming of age” period for the Special Forces. 
Although, the Special Forces had been activated in 1952 at Fort Bragg in 
North Carolina, they were largely dismissed as an esoteric bunch until 
Kennedy came to power. Their numbers almost tripled, from 1,810 in 1961 to 
4,714 in 1963253, and the administrationʼs first budget specifically foresaw “a 
substantial contribution in the form of forces trained” for guerilla warfare.254  
In addition, the administration maintained a high level of publicity 
around the Special Forces. Joe Alsop, an administration insider, writing just 
weeks after Kennedyʼs inauguration, described an NSC meeting where 
Kennedy praised the Special Forces as “equal to the nuclear deterrent.”255 
Both Kennedy brothers went out of their way to raise the profile of the Special 
Forces: President Kennedy decreed that they be given their iconic green 
berets as a “symbol of excellence, a badge of courage, a mark of 
distinction”256 and Robert Kennedy famously kept a green beret on his desk. 
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 In his address to the National Bar Association in February 1962, 
McNamara singled out the Special Forces, though not by name, as a key tool 
to deal with “wars of national liberation”, which he described as “often not 
wars at all.” He warned that dealing with these types of situations “requires 
some shift in our military thinking” and that the Defense Department was 
“used to developing big weapons and large forces” whereas it now needed to 
train “fighters who can, in turn, teach the people of free nations to fight for 
their freedom.”257  
In a speech delivered at the Special Forces training school in Fort 
Bragg that was initially intended for McNamara, his assistant Yarmolinsky 
explained how the Special Forces fit into flexible response and the need to 
have forces “across the full spectrum” of conflicts. He explained their special 
value in the face of guerrilla warfare and subversion where they had “taken on 
an importance that was virtually undreamed of only a decade ago.” 
Significantly, one line was removed from his speech at the last minute that 
might have had special resonance with Vietnam: “We have no desire to, and 
few countries would want us to, send large scale American troops to their 
nations to deal with problems of terrorism and subversion and guerrilla 
warfare. Nothing could be more inappropriate.”258 
Also, in private, Yarmolinsky, who as a leading member of Kennedyʼs 
presidential campaign had been instrumental in creating the idea of the “New 
Frontier” went further and explained how “these people are properly New 
Frontiersmen as much as any Peace Corps volunteer of AID mission member. 
In a world where force is still necessary, they can make the necessary use of 
force both understand and justifiable to the uncommitted people of the 
world.”259 Thomas Hughes, who became Director of the State Departmentʼs 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) in 1963 and worked closely on 
Vietnam, also saw the Special Forces as a preeminent symbol of the New 
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Frontier and Vietnam as their first project: “A new breed of Americans, right 
out of Kennedy's inaugural address, was being tested in Vietnam.”260 
 
From a bureaucratic perspective, the Special Forces also fit tidily into the 
types of cross-government work that the administration wanted to experiment 
with and from an economic perspective, with a more cost-efficient strategy 
whereby the United States could rely on airlift capabilities and rapid reaction 
forces instead of forward positioning to deal with crisis situations across the 
world. Yarmolinsky explained how “not numbers but quality” mattered most 
and that the Special Forces showed how a “relatively small body of superbly 
capable and superbly trained men can provide, and I am sure will provide, an 
enormous contribution.”261 In addition, capabilities such as the Special Forces 
held a distinct appeal because they were so adaptable, had a much lighter 
logistic and support base and because the Defense Department did not have 
to finance them entirely. 
The Special Forces in Vietnam represented the type of bureaucratic 
innovations that the Kennedy administration sought through its Special Group 
(CI). The Special Forces were deployed under CIA command and ran projects 
in remote villages where ethnic minorities lived, notably the Montagnard 
communities. The latter were discriminated against in Vietnamese society and 
were therefore reluctant to embrace either the Diem regime in Saigon or the 
North Vietnamese communists. Working with other agencies in Vietnam, the 
Special Forcesʼ work combined seemingly anodyne activities such as running 
clinics and offering job training with psychological and propaganda operations 
as well as programs to arm and train local militias. As one CIA history 
explained “they were more than soldiers; they were, in a way, community 
developers in uniform.”262 From a bureaucratic perspective, the most 
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interesting aspect of these activities is that the executive authority over the 
Special Forces and civic action programs was not with the Army but with the 
CIA, in coordination with the ubiquitous ISA.263
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CHAPTER 3: TAKING CHARGE OF VIETNAM POLICY 
 
Vietnam seemed a perfect place for the Kennedy administration to “take a 
stand” and test out its abilities to wage limited wars in the developing world. 
As General Taylor enthusiastically wrote, “A victory for us would prove that 
our people can live in the village with Asians and help them. That 
underdeveloped nations can defeat “wars of liberation” with our help, strike a 
telling blow to the mystique of the “wave of the future.””264 Many historians 
remember the Kennedy administrationʼs involvement in Vietnam against this 
militant and hopeful backdrop. They have depicted a linear and uninterrupted 
upward trajectory toward a deepening United Statesʼ commitment and 
increasing number of troops that culminated in the full-scale “American War” 
in Vietnam. However, the trends in increasing troop numbers belie the fact 
that a period of planning for withdrawal in 1962-1963 punctuated this 
otherwise steady trajectory and that McNamara was the leading force behind 
those plans. 
In the spring of 1962, after months of disorder in the field and in 
Washington, the Defense Department “zeroed in” on Vietnam policy as it had 
already done on many of the administrationʼs most complex problems. 
Although this initially seemed to presage a deeper and more militarized 
presence in Vietnam, the administration instead turned to a policy of 
disengagement. In July 1962, McNamara formally instructed the JCS to draft 
what became known as the CPSVN, which posited as its goal a relatively swift 
U.S. withdrawal by 1965. As the CPSVN emerged as the most effective tool 
for a general “winding down”265 of the in-country presence and became 
embedded in the OSDʼs budgetary calendar, it created a momentum and 
imperatives of its own.  
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In some ways, the story of the withdrawal plans begins where it ends, 
namely in the October 1963 meetings when, following General Maxwell D. 
Taylor and McNamaraʼs trip to Vietnam, a series of NSC meetings produced a 
public and administration-wide policy of disengagement from Vietnam. The 
transcripts of the October NSC meetings reveal the motivations of the various 
decision-makers. Together with McNamaraʼs trip notes, the transcripts also 
shed particular light on his role in pushing for withdrawal. They are the focal 
point for much of the following chapters. 
McNamaraʼs understanding of where the Defense Department stood in 
relation to other agencies in government – namely as an implementing rather 
than a policy-setting office – together with his own short-term bureaucratic 
priorities, explain his support for withdrawal. His approach was more 
mechanistic than visionary: he implemented rather than articulated strategy 
and was more concerned with the economic and budgetary issues treated in 
the second part of this thesis than any grand strategy per se. Yet historians 
have largely ignored the period perhaps because its existence fits poorly with 
the conventional view of McNamara as one of the most prominent and 
explicitly hawkish architects of the war. 
Roger Hilsman, a former colleague and main strategist for Vietnam in 
the State Department, perhaps overstated McNamaraʼs intelligence, but not 
his forcefulness in describing how McNamara had the “imagination to push 
views even farther down the line of their logical development, and […] the will 
for strong leadership.”266 In the months leading up to McNamaraʼs instructions 
to the JCS to draft the withdrawal plans, he received a number of overlapping 
views on Vietnam from Kennedy and his counterinsurgency advisors. 
Specifically, the advisors felt that U.S. policy in Vietnam had become 
excessively reliant on military force. 
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President Kennedy or McNamaraʼs withdrawal plans? 
Historians have long debated “Kennedyʼs withdrawal plans”; when they accept 
that these plans were more than contingency plans or a public relations stunt, 
they tend to assume the plans flowed from President Kennedyʼs vision. John 
Newman, for instance, has written about secret understandings and meetings 
where President Kennedy instructed McNamara to begin plans to withdraw 
after he realized that military advisors in the field had deceived him.267 
However, when asked about this, McNamara said he had “absolutely no 
recollection of any such conversation” and insisted that he initiated the 
planning rather than the President.268 Ultimately, the decisions to move 
towards a policy of disengagement on Vietnam were largely above board and 
fit neatly with McNamaraʼs own bureaucratic priorities at the OSD. 
Also, just as the war itself later came to be known as “McNamaraʼs 
war”, the withdrawal plans were also closely associated with McNamara. In 
Washington, in 1963, they were known as “his” plans. Furthermore, just as 
President Johnson played a key role in the branding of the war as 
“McNamaraʼs”, and to some extent hide behind his Secretary of Defense, 
Kennedy too let McNamara become the public face for plans with which he 
was at least complicit.  
During the crucial October 2-3 1963 meetings where McNamara and 
Taylorʼs report from Vietnam was discussed and after which his 
disengagement plans were publicized and agreed upon as administration 
policy, President Kennedy asked McNamara a number of probing questions 
as if he was discovering the material for the first time. However, they had met 
alone for two hours on the morning of October 2, 1963 upon McNamaraʼs 
return from Vietnam to review the draft report.269 After meeting with the 
President, McNamara had spent about two hours with William Bundy, 
finalizing the report in time for the NSC meeting in the late afternoon. Given 
the importance of “loyalty” in McNamaraʼs understanding of his job, he would 
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most likely not have supported such a high-profile policy if it did not have 
Presidential approval. 
Also, and here historians with a more suspicious bent have found 
fodder for their arguments, it was not unlike McNamara to change the policy 
he defended after meeting with the President, arguing the exact opposite of 
what he privately or at least initially supported. McNamara might have shifted 
from being relatively aggressive on Vietnam to being the leading advocate for 
disengagement because he wanted to loyally represent the Presidentʼs secret 
views. However, his own priorities at the OSD and the fact that, until 1962, he 
and many in the administration had not really given Vietnam full attention, also 
explain his change. 
 
The United Statesʼ commitment to Vietnam  
Although Kennedy had created a Task Force on Vietnam in his first month in 
office270, the administration only really turned its attention there in the spring 
of 1961. Before then, the administrationʼs main focus in Southeast Asia had 
been Laos, a candidate for military intervention until Kennedy settled on 
negotiations and eventually neutralization. However, both Kennedy and 
McNamara rejected the idea forcefully put forward by French President 
Charles de Gaulle and later by Senator Mike Mansfield, that Vietnam should 
be neutralized as well.  
With Vietnam coming to the fore, in May 1961, Kennedy dispatched his 
Vice President to reassure South Vietnamese Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem 
and assess the regimeʼs ability to withstand a burgeoning Communist 
insurgency. Upon his return, Johnson expressed alarm at the situation but 
applauded Diemʼs leadership qualities and proposed that with greater U.S. 
support, he could provide a “pole of attraction for the countries of Southeast 
Asia.”271 Kennedy greeted Johnsonʼs suggestion that intervention was needed 
“with a great deal of impatience” even while he expanded assistance to 
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Vietnam.272 At the time, McNamara erred on the side of robust support and 
explained to the House of Representativeʼs Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
“You ask how much effort should we put in to stem the flow and march of 
Communism in that area and I would reply whatever effort is required.”273 
To some extent, McNamaraʼs strong statements were a product of the 
administrationʼs lack of strategy for Vietnam. The Vietnam problem had not 
preoccupied the administration and so it had chosen instead to follow the 
“path of least immediate resistance”, namely to continue to define the conflict 
in Vietnam in terms it had inherited from Eisenhower.274 The commitment to 
Ngo Dinh Diem and South Vietnamʼs independence went unquestioned and, 
as Eisenhower had described in his landmark “domino theory” speech, the 
conflict there was defined principally as one of Communist aggression.275 
 However, even as U.S. assistance expanded, the situation on the 
ground continued to deteriorate. Within the administration, a consensus was 
emerging that the Defense Department should prepare for a more active 
military role for the United States. In this context, in November 1961, Kennedy 
sent two more advisors to Vietnam: Maxwell Taylor, who was still the 
Presidentʼs military advisor then and Walt Rostow, McGeorge Bundyʼs Deputy 
at the NSC and a noted economist and modernization theorist. Kennedyʼs 
instructions for them reflected the administrationʼs ambivalence over Vietnam: 
on the one hand, he asked them to consider “how we organize the execution 
of this program” while also asking “is the U.S. commitment to prevent the fall 
of South Vietnam to Communism a public act or an internal policy decision of 
the U.S. Government?”276 In other words, the tripʼs objective was two-fold: to 
ascertain whether the administration should commit itself to the fate of South 
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Vietnam and separately, what it could do in either scenario to improve the 
situation on the ground. 
 From the outset, Kennedy and Sorensen expressed reservations over 
a stronger military role. Sorensen wrote that “we need to think” before sending 
combat troops including “whether US troops can accomplish much more in the 
mud and the mountains than Vietnamese troops (who could be better trained, 
supported and directed.”277 Similarly, Taylor noted that Kennedyʼs instructions 
were that he “should bear in mind that the initial responsibility of the effective 
maintenance of the independence of South Vietnam rested with the people 
and the government of that country. This was not something that the United 
States should take over and deal with unilaterally.”278 
 Despite this note of caution, Taylor and Rostow returned from Vietnam 
with a host of recommendations for improving and expanding the assistance 
program, including replacing Ambassador Frederick Nolting with someone 
“like [Averell] Harriman”, expanding the defoliation program, deploying more 
air support and crucially, introducing troops using the cover of floods that had 
been battering the country.279 The Military Assistance Advisory Group 
(MAAG) in Vietnam and the Commander in Chief in the Pacific (CINCPAC) 
had first suggested the floods as “excellent opportunity to minimize adverse 
publicity” for introducing troops.280 At the same time, knowing the Presidentʼs 
reservations, Taylor reassured Kennedy that the “this force is not proposed to 
clear the jungles and forests of VC guerrilla. That should be the primary task 
of the armed forces of Vietnam from which they should be specifically 
organized, trained and stiffened with ample advisors down to the battalion 
level.”281 
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 Although McGeorge Bundy had warned Taylor not to share his views 
publicly, “especially those relating to US forces”282, he and others in 
administration welcomed them. Bundy himself told the President, “I believe we 
should commit limited U.S. combat units, if necessary for military purposes 
(not for morale) to help South Vietnam” and agreed with Rusk and McNamara 
than a “military man” rather than a civilian Ambassador should be put in 
charge of the country team.283 The State Department agreed: Deputy 
Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson wrote that the government should 
“take the decision to commit ourselves to the objective of preventing the fall of 
South Vietnam” knowing that the introduction of “US and other SEATO forces 
may be necessary to achieve that objective.”284 
 Crucially, McNamara initially supported the conclusions of the report 
and suggested that the administration should send a “strong signal to the 
other side”, even if introducing troops threatened to create greater 
commitments down the road. He even estimated that this could balloon into 
as many as 205,000 troops.285 However, by November 11, he made a 
revealing volte face and instead agreed with the President that troops should 
only be a last resort.286 Where some see a “vacillation”287 on McNamaraʼs 
part, it is more likely, as the Pentagon Papers have suggested, that 
presidential instructions or nudging explain his change of opinion, with 
McNamara turning around to loyally defend the Presidentʼs view or at least a 
view Kennedy wanted represented within the bureaucracy.288 Nitzeʼs notes 
from the meeting where the Taylor report was discussed are informative. In 
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his notes, Nitze wrote that Kennedy commented, “Donʼt say we commit. Donʼt 
want to put troops in.”289  
 
Defense Department leadership 
In the months that followed, and as he assumed a leadership role on Vietnam 
policy, McNamara came to push this view more aggressively throughout the 
bureaucracy. By December 1961, he was redacting Kennedyʼs letters to 
Diem, including by removing a key line that “the needs of your embattled 
nation will be met”; no such open-ended commitment was provided for the 
remainder for the Kennedy administration.290  
 As he did within the OSD, McNamara took charge by also changing 
organizational structures and the people that staffed them. Some of the staff 
changes were under his control; others part of a broader administration 
reshuffle. Two advisors were sidelined because they were considered to be 
too close to the Diem regime and associated to past, failing policies. The first 
was Edward Lansdale, a former OSS officer in Vietnam and friend of Diemʼs 
who had been active on the Task Force for Vietnam. He was also eclipsed 
because McNamara “did not like him.”291 The second was Ambassador 
Nolting who was sidelined before Henry Cabot Lodge eventually replaced him 
in 1963.292 Lodge had been Kennedyʼs political opponent for the 
Massachusetts Senate seat in 1952 and again as Vice Presidential candidate 
on the Nixon ticket in 1960. Although the administration insisted that Lodgeʼs 
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choice did “not have political significance” or that Rusk alone had made the 
decision, this seems unlikely.293 Instead, McGeorge Bundyʼs notes from a 
later meeting when problems in Vietnam became particularly acute suggest 
that he was always seen as providing useful political cover against 
Republican criticism: “put in on Lodge” Bundy wrote and underlined several 
times.294 
Also, in November 1961, with what historians have called the 
“Thanksgiving Massacre”, key hawks were removed from positions of 
influence on Vietnam as the administration moved to “bring more people who 
understand the Kennedy policies and believe in them.”295 Walt Rostow, the 
Deputy National Security Adviser, who had sparked a governmental debate by 
suggesting the introduction of ground troops to Vietnam, became head of the 
State Departmentʼs Policy Planning Council.296 At the CIA, John McCone 
replaced Allen Dulles and immediately worked on improving cooperation with 
the OSD. Averell Harriman, who as Ambassador at Large had overseen 
negotiations on Laos, became Assistant Secretary for the Far East. Arthur 
Schlesinger later described how the notoriously overpowering and impatient 
Harriman “gave Far Eastern policy a coherence and force it had not had for 
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years [and] rapidly became the particular champion of the New Frontier within 
the State Department.”297  
 On the military side, things also changed rapidly. The Taylor-Rostow 
report gave added impetus to McNamaraʼs support for creating a command 
rather than the MAAG that currently existed and for expanding assistance 
programs. Acting on its suggestions, McNamara increased assistance 
programs including Project Farm Gate, a project aimed at using air power for 
guerrilla warfare, including through defoliation. Second, Rostow had also 
added to growing criticism of the MAAG Chief Lt. General Lionel McGarrʼs 
ability to manage the mounting U.S. presence. He wrote to President Kennedy 
that he “believe[d] that all the choppers and other gadgetry we can supply 
South Vietnam will buy time and render their resources effective if we do not 
get a first class man out there to replace McGarr.”298 By February 1962, the 
MAAG and McGarr had been replaced with the Military Assistance Command-
Vietnam (MACV) led by General Harkins, a Maxwell Taylor protégé. 
McNamara pitched Harkins to Kennedy explaining that the “JCS consider him 
an imaginative officer, fully qualified to fill what I consider to be the most 
difficult job in the US Army.”299 
 
“Over-militarizing” the commitment 
However, Kennedyʼs civilian advisors understood the risk inherent in creating 
MACV with a designated 4-star general at its helm and in incrementally 
strengthening its powers. Moreover, together with troop numbers rising from 
an early low of 3,000 in 1961 to over 12,000 by 1962, this organizational 
change could be perceived as a “theatre buildup for the entire Southeast Asia” 
as Admiral Felt described it.300 The civilian advisors feared that military 
commanders might see the creation of MACV as a concession towards their 
plans to “be ready for whatever action they may decide it necessary to 
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take.”301 The Embassy in Saigon warned that that “this is essentially a political 
job in the broadest sense, and should be organized and run as such” and 
warned that the “vigor in the Department of Defense in this situation needs to 
be matched by equal vigor in the non-military aspects if the proper proportions 
are to be maintained in our total effort there.”302 
The civilian advisors were also concerned that in centralizing authority 
under MACV, the U.S. strategy in Vietnam might shift towards a conventional 
military perspective. In April 1962, for instance, Robert Komer of the CIA 
wrote to McGeorge Bundy and Taylor questioning whether the Defense 
Department was well suited to take over policing functions and warned that 
the United States should “guard against over-militarizing our 
counterinsurgency effort.” He added that the military had “no greater expertise 
than cops recruited by AID/CIA, indeed less” and also that putting these 
activities under DoD control “risk[ed] the same thing that occurred in AID – the 
program is so small compared to the main function of the agency that it gets 
lost in the wash.” He concluded, “We donʼt want a bunch of colonels running 
programs in which they have no particular expertise.”303 Rufus Phillips, the 
head of AID in Saigon, who was also a former CIA official in the country, had 
in fact threatened to resign over these concerns: he worried that DoD 
command produced inefficiencies, delays and impeded the necessary 
flexibility for counterinsurgency.304 
However, by January 1962, it was the JCS, not McNamara, who were 
encouraging the introduction of ground troops and a more conventional 
reading of the conflict Vietnam. The JCS argued for “all actions necessary to 
defeat communist aggression” and warned that losing South Vietnam could 
lead to “communist domination of all of the Southeast Asian mainland” and 
that “SEATO [would] cease to exist.” Crucially, whereas he had been 
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receptive to ground troops requests in the past, McNamara now forwarded the 
recommendations to the President with a cover letter that said that he was 
“not prepared to endorse” it.305 McNamara sounded more like Komer and 
Phillips. In a speech delivered in February 1962, as MACV was being 
established, he struck a note of caution saying, “Combating guerrilla warfare 
demands more in ingenuity than in money or manpower.”306 
 
As the next chapter describes, by early 1962, McNamaraʼs attention turned to 
counterinsurgency strategies coming from the field and Washington that 
promised to achieve the two objectives laid out by President Kennedy after 
the Taylor-Rostow report, namely limiting the U.S. governmentʼs commitment 
to South Vietnam and avoiding the introduction of ground troops. As the 
number of troops grew, it became all the more urgent to define what exactly 
these troops could or could not do and what their exact objective was; in other 
words, to develop a strategy. 
Concurrently, the administration matured in its organizational 
arrangements for counterinsurgency, most notably with the creation of the 
Special Group for Counterinsurgency in January 1962. In its first month, the 
Special Group received a document that Roger Hilsman, the Director of the 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State Department, had drafted 
which was entitled the “Strategic Concept for South Vietnam”. The paper was 
specifically designed to produce a counterinsurgency strategy for Vietnam as 
an alternative to the application of military force. Hilsman, a West Point-
educated counterinsurgency expert, had been with the OSS behind enemy 
lines in Burma and later a speechwriter for Senator Kennedy. Together with 
Harriman, his mentor, who had been promoted with the “Thanksgiving 
Massacre”, Hilsman tried to regain State control of Vietnam policy in the early 
months of 1962.  
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At the OSD, ISA replaced Gilpatric in coordinating Vietnam policy, 
eventually overseeing each successive draft of the CPSVN from 1962 to 
1963. From McNamaraʼs bureaucratic vantage point, the administrationʼs 
Vietnam policies were now beginning to work as they should: with strategic 
guidance coming from the State Department and the White House and ISA 
organizing requisite defense tools. However, since ISA was also responsible 
for the Departmentʼs aid program and was staffed with McNamaraʼs most 
loyal advisers, his influence and economic and fiscal considerations colored 
their decisions. 
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CHAPTER 4: STRATEGIES FOR VIETNAM 
 
1962 was a boom time for counterinsurgency intellectuals in Washington. Not 
only had they sparked the Presidentʼs interest but, on Vietnam, they found an 
unlikely ally in Secretary of Defense McNamara. He embraced the opportunity 
to test new tools and techniques for fighting limited wars in the developing 
world not least because they seemed an economical alternative to 
conventional deployments. McNamaraʼs concerns over the ballooning costs of 
Vietnam operations coalesced with the counterinsurgency concern with the 
militarization of field operations to produce the CPSVN in July 1962. The plan 
promised to refocus the United Statesʼ mission in Vietnam as the assistance 
forces drew down. 
McNamaraʼs calendar provides insight into the people who might have 
influenced his understanding of counterinsurgency theory. At the start of April 
1962, he had two unusually long meetings with Robert Thompson – one 
meeting that lasted five hours and another for three hours.307 Thompson, a 
British counterinsurgency expert with experience suppressing the Malayan 
insurgency, advised the U.S. government on its policies in Vietnam through 
the British Advisory Mission in Vietnam (BRIAM) and became increasingly 
prominent as he bypassed U.S. officials in the field and consulted closely with 
both the Task Force for Vietnam and with Robert McNamara. McNamara 
described Thompson as “somewhat of a legend”308 while Ambassador 
Ormsby-Gore noted “how much weight the President attached to Mr. 
Thompsonʼs views upon the situation in Viet Nam.”309 
In the spring of 1962, both Roger Hilsman and Thompson produced 
plans which stressed the need to have “largely civilian rather than military” 
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advisors at the local level and a greater focus on development.310 For 
Hilsman, this was explicitly designed to short-circuit what he saw as the 
militarization of the administrationʼs Vietnam policy. For much of 1962, the 
administration refined its counterinsurgency strategies while, in July 1962, 
McNamara began setting an end-date for winding down the Defense 
Departmentʼs presence in Vietnam altogether.  
 
The intellectual backdrop for counterinsurgency 
As Hilsman noted in a footnote of his “plan” for South Vietnam, which went 
through a number of versions between January and March 1962, “The basic 
approach followed in this plan was developed by Mr. R.G.K. Thompson.” The 
Pentagon Papers go further and describe his report as “an unabashed 
restatement of most of Thompsonʼs major points toward which President 
Kennedy had, not incidentally, already expressed a favourable disposition.”311 
At the time, the Foreign Office came to a similar conclusion, noting that 
Hilsmanʼs “basic concept owes a great deal to Thompson, with whom he had 
a long talk while in Saigon” also candidly pointing to the reason that 
McNamara didnʼt much care for Hilsman, namely that he was “not the most 
modest of men and is inclined to overrate his own abilities.”312 
 However, McNamara paid attention to Thompson and to Bernard Fall, 
another source of inspiration for Hilsman and one of the few people 
McNamara acknowledged had “educated” him on Vietnam.313 In an 
anonymous article published in March 1962 that Hilsman widely circulated in 
the State and Defense Departments, Fall complained that the “United States 
seeks to win the struggle by mechanical means (helicopters and weed killers) 
forgetting all over again that a revolutionary war can be won only if the little 
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people in the villages and the hills can be persuaded that they have a stake in 
fighting on our side.”314 
 At their core, Thompsonʼs “Delta Pacification Plan” and Hilsmanʼs 
“Strategic Concept” shared similar recommendations though they diverged on 
emphasis: Hilsman focused relatively more on civic action and security while 
Thompson emphasized strengthening political and administrative 
structures.315 Still, they did find common ground in recommending that South 
Vietnamese forces, and their American assistants, should focus on guerrilla 
rather than conventional tactics and push the strategic hamlets program.  
In March 1962, with great fanfare, Diem launched Operation Sunrise 
with the strategic hamlets program at is center. As the “keystone” of the 
counterinsurgency strategy in Vietnam, the strategic hamlets program was 
designed to produce secure villages where peasants could be separated from 
the Vietcong by applying the “oil spot” theory of expanding security on the 
basis of military operations designed to “clear and hold”.316 The gist of “clear 
and hold” was that military forces should secure an area and extend the “safe” 
area outwards rather than the alternative “search and destroy”, which relied 
on targeted and temporary military engagements.317 In practice, the strategic 
hamlets became a loosely-defined rubric where many different agencies 
lumped their programs.  
 
Putting theory into practice 
Both Hilsman and Thompson foresaw some of the main problems that derived 
by translating theories into practice. First and foremost, they complained 
about the lack of civilian-military coordination in Vietnam, a prerequisite for a 
                                                
314 Z, “The War in Viet-Nam: We Have Not Been Told the Whole Truth,” The New Republic 
(March 12, 1962). 
315 On the differences between Hilsman and Thompsonʼs approach, see especially: Peter 
Busch, All the Way with JFK?: Britain, the United States and the Vietnam War (Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 102-107. 
316 Honolulu Briefing Book (Part II), November 20, 1963, Folder: Vietnam, Honolulu Briefing 
Book, 11/20/62, Part II, Box 204, NSF, Countries Series, Vietnam, JFKL. 
317 Unfortunately, in a Vietnamese context, the strategic hamlets program bore an uncanny 
resemblance to Diemʼs earlier and doomed Agroville Program, which many at the time noted 
could seem to “peasants as old wine in newly labelled bottles.” Pentagon Papers, Gravel ed., 
Vol. 2.2. 
	   115 
successful counterinsurgency strategy.318 Second, Hilsman argued that 
American military culture was incompatible with the program in Vietnam and 
the militaryʼs role should therefore be reduced. “As a perusal of MAAGʼs 
Jungle Jim and military forces tend to follow tactics more appropriate to 
conventional, World War II situations than to guerrilla warfare,” he wrote.319 
He later explained, “My major policy was to get MACV out of business, that 
Americans couldnʼt do anything but advise Diem. This is what it finally came 
down to.”320 
 By the summer of 1962, the administrationʼs counterinsurgency 
strategies seemed on track in Vietnam and Forrestal wrote to Kennedy that 
“while we cannot yet sit back in the confidence that the job is well in hand, 
nevertheless it does appear that we have finally developed a series of 
techniques which, if properly applied, do seem to produce results.”321 
However, by December, after a flurry of official visits to Vietnam, Forrestal and 
Hilsman spoke about confusion in the field. In their trip report, they asked, “Is 
there a plan? This answer is no. There are five or six plans many of which are 
competing. There is consequently great confusion.”322 As a result, at the end 
of the year, at his American advisorsʼ behest, Diem consolidated existing 
plans into a National Campaign Plan (NCP) that matched the CPSVN 
timetable. 
 Overall, as the administration moved into 1963, the signs were not 
good. The new year began with a humiliating defeat for the South Vietnamese 
forces in Ap Bac. Questions were raised about field reporting, the ability of the 
South Vietnamese to fight despite all the assistance that had been offered 
and also about the team assembled on the field. Despite these concerns, 
McNamara instructed the JCS to accelerate the CPSVN timetable, shortening 
the timetable for the handover of responsibilities to the South Vietnamese. In 
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the spring of 1963, things seemed to get worse as the Catholic Diem regime 
began a violent crackdown against the Buddhist community provoking 
nationwide unrest as well as anger back in the United States. Congressional 
figures had begun to describe the country as a “quasi-fascist” state, yet the 
Diem regime seemed entirely unresponsive to the Kennedy administrationʼs 
requests for political reform.323 One of the first emblematic images of the 
Vietnam conflict emerged from the “Buddhist crisis” with the self-immolation of 
a protesting Buddhist monk. Still, against this backdrop, in May 1963, 
McNamara requested and received his second draft of the CPSVN with an 
even shorter time horizon. 
 Instead of throwing McNamaraʼs plans off-course, the events in South 
Vietnam seemed to confirm his determination to continue to centralize 
programs and authority under the Defense Department and to move forward 
with the CPSVN. By July 1963, virtually all the programs were being either run 
by or coordinated with MACV. In addition, he moved more aggressively to 
make clear that the end goals were to help the South Vietnamese fight their 
war and to continue to insist that it was an insurgency rather than a full-scale 
conventional war. The overarching objective of each version of the CPSVN 
and in the public announcement in October 1963 was to “prepare the 
Vietnamese to assume full responsibility by December 1965” with a 
“withdrawal of all U.S. special assistance units and personnel by that date.”324 
What the South Vietnamese took “full responsibility” for evolved. Earlier drafts 
recognized a limited external threat in addition to an insurgency; later drafts 
identified the threat of an insurgency alone.  
Defining the conflict only as an insurgency had implications for troop 
planning of U.S. and South Vietnamese forces. As long as the conflict in 
Vietnam was defined as a conventional engagement where the United States 
had a major responsibility, engagement was inherently open-ended and 
produced risks of escalation as battlefield failures led to continued demands 
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for ever-growing force deployments. By setting out clear parameters in 
October 1963 that the peak of U.S. strength had now been met,325 the CPSVN 
sought both to put a break on the escalatory momentum and to halt continued 
requests for troop strength increases in Vietnam.  
 
The services and doctrinal gaps in Vietnam 
Hilsmanʼs greatest ally, whether by design or chance, was McNamara. 
Whether or not McNamara had concluded that U.S. military culture was 
“incompatible” with the situation in Vietnam, as Hilsman did, is not clear. What 
is clear is that he was concerned with the militaryʼs unwillingness to break out 
of traditional frameworks, that on Vietnam as in other areas of defense policy, 
he felt a large doctrinal gap between civilian and military advisers, and as a 
result, he became increasingly involved in dictating strategy, an area that was 
traditionally reserved for military commanders.  
For instance, in January 1962, as if to prove Hilsmanʼs fears, the 
Chiefs reported to the President that “any war in the Southeast Asia mainland 
will be a peninsula and island-type of campaign – a mode of warfare in which 
all the elements of the Armed Forces of the United States have gained a 
wealth of experience and in which we have excelled both in World War II and 
in Korea.”326 Again, in March 1962, Le May disregarded McNamaraʼs 
instructions to focus on clear-and-hold operations and strategic hamlets, 
dismissing them as “too defensive” and requesting instead that the Air Force 
be granted fighter aircraft.327 Similarly, in November 1962, U.S. Army Chief of 
Staff Wheeler made a speech where he noted: “It is fashionable in some 
quarters to say the problems in Southeast Asia are primarily political or 
economic, rather than military. I do not agree. The essence of the problem in 
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Vietnam is military.”328 This could not have been more at odds with the official 
administration policy.329 
Faced with the Chiefs “blinkered pursuit of conventional objectives”330, 
McNamara regularly reminded them and notably Admiral Felt that they were 
dealing with subversion and not the conventional military threats that they felt 
prepared to handle.331 This frustrating back-and-forth troubled Kennedy who 
“privately complained that everybody […] seemed to be forgetting that our role 
in Vietnam should be political rather than military.”332 Moreover, although the 
CPSVN specifically indicated that operations should focus on “clear and hold”, 
the services dragged their feet. Hilsman or one of his colleagues at INR 
angrily annotated one memo from CINCPAC in February 1963 with the 
following comment: “The number of clear and hold operations for 1962 would 
not exceed (and probably less than) 15, while the number of search and 
release operations for last year would probably exceed 100!!”333 
 
Developing a country team 
Aside from these conceptual differences, McNamara was also concerned that 
bureaucratic divisions along Service and civilian-military lines were hampering 
the administrationʼs strategy in Vietnam. As Thompson and Hilsman 
observed, the success of the strategy depended on successful inter-agency 
cooperation.  
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 In May 1962, one report from the field read: “we have too many cooks 
busy spoiling the broth – there are military agencies: Army, Air Force and 
Navy as well as State Department and other civilian groups all in the area: 
USIA, CIA, AID, etc. There is no unified command and no comprehensive 
planning.”334 In his October 1963 report, McNamara concluded that MACVʼs 
principal objective of producing a better-coordinated policy on the ground was 
not succeeding. Early hopes about the “unparalleled opportunities” to create a 
template of “functioning inter-agency and international effort” in Vietnam that 
could “serve as guidance in other free world struggles”335 floundered on the 
fact that not even Ambassador Lodge and General Harkins, who had been 
friends back in Massachusetts, could successfully cooperate. By November 
1963, a White House meeting concluded “there is no country team in Vietnam 
at the present time in any real sense.”336 
 Service rivalries also began to emerge. In particular there were 
complaints that MACV was Army-dominated, mirroring charges in Washington 
that the administrationʼs new defense policies favored the Army over the other 
services. McNamara himself conceded that while the “primary responsibility in 
these areas lies with the Army”, it was important to expose other services, and 
especially the Marines and Air Force, to the experience as well.337 All the 
same, by the end of 1963, of the 16,000 troops on the field, 10,100 were Army 
troops; and of the five general officers in key positions, only one was from the 
Air Force.338 Army officials were also prone to making “derogatory comments” 
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about Air Force overtures to become involved in counterinsurgency, a field 
they felt “had always been primarily Army.”339  
To some extent, the Armyʼs experience in counterinsurgency was 
irrelevant to Service Chiefs who believed that a conventional war was around 
the corner. Even General Taylor, in the spring of 1962, joined the chorus of 
military advisors that the “point could quickly come when the VC would come 
out to fight something resembling a conventional war.”340 The Army itself 
admitted in a critical report that, “We seem to be still trying to counter 
insurgency with tools and methods applicable to a conventional war,” though it 
noted that, “The Army is nonetheless considerably ahead of the Air Force. 
They insist on applying the wrong tools in the wrong way.”341  
 
Vietnam as a laboratory 
Inter-service rivalries also loomed large on the use of Vietnam as a testing 
ground for counterinsurgency. In keeping with his interest for 
counterinsurgency, Kennedy viewed Vietnam as an ideal “training 
laboratory”342 and urged the services to “expose [their] most promising officers 
to the experience of service there.” He “directed that the Service make 
[Vietnam] a laboratory both for training our people, and for learning the things 
that we need to know to successfully compete” in what he saw as the “future 
of war.”343 Rotations in Vietnam became prerequisites for Army promotions 
and were especially important for the Special Forces. Vietnam taught them to 
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work in fully unconventional “wars of national liberation” contexts, precisely 
the kind of situation Kennedy wanted them prepared for.344 The Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff chimed in noting the importance of using “Vietnam in 
particular, and Southeast Asia in general, as a "laboratory" for the 
improvement of U.S. counterinsurgency and remote area conflict capability”, 
something he felt was “very much in the national interest."345 
 In April 1961, in order to “test new techniques”, the administration also 
set up a Combat Development Test Center (CDTC) in South Vietnam as part 
of a program called Project Agile run out of the Defense Departmentʼs 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). By January 1962, it also 
reported to the newly created Special Group (CI). Although the center 
combined military and civilian experts, it reported to the Secretary of Defense 
and to MACV on the military aspects alone. The center oversaw the testing of 
a range of more or less controversial tools from using dogs and high-powered 
voice amplifiers in the strategic hamlets to the more contentious use of 
herbicides.346 By September 1962, the Army set up its own test unit center 
and three months later, the Air Force did the same.347  
 As a result, by the end of 1962, both CINCPAC and the JCS were 
expressing concern “about the proliferation of such activities.” Not only were 
the services competing over programs but they also seemed to be bypassing 
CINCPACʼs authority. In keeping with Eisenhowerʼs reforms to command 
structures, MACV was meant to coordinate operations in Vietnam and report 
to CINCPAC who, in turn, reported to the Secretary of Defense. The services, 
who were no longer meant to have operational responsibility, seemed to be 
reasserting themselves through the backdoor under the rubric of “testing”. 
This was the sub-plot, so to speak, when CINCPAC expressed “concerned 
about the nature of the tests” that the Army was conducting, and expressed 
“desires to keep tight control and monitory R&D activities in South 
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Vietnam.”348 Ultimately, Admiral Felt and the JCS concluded that testing was 
spiraling out of control and detracting from the main objective. He 
recommended that it should therefore be scaled back.349 By October 1963, 
experimentation was either reduced or transferred to Thailand; and according 
to the CPSVN, was being phased-out altogether.350  
Similarly, the CPSVN process addressed concerns over the 
proliferation of militias and paramilitary forces in South Vietnam. By 1962, 
MACV oversaw Civil Guard (CG) and Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and hamlet 
militia, which were tasked with more traditional security concerns in the 
villages as an adjunct to the South Vietnamese Army forces (ARVN). In 
addition, under the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program, Special 
Forces under CIA command oversaw an even greater number of forces, many 
of whom played on the countryʼs divided ethnic and religious lines. For 
instance, the Trailwatchers, a force that operated along the Laos and 
Cambodia borders, drew primarily from the Montagnards minority while other 
forces played on Catholic allegiances, including the Catholic Youth and the 
Fighting Fathers. 
William Colby, the CIA Station Chief who oversaw many of these 
forces, complained that they lacked order, control and coherence, and that 
they were wasteful.351 The CIA could not afford the costs associated to the 
“rapidly expanding operations”352 as the number of Special Forces under his 
command tripled to almost 5,000 troops between 1961 and 1963.353 
Moreover, the Army began to express anger that its Special Forces, “probably 
the most mature and best-trained in the Army [were] employed in providing 
basic training to Vietnamese recruits” and that they were still operating under 
CIA command while the Army was running its own parallel programs in 
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Vietnam.354 For all these reasons, Colby welcomed the decision in July 1962, 
as part of the CPSVN process, to centralize paramilitary forces under MACV 
command as part of Operation Switchback and to wind down their numbers in 
subsequent years. Ultimately, bringing the Special Forces and their programs 
within the remit of MACV served first, to centralize disparate operations 
around the country in way that promised greater operational coherence and 
coordination, and second, to secure their long-term financing. 
 
Civil-military tensions over the use of air power 
Later versions of the CPSVN also wound down the use of air power on the 
battlefield, a victory for the counterinsurgency experts over their military 
counterparts and indeed over McNamara. The gap between the Chiefs and 
counterinsurgency experts was perhaps at its widest over the use of air power 
and especially defoliants in Vietnam. McNamaraʼs position on this debate is 
instructive because it shows how he did not fit along neat and binary notions 
of hawks and doves. Although he argued for winding down the U.S. presence 
on the one hand, he was enthusiastic about the use of new technology, not 
least because it promised to be relatively cheap and because the South 
Vietnamese could be trained relatively quickly to use it themselves. He was 
less attuned to humanitarian concerns over the use of herbicides. When he 
did push to draw back the program it was part of a general winding down of 
the U.S. presence and a tightening of operations in Vietnam. In fact, 
McNamaraʼs shift probably derived from Robert Thompsonʼs change of heart 
on the issue.  
 McNamara had been an early proponent of using air power in Vietnam 
when the program began in earnest after the Taylor-Rostow report. One 
official history has suggested that his enthusiasm derived from the fact that he 
“could quantify results.”355 Michael Forrestal at the NSC, who opposed the 
program, wrote that, “The main train of thinking was that you cannot say no to 
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your military advisors all the time and, with this I agree.”356 But McNamara 
had not had many qualms refusing his military advisorsʼ input in the past. He 
wanted to prove that the Defense Department could make a valuable 
contribution to the new models of war fighting. Hilsman explained that to 
understand the bombing program “it is probably necessary to understand the 
peculiar stake of the Air Force as an organization”, namely that it needed to 
prove its relevance for counterinsurgency.357 But this was also true of the 
Defense Department as a whole: in the aftermath of the Ap Bac battle, Earle 
Wheeler, the Army Chief of Staff, was dispatched to Vietnam specifically to try 
to identify how to “use air power in counterinsurgency operations.”358 
 While using air power in Vietnam was divisive, the defoliation program 
was particularly so. In the spring of 1962, the administration felt compelled to 
issue press guidelines to the field in the face of the “much publicized” use of 
herbicides. Harriman, his friend the economic John Kenneth Galbraith, 
Hilsman and Forrestal were especially angry about the program as was 
Edward Murrow at the USIA who warned that the administration would “pay 
dearly for [it] in terms of Asian opinion.”359 Faced with Harkins and Feltʼs 
suggestion in December of 1962 to create open-fire zones along the 
Cambodian border, Harriman “question[ed] the use of airpower in 
counterinsurgency”, complaining that “we must never forget that this is a 
political war” and reminding his colleagues that “French experience suggests, 
in fact, that air interdiction is not a useful concept in this kind of warfare.”360 
The MAAG also warned that “the indiscriminate use of firepower, regardless 
of caliber, type or means of delivery cannot be condoned in counterinsurgency 
operations”, that it “only serve[d] to push people into Viet Cong arms.”361 
Aside from public relations aspects, the programʼs detractors 
questioned its military use. Reports from the field indicated only limited 
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success: one Army report bluntly noted that the “defoliation program is a 
failure. Thatʼs the official view now.”362 The reports circulated around 
Washington: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lemnitzer indicated that 
observations were “not impressive”363 while Harold Brown, McNamaraʼs 
Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) who managed 
Project Agile, wrote that reporting on the success of these programs was 
“overoptimistic.”364 However, the program continued to be met with “the strong 
approval of Secretary McNamara, General Taylor” and “the field”, which was 
primarily CINCPAC.365 Well after he had received reports questioning the 
value of air operations, McNamara was still telling Kennedy that they were 
producing “excellent results” and recommending that he give Harkins “free 
reign.”366 
By November 1962, despite continued requests from MACV, CINCPAC 
and McNamara, the detractors had convinced President Kennedy to cut back 
the program and ensure that it be “reoriented upon the original concept as 
soon as possible.” He also required that each operation receive prior White 
House, rather than OSD, approval and prove its “operational value.”367 By the 
spring of 1963, McNamara was on board and as the CPSVN planning went 
ahead, the air units were the first to be withdrawn. The initial 1,000-man 
increment included mostly air units, including a C-123 spray detachment and 
armed helicopters.368 
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 The Presidentʼs instructions might have influenced McNamaraʼs 
change of heart but Thompsonʼs trajectory on the issue of air power was also 
informative. Going against many field reports, in April 1962, Thompson was 
generally favorable to the program. He argued that the “use of air in the form 
of helicopters, C-123 and attack planes” was “remarkably effective” while his 
only reservation over crop destruction was that “foreigners should not be 
actively involved.” At the same time, he sounded a note of a caution 
explaining that “many so-called Viet Cong are not fighting for Communism” 
but instead nationalism that could be reinforced should they see “foreigners 
killing Vietnamese.” In large part, it was a public relations issue for Thompson, 
part of the “psychological and information activities” that he advocated, which 
recommended that foreigners should not be “at the sharp end” and instead 
should focus on “doctors, USOM369 people or Civic Action people who are 
handing out services or goods [who] cause no problem.”370  
However, a year later, Thompson had turned sharply and on a visit to 
Washington, warned President Kennedy against relying on defoliants and air 
power more broadly. Now he “doubted that the effort involved in defoliation 
was worthwhile” because of the “automatic aversion of the Asians to the use 
of unknown chemicals.” On air power, he said that, in the long-term the “war 
would be won by brains and feet” rather than helicopters and was now “dead 
against” bombing “as this would leave an indissoluble legacy of bitterness.”371 
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CHAPTER 5: MCNAMARA THE SCEPTIC 
If Thompsonʼs trajectory is important to understanding McNamaraʼs changed 
assessment of the use of air power, it is especially important to understanding 
McNamaraʼs “optimism” about the situation in Vietnam. Historians are divided 
as to why McNamara set in motion withdrawal plans in July 1962. On the one 
hand, there are those who argue that McNamara, and perhaps Kennedy as 
well, believed the war would effectively end by 1965 – that the insurgency 
could be reduced to “low-level banditry” by that time.372 On the other, there 
are those who argue that Kennedy presciently understood that the United 
States was on a losing path in Vietnam. In fact, neither is correct. Newly-
available documents show that, in private, McNamara was not really optimistic 
about U.S. prospects in Vietnam but neither was he convinced that all 
intervention was doomed to failure. Instead, he saw Vietnam as a test case 
for a new kind of intervention that did not depend on a short-term, U.S. victory 
in the traditional sense. Furthermore, in the medium term, as the previous 
chapter detailed, winding down the U.S. presence was also designed to 
produce greater operational coherence. 
During the October 3rd NSC meeting, Kennedy specifically asked 
McNamara if the withdrawal plans were based on “an assumption that itʼs 
going well” and whether this could be make the administration look foolish if 
things turned sour. In response, McNamara stated his two “major premises” 
for announcing the phase-out: first, he believed that the “military campaign” 
would be “complete” by the end of 1965 and “secondly, if it extends beyond 
that period, we believe we can train them to take over the essential functions 
and withdraw the bulk of our forces.” When McGeorge Bundy asked him 
“whatʼs the point of doing that?” McNamara responded, “We need a way to 
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get out of Vietnam. This is a way of doing it. And to leave forces there when 
theyʼre not needed, I think is wasteful and complicates both their problems 
and ours.”373 For McNamara, withdrawal was not pegged against victory; 
instead, he was most interested in “a way to get out.” Ultimately, for him, 
having forces on the ground was complicated for the Vietnamese and 
wasteful for the United States.  
 
The administrationʼs optimism 
The Pentagon Papers observe that “optimism dominated official thinking” in 
the 1962-1963 period.374 While this might have been true of the administration 
and McNamaraʼs public pronouncements, the reality behind closed doors was 
more complex. In fact, in the months leading up to the July 1962 Honolulu 
conference, Hilsman complained that a “wave of discouragement” had hit the 
Pentagon; a phenomenon he found “surprising since the evidence points in 
quite the other direction.”375 If anything, a consensus emerged in the 1962-
1963 period that the situation in Vietnam might be approaching a stalemate; 
Ambassador Lodge, General Taylor, the CIA as well as USOM in Vietnam 
among others seemed to share that view. In the fall of 1962, the Task Force 
on SEA had described the situation as “basically a stand-off with no clear 
prospect of victory for either side” while Taylor, in assessing the difference 
between his visits in October 1961 and 1962 said that whereas before the 
“Viet Cong [had been] winning the war”, by 1962, “no one clearly has the 
initiative.”376  
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Moreover, both McNamaraʼs October trip report and the November 
1963 CPSVN focused on the danger that programs in Vietnam had become 
“over-extended” or confused and that the administration needed to move to a 
“consolidation” phase. In addition, they and the Special Group CI concluded 
that the civic action and civil programs as well as the strategic hamlets, which 
were all at the core of the counterinsurgency program, were “lagging”.377 To a 
large extent, the narrative about McNamaraʼs optimism on Vietnam relies on 
his public pronouncements and posture, which remained positive. At the end 
of the October NSC meetings, the press announcement read that, “Secretary 
McNamara and General Taylor reported their judgment that the major part of 
the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965.”378 
However, in an exchange during the October meetings, McNamara 
specifically addressed the idea that his projections were overly optimistic. He 
conceded that the 1965 timeline was the one area where he and Taylor 
disagreed: “the only slight difference between Max and me in this entire report 
is in this one estimate of whether or not we can win the war in ʼ64 in the upper 
three territories and in ʼ65 in the fourth. Iʼm not entirely sure of that.” Yet, he 
concluded,  
“But I am sure that if we donʼt meet those dates, in the sense of ending 
the major military campaigns, we nonetheless can withdraw the bulk of 
our U.S. forces, according to the schedule we have laid out because 
we can train the Vietnamese to do the job.”379 
In other words, as far as McNamara and his planners were concerned, 
withdrawal could happen because the Vietnamese would be trained do the job 
not because there would be peace by 1965. As his trip report explained, “The 
US advisory effort, however, cannot assure ultimate success. This is a 
Vietnamese war and the country and the war must in the end, be run solely by 
the Vietnamese. It will impair their independence and the development of their 
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initiative if we leave our advisers in place beyond the time they are really 
needed.”380 
 
General Harkinsʼ optimism 
Although McNamaraʼs most optimistic advisors (notably General Paul D. 
Harkins and Thompson) first suggested the 1965 end-date, only Harkins 
seemed to believe that there would be peace by then. There is no doubt that 
Harkinsʼ reporting was unequivocally optimistic.381 In July 1962, he told 
McNamara that it would take a year to train the Vietnamese382; a few months 
later he predicted “all our programs will come to fruition by the end of 1962.”383 
July 1962 was a key date because it was at this time, during the Honolulu 
conference, that McNamara asked the JCS to begin the handover of military 
responsibilities to their South Vietnamese counterparts. This timing explains 
why many historians have assumed that McNamara began to plan for 
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withdrawal on the basis of Harkinsʼ reporting and resulting “euphoria and 
optimism.”384 
However, the administration did not especially value Harkins and his 
staff. Harkins, a man appointed largely because he was General Taylorʼs 
protégé and longtime friend, had to defend his staff against charges that they 
were incompetent. He experienced a fall from grace that became particularly 
acute after the defeat at Ap Bac in 1963.385 He came under criticism from 
Kennedy (who, according to Forrestal, “wanted to get rid of him”386), Senator 
Mansfield (because he was “too optimistic”387), McGeorge Bundy (who later 
described Harkins as a “dope”388) and especially McNamara. McNamara 
diplomatically explained that Harkins “looked and spoke exactly as a general 
should” and more bitingly, that although he was “a protégé of the scholarly 
Max Taylor, he lacked his mentorʼs intellectual caliber.”389 McNamaraʼs 
Deputy, Roswell Gilpatric, less diplomatically remembered that his boss was 
“just not impressed either by Harkinsʼ record or by the personal attributes of 
the man when he saw him.”390  
 
Robert Thompson and optimism as a tactic 
As of 1962, McNamara became increasingly doubtful about field reports, 
notably from Harkins, and had begun reaching outside traditional channels to 
crosscheck information. This led him to conclude that the United States could 
not win militarily in the traditional sense. His trip to Vietnam in the fall of 1963 
confirmed this view. As a result, he put in motion a plan to demilitarize U.S. 
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involvement to meet the new objective of helping the South Vietnamese help 
themselves. He felt that this could be accomplished within Harkinsʼ timeline. 
To a large extent, in keeping with Thompsonʼs advice, a public display of 
optimism was a strategy for McNamara. Projecting optimism was a way of 
keeping the CPSVN on track.  
In fact, Thompsonʼs optimistic views and trajectory offer a key to 
understanding McNamaraʼs. Whereas Harkinsʼ view of victory was predicated 
on a training mission and on the military aspects of the war, Thompsonʼs was 
political and focused on training lower-level forces and the construction of 
strategic hamlets.391 As such, the decreased military presence envisaged in 
the withdrawal plans had little impact on his long-range plans. In addition, in 
his discussions with McNamara it is clear that Thompson, unlike Harkins, felt 
that optimism was a calculated posture to avoid U.S. domestic audiences from 
turning against the war and to keep the South Vietnamese motivated and 
confident that they were on the “winning side”. 
Thompsonʼs trajectory during the July 1962-October 1963 period is 
informative. In the spring of 1962, Thompson reached the peak of his 
optimism spurring McNamara to urge his military commanders to accelerate 
the withdrawal plans. Using a well-worn phrase, Thompson noted that the 
“tide has turned”392 and at a meeting at Fort Bragg, confidently announced 
that “we definitely are winning.”393  
But by the fall of 1963, a shift had occurred. Thompson produced a 
report that described the current path as a “collision course” and warned of a 
“grave risk that the only choice before us will be of losing either with or without 
Diem.”394 In a meeting with Lodge in September 1963, he argued that the 
United States should stick to Diem even though the Buddhist crisis had 
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derailed progress (contrary to what American military advisors were 
saying).395 At the same time, he reassured his American colleagues that, “If 
everything was to go 50% according to plan, then I would say that there could 
be a decisive military improvement in twelve months and certainly within two 
years.”396 This was exactly the time frame that McNamara imposed for the 
withdrawal plans.  
Much of Thompson and McNamaraʼs optimism was calculated to 
influence events both on the ground and in Washington. Although Thompson 
was not officially in Vietnam during the McNamara-Taylor visit, McNamaraʼs 
notes made on the first day bear Thompsonʼs hallmark. In particular, one 
remarkable phrase: “People want to be on winning side – if word gets around 
that we have doubts, are cutting aid, or likely to pull out, it will reduce the will 
of the people in the hamlets to resist.”397 These are almost exactly the same 
words Thompson penned in a letter to the British High Commissioner in New 
Zealand about the situation in Vietnam where he wrote that, “The key to the 
present situation is confidence. The peasants are not going to stick their 
necks out unless they think they will be on the winning side. Naturally 
therefore I have to be optimistic if I am to influence events. You must play as if 
you are going to win.”398 
Herein lays the key to understanding Thompsonʼs and McNamaraʼs 
optimism: they did not necessarily believe that everything was going to plan; 
they were looking for a way to galvanize the troops, both at home and in the 
field. The idea that optimism was a means to an end was a recurring theme in 
Thompsonʼs correspondence: he had previously noted that the momentum of 
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the 1962 victories had “inspired confidence in the successful outcome of the 
war”399 and that confidence “would be self-generating.”400 Considering the 
McNamara-Taylor report observed a “general atmosphere of watch-and-
wait”401, McNamara made a calculated choice to be optimistic because it kept 
his plan on track. Without an energized South Vietnamese partner and with a 
Congress threatening to cut off aid, a long-drawn program of handing over 
responsibilities could not happen. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to square McNamaraʼs tendency to be overly 
critical of military advice with the notion that he was uncritically accepting of 
Harkinsʼ input. In an oral history, McNamara, using an analogy of factory 
workers at Ford, commented on “the foolhardiness of combining the 
intelligence function with the operating function […] that intelligence estimates 
that came from the unit that was associated with operations were tainted […] 
by the biases that we all have in evaluating our own operations.”402 That 
critical reading of intelligence estimates influenced the way McNamara 
received Harkinsʼ reports and subsequently informed the Taylor-McNamara 
reportʼs conclusions. Going against Harkinsʼ assessment, the report pointed to 
the continuing issue of poor intelligence403, to the fact that the Vietcong effort 
had “not yet been seriously reduced in the aggregate” and commented that 
people were unanimous that the strategic hamlet programs was 
“overextended in the Delta.”404 
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McNamaraʼs notes from this trip are also instructive405: during a visit to 
a Special Forces detachment, which was at the vanguard of 
counterinsurgency, he concluded “there has been progress in the Delta during 
the past year (have strategic hamlets, etc.) but not working as much as they 
claim and their plan for the future is weak.” In another area, he described 
“clearly a miserably planned hamlet program.”406 He met with Professor 
Honey, a scholar of Vietnamese culture and history, who recognized that they 
were “in theory great” but “in practice: not.” In the Delta, U.S. advisors told him 
that “in some hamlets [there were] 20-30% VC sympathizers” and that there 
had been “little or no progress in winning over the people.” Within days, Vice 
President Tho confirmed this alarming assessment, writing that there were 
“not more than 20 or 30 properly defended hamlets.”407 McNamaraʼs trip file 
also contained a USOM “informal appreciation” of the strategic hamlets which 
called it an “idealistic program” that had failed primarily for the reasons that 
had troubled Thompson, namely a “lack of provincial capability”; it also 
highlighted the Delta as an area where “communists still control most of the 
people.”408 
In addition, the tripʼs purpose was also to ascertain whether or not the 
Buddhist crisis had affected military progress. Although the people he met 
with were nearly unanimous in their appraisal that it had not, he wrote 
“sympathy for the VC will build up because the devil you donʼt know is better 
than the one you do […] attests how little leverage we have.” All in all, these 
are not the notes of an optimistic man on the cusp of victory.  
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Several of McNamaraʼs colleagues recall a decisive shift in the fall of 
1963. General Krulak, who sat on the Special Group (CI) as the JCS 
representative and joined McNamara on his October 1963 trip to Vietnam, 
expressed his “admiration” for McNamara “because he saw the truth more 
quickly than most, and he saw through the phoniness of what he was told 
when he went to Vietnam be it by the Vietnamese, or our own people.” Krulak, 
recalled that Kennedy had received “clear indications” from McNamara that 
the counterinsurgency operations were “not going well” and were “not 
implemented earnestly and this would morph into a conventional war”, 
something Kennedy explicitly sought to avoid.409 Forrestal and Hilsman also 
recall a decisive shift in September 1963, a point where McNamara realized 
that “he had been badly misinformed by Harkins.”410  
Ultimately, the idea that McNamara was optimistic that “victory” would 
be achieved by 1965 is not borne out either in his September trip notes or in 
his statements at the ensuing NSC meetings. Although he accepted his 
military advisorsʼ timeline, he did not accept their positive assessments. He 
nevertheless continued to make optimistic statements “to influence events” on 
the ground. The South Vietnamese needed to believe they were “on the 
winning side” if they were to take over responsibilities in earnest; and in 
Washington congressional leaders needed to believe this if he was to avoid 
cuts to his long-term plans for Vietnam.  
Historians have highlighted the press release after the October NSC 
meetings that announced the administrationʼs plans to phase out from 
Vietnam, to underscore McNamaraʼs undue optimism in the fall of 1963. As 
the next chapter shows, rather than providing evidence of McNamaraʼs 
optimism, the statement was first and foremost a maneuver aimed at, among 
others, members of the administration that could put obstacles in the 
CPSVNʼs way.  
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CHAPTER 6: THE MANY PURPOSES OF THE 
OCTOBER ANNOUNCEMENT 
 
The administration resisted making a press announcement until October 1963 
because publicizing the withdrawal plans committed it to a timetable and a 
narrative of a war in a de-escalating phase. In fact, even though NSAM 263, 
the summative document of the NSC meetings, instructed that “no formal 
announcement” should be made about the withdrawal plans, within hours 
Press Secretary Salinger and Secretary McNamara organized a press 
conference.411 As expected, when it came, the announcement produced front-
page news: the Baltimore Sunʼs cover, for instance, was splashed with the 
headline “McNamara and Taylor Feel U.S. Can Withdraw Most Of Troops 
From Vietnam By End of 1965”.412 The New York Times cover featured a 
photo of President Kennedy listening intently to Taylor and McNamara with 
the headline “Vietnam Victory by the End of ʼ65 Envisaged by U.S”.413. 
Just as McNamara had insisted on having the 1965 end-date in his trip 
report, he also insisted on making a public announcement, knowing that it 
would attract media attention. The announcement fulfilled a number of his 
short and long-term objectives. In the short-term, the administration hoped to 
goad the Diem regime into implementing much-needed and long-awaited 
political reforms that would “win the hearts and minds” of the South 
Vietnamese as a prerequisite for defeating the Vietcong insurgency.414 
Crucially for McNamara, it also prepared him to counter the criticisms of 
Senators Fulbright and Mansfield before going to Capitol Hill the following 
week, and in so doing, to delay possible cuts in aid funding.  
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However, the more important objective for McNamara was a 
bureaucratic one: that is to peg the whole, fractured administration to his 
chosen policy and to create considerable momentum against further 
escalation. A telling exchange during the October NSC meetings between 
Kennedy and his Press Secretary Pierre Salinger speaks to this objective 
most clearly. When Salinger indicated that “the significance of this is that this 
is a government-wide statement of policy which has the approval of every”, 
Kennedy cut him off to add, “And more than that. Itʼs not only that statement 
[…] to obey […] but also the report, the essence of the report, was endorsed 
by all.”415 
Moreover, the press release actually contained two distinct 
announcements: a token, thousand-man withdrawal by the end of 1963 and, 
in addition, a gradual phase-out of remaining military personnel by 1965. The 
thousand-man withdrawal was arguably a public relations exercise aimed 
primarily at appeasing the SFRC whereas the overall phase-out was, as the 
Pentagon Papers has described it, a “political-managerial”416 move that 
reflected McNamaraʼs style and priorities. 
 
The October announcements as public relations 
In tracing the token 1,000-man withdrawal back to its first expression, it is all 
the more clear that it was always distinct from the overall withdrawal plans. 
The idea of announcing a “token withdrawal” originated in discussions with 
Robert Thompson and the Foreign Office in April 1962 when Thompson 
suggested that it could be made “when it appear[ed] reasonably certain that 
the tide had turned in Vietnam.”417 He argued that it was true in July 1962 and 
by October 1962 suggested that the token withdrawal should take place within 
approximately a yearʼs time (i.e. in October 1963) and that it should be “well 
thought out and well-timed, so that it achieved the maximum effect without 
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taking any of the pressure off here.”418 This suggests that the token 
withdrawal was first, a public relations move (it should be “well-timed”) and 
second, distinct from the overall strategy (it should not “tak[e] any pressure off 
here”). The token withdrawal provided a public backdrop against which the 
administration could present the withdrawal plans but did not affect the 
content of these plans.419 
 At the same time, the administration had to balance different audiences 
in South Vietnam and in Washington DC. Earlier in the summer, it seemed 
that announcing a withdrawal achieved the administrationʼs objectives in both 
settings. In a private conversation, McNamara explained to President 
Kennedy that “we ought to think about the possibility of pulling 1000 men by 
the end of the year”, that this was good “for domestic political purposes and 
also because of the psychological effect it would have on South Vietnam.”420 
In keeping with this, MACV and CINCPAC proposed bringing the troops 
“home by xmas [sic] for compassionate and publicity reasons” and envisaged 
“statements of mutual gratitude” as well as grand ceremonies.421  
 However, after McNamaraʼs trip when he had observed “hedging” and 
uncertainty from the South Vietnamese part, the decision was made to treat 
the withdrawal quietly and justify it on the basis that the function was either 
completed or the South Vietnamese could complete the job themselves.422 
President Kennedy now instructed Lodge that removing the “1,000 US 
advisors by December of this year should not be raised formally with Diem. 
Instead the action should be carried out routinely as part of our general 
posture of withdrawing people when they are no longer needed.”423 
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For McNamara, the Senate was the more important audience. During 
the October meetings, Kennedy specifically asked McNamara about the 
“advantage” of announcing the thousand-man withdrawal. McNamara 
responded that,  
“The advantage of taking them out is that we can say to the Congress 
and the people that we do have a plan for reducing the exposure of 
U.S. combat personnel to the guerrilla actions in South Vietnam, 
actions that the people of South Vietnam should gradually develop a 
capability to suppress themselves. And I think this will be of great value 
to us in meeting the very strong views of Fulbright and others that 
weʼre bogged down in Asia and weʼll be there for decades.”  
Kennedy agreed with McNamara and suggested that any public statement 
should be “run by” these congressmen.424 Both Kennedy and McNamara were 
concerned about losing key allies of the administrationʼs aid program.  
For Taylor, the other author of the October 1963 report, the more 
important audience was Diem. Before leaving for Vietnam, he had “thought it 
would be useful to work out a time schedule within which we expect to get this 
job done and to say plainly to Diem that we are not going to be able to stay 
beyond such and such time with such and such forces, and the war must be 
won in this time period.” The minutes of the meeting read that, “The President 
did not say “yes” or “no” to this proposal.”425 Unlike McNamara, Taylor went 
along with a public announcement of the policy to disengage because he 
hoped to influence the uncooperative regime in Saigon.  
Although Robert Kennedy had first suggested that the threat of 
withdrawal could be used as a pressure tactic426, by the time of the October 
1963 NSC meetings Taylor alone was pushing the idea. For Taylor, the 1965 
deadline was basically arbitrary and primarily a threat designed to get Diem in 
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line in the face of growing pressure within the administration for a coup.427 
McNamaraʼs approach was almost exactly opposite. He lamented the lack of 
influence and although the terms of reference of his trip to Vietnam had 
included finding ways “of influencing Diem”, his notes reveal his frustration. In 
them, he complained, for instance, about “how little leverage we have” on the 
“completely unsuccessful government in Saigon.”428  
In addition, although McNamara saw the value of “creating uncertainty” 
in Diem429, he was also skeptical that such a strategy could be effective.430 
Both before and after the Taylor-McNamara trip, “pressure programs” were 
met with skepticism: President Kennedy “did not think that [they were] likely to 
be effective”431 while the Working Group on South Vietnam and the CIA 
warned that any threat even to “employ its ultimate sanction (pulling out of 
South Vietnam) would almost certainly be regarded as hollow by the 
[Government of South Vietnam].”432  
Ultimately, the Taylor-McNamara report itself presented this strategy 
not as an optimal policy but as a desperate effort: it noted that they could 
“increase [the regimeʼs] obduracy” but “unless such pressures [were] exerted, 
they [were] almost certain to continue past patterns of behavior.”433 Also, the 
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“Selective Pressures” that it did suggest included everything but military cuts 
which it deemed especially unfeasible and counterproductive. Notably it 
excluded the CPSVN.434 “In sum,” the report read, “The effect of pressures 
that can be carried out without detriment to the war effort is probably limited 
with respect to the possibility of Diem making necessary changes.”435 For 
McNamara, a pressure program, if it achieved anything, was designed to keep 
the CPSVN on track: a responsive government in South Vietnam would 
increase the likelihood that a self-sustaining program would be in place by 
1965 when the U.S. military withdrew.  
 
The press statement as a bureaucratic move 
The decision to announce the withdrawal plans on October 3rd 1963 was also 
a bureaucratic move. While drafting the Taylor-McNamara report, Chester 
Cooper, William Bundy and General Taylor each questioned the advisability of 
recommending a 1965 end-date. However, McNamara insisted he was “just 
following orders” and that the date must stay in the report.436 He also overrode 
Kennedyʼs reservations about committing the administration to a set date. 
After getting the military on board (they drafted the CPSVN), this was a way of 
getting the whole national security bureaucracy on board as well. By getting 
all the key actors involved in Vietnam policy to publicly commit to a policy of 
de-escalation and getting Taylor especially to co-own the prediction that most 
military operations would end by 1965, McNamara effectively neutralized 
bureaucratic politics.  
The end-point for the withdrawal plans and in the announcement was 
not “victory” in a traditional or unambiguous sense. Instead, as laid out in the 
CPSVN and in NSAM 263, it was: “until the insurgency has been suppressed 
or until the national security forces of the Government of South Viet-Nam are 
capable of suppressing it.”437 Semantics are important here: it was not and but 
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or. In time, the second alternative took precedence: the South Vietnamese 
were to fight the war themselves.  
Clearly, the nuances of the policy had filtered through the 
administration effectively since Forrestal detailed the standing policy to Bundy 
a month later as follows: “The President made the point, as I remember, that 
our only interest was to help South Viet Nam defend itself against subversive 
aggression from the North. […] More recently we have added a gloss to this 
formula and implied (in the NSC statement of last month) that we would also 
withdrawal the bulk of our personnel as soon as the South Vietnamese were 
able to cope for themselves. Secretary McNamara and General Taylor 
estimated that this might occur in 1965.”438 The policy also filtered to the field 
with Lodge reiterating to his South Vietnamese counterparts that: “Americans 
are here to help Vietnam stand on its own feet, after which we would go 
home.”439 Not everyone in the administration necessarily believed that this 
was the final objective or outcome, but by October 1963 the administrationʼs 
stated policy and the basis for military planning was that the United States 
was in the process of disengaging from Vietnam and transferring 
responsibility to the South Vietnamese.  
In a revealing passage in In Retrospect, McNamara went into some 
detail about the divisions in the administration that culminated in the October 
meeting.440 Since his written notes for the first draft were relatively blunter, 
they are used instead. In them, he described three “factions”:  
“Group one believed the Training Mission had been successful and 
should be withdrawn. Group two believed the Mission hadnʼt 
succeeded but had been in place sufficient time to demonstrate 
success wasnʼt possible. Group three believed that additional US 
support, either through a Training Mission or through training 
supplanted by US combat forces, would be required and was justified." 
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As he explained, while all these “factions” agreed on the end-point, they did 
not necessarily agree on the way to get there or how close the administration 
was to meeting its objective. However, a public commitment to his policy and 
his end-date forced their hand and produced administration-wide unity. 
Indeed, as a State Department cable explained, “We have been making 
serious effort in conjunction with McNamara-Taylor mission to achieve actual 
and visible unity within USG.”441 
 Although McNamara also described the meetings as “heated” and 
“controversial”, in fact this was not entirely correct. His report was sufficiently 
ambiguous that most participants were convinced that their objectives were 
being met. Taylor could feel that the pressures on Diem had been raised. 
Hilsman, who often clashed with McNamara and was prone to making snide 
remarks about him, was so satisfied with McNamaraʼs position at the October 
2nd 1963 meeting that he sent him a laudatory letter that read: “I want to 
express my admiration for a perceptive job performed under the most difficult 
circumstances imaginable. I think you have brought some badly needed order 
to both Saigon and Washington, for which I am personally grateful.”442 
Ultimately, the October announcements served a number of important, 
short-term objectives for McNamara. First, he could “meet” the views of critical 
congressmen as he prepared to meet with them. Second, by announcing the 
process of withdrawal but then treating actual withdrawals in a “low-key” way, 
the administration could try to create uncertainty in the Diem regime without 
giving the Vietnamese the impression that the U.S was “abandoning” them. 
Lastly, it consolidated the OSDʼs policy of phasing out of Vietnam and thus 
created a bureaucratic momentum in that direction. The latter was not, as 
Forrestal had suggested, primarily externally-oriented “gloss”443 but an 
important internal, bureaucratic maneuver.  
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 In an oral history that he gave many years later, McNamara reflected 
on bureaucratic politics in a way that seems particularly relevant to his 
October decisions. He explained, “I would point out that there is an important 
distinction between decisions that are a function of bureaucratic politics or 
decisions that are dominated by bureaucratic politics on the one hand, and, 
on the other, the implementation of decisions taken in the national interest – 
implementation which must take account of bureaucratic politics, and in a very 
real sense neutralize bureaucratic politics.”444 
 
November 1963 
McNamara hoped that a public announcement might set the policy “in 
concrete”445 but he could not have predicted the events that followed and 
which threw it off course. His report had sounded a note of caution that events 
could still create setbacks. Above all there was the possibility of an 
“unanticipated coup dʼétat or death of Diem.” Far from being “unanticipated”, 
McNamaraʼs trip notes showed deep discontent and uncertainty over Diemʼs 
future and over whether the war was winnable with him.  
McNamara opposed the coup, although not vehemently, primarily 
because it introduced uncertainty into his plans. Even before his trip, he was 
unconvinced that coup plotters within the administration knew “how we make 
this thing work.”446 His notes of his meeting with Professor Patrick Honey in 
Saigon, a man he would continue to consult throughout the war, echo 
McNamaraʼs risk aversion despite his frustrations with Diem. They read: 
“dangerous to make a change […] can we win with this regime, he believes 
we canʼt; then what is going to replace it – this is extremely risky.”447  
Ultimately, as McNamara explained to the SFRC, Diem was a prime 
case of “better the devil you know” and he sought to avoid any distractions or 
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disruptions to his planning process. As a result, after the October meetings, 
Kennedy belatedly informed Ambassador Lodge to put a stop to 
communication with would-be coup-plotters in Saigon.  
However, by the end of November, both Prime Minister Diem and 
President Kennedy were dead and, with them, McNamaraʼs best-laid plans for 
Vietnam and for the Defense Department. The ambiguity of the October 
decisions and announcements was enough to get a very disparate group of 
advisors to agree to the policy as well as eventually to overturn it. In the end, 
Kennedyʼs policy might have been doomed to failure: counterinsurgency 
strategy with a much-reduced U.S. presence might not have been enough to 
stave off the insurgency and the Kennedy administration might have been 
compelled to intervene under domestic pressure. On a deeper level, the 
administration never really solved an underlying dilemma of 
counterinsurgency strategy, namely whether security or development issues 
should take precedence. In any case, counterfactual reasoning is fraught with 
problems and can be left to others.448  
 
Conclusion 
The first part of this thesis has described the reforms effected by McNamara 
at the OSD and his efforts to align the Defense Departmentʼs resources and 
capabilities to the Presidentʼs chosen policies and specifically on Vietnam. 
McNamara was projected into a leading role on Vietnam because of his 
proximity to the President and because of his ability to bring order to the 
administrationʼs most complicated problems. As it happened, the Presidentʼs 
chosen policy was to use Vietnam as a test case for his interest in 
counterinsurgency, to provide a case study for the “wars of national liberation” 
that loomed across the developing world.  
Although McNamara sat at the helm of the United Statesʼ military 
organization, he did not necessarily favor military solutions to the problems in 
Vietnam, on the contrary. Instead, the administration moved to a strategy 
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geared towards “self-help”, as spelled out in Kennedyʼs inaugural address, 
and towards disengagement from Vietnam in part to pre-empt the trends 
towards militarization that troubled Kennedyʼs civilian advisors in 1962. 
McNamara chose withdrawal not out of optimism but because it was most the 
coherent and efficient option available to him to meet the views of advisors 
such as Hilsman and Thompson. From a bureaucratic perspective, and 
according to McNamaraʼs understanding of civil-military relations, which was 
shaped by the Eisenhower administrationʼs legacy, policy was now working as 
it should.  
Nevertheless, the economic dimensions of withdrawal are fundamental 
to understanding McNamaraʼs enthusiasm for counterinsurgency and for the 
chosen policies. If he gave the plans added urgency and pressed on his 
military advisors to accelerate their phased withdrawal plans, it was also 
because of his preoccupation with fiscal and economic concerns. The latter 
are treated in the second part of this thesis and connect to the second 
dimension of civilian control as it was laid out in the introduction, namely that 
civilian control of the military also implied that the OSD should define the 
appropriate fiscal commitment to military requirements balancing them against 
domestic and economic concerns. 
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PART II:  
THE OSD AS A BRIDGE: THE ECONOMIC 
IMPLICATIONS OF DEFENSE AND OF VIETNAM 
 
 
CHAPTER 7: CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE DEFENSE 
BUDGET 
 
Since its inception, the OSD had played a steadily growing role in designing 
defense policy. Whereas in 1947, the role of the OSD had been limited to 
coordinating war plans that were produced in the separate services, by 1962, 
the military services had little input on setting strategy in Vietnam or indeed 
elsewhere. On the budgetary side, the evolution was more fitful. Since 1947, 
each successive administration had tried to reinforce civilian control of the 
budgetary process but with only limited success. The 1958 Defense 
Reorganization Act asked that the OSD “provide more effective, efficient, and 
economical administration in the Department of Defense” and McNamaraʼs 
immediate successor, Thomas Gates, defined the outlines of an action plan to 
this end but without substantially acting upon it. 
As the Prologue described, McNamaraʼs predecessors were divided 
between those who were great economizers such as Eisenhowerʼs Secretary 
of Defense Charles Wilson who put a primacy on fiscal balance and those 
who were “defense-firsters” such as Trumanʼs last Secretary, Robert Lovett. In 
1961, the incumbent President seemed to fall into the latter group: a central 
theme of his campaign was that Eisenhower had been dangerously 
concerned with budgetary balance and thus had allowed a “missile gap” to 
emerge. Moreover, Kennedy reached out to figurehead “big spenders” in the 
transition including Stuart Symington and Lovett. He tried to bring Lovett into 
his administration, offering him either his old job or the Treasury 
Secretaryship. However, despite the campaign rhetoric and after Lovett turned 
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down the offers, Kennedy filled both positions with men rooted in the 
Republican Party and in more conservative attitudes towards the budget. 
 As Secretary of Defense, McNamara erred on the side of fiscal 
prudence and developed a reputation for cost-cutting while he recognized, 
and at times was alarmed with, the pressures to increase spending on 
defense projects. The pressures were those that had troubled his immediate 
predecessors, namely the services defending their budgets and congressional 
leaders defending the services or jobs in their constituencies. At the same 
time, with a Congress that dragged its feet on most of the administrationʼs 
attempts at social programs, McNamara and his colleagues recognized the 
Keynesian potential of the defense budget and pushed through programs, 
including the civil defense program, that were as much defense projects as 
they were about upgrading civilian infrastructure. 
 Ultimately, McNamaraʼs core “revolution” on implementing civilian 
control came to the budgetary process, principally in the shape of Systems 
Analysis and Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). More 
than the changes to the reporting lines that were described in the preceding 
sections, these changes became a “substitute for unification of the services 
and the establishment of a single chief of staff” as they forced the services to 
produce one overarching budget in keeping with national, shared 
objectives.449 In addition to the analytic rigor they brought to defining the 
United Statesʼ goals and aligning resources to those ends, they gave 
McNamara a privileged overview of the Departmentʼs economic impact. 
 
The Comptrollerʼs Office and the defense budget 
McNamaraʼs vision for the Defense Department emphasized cost-cutting and 
rational analysis. Having been given a free hand to hire the team he 
desired450, McNamara brought in his “whiz kids”, primarily analysts from 
RAND or other security intellectuals many of whom had a background in 
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economics, to radically overhaul what they saw as the archaic way of running 
national defense. They brought a culture of “rational” thought from RAND to 
existing "irrational planning and budgeting practices."451 
The key office for this agenda was the Comptroller where McNamara 
put Charles Hitch; their first meeting “was reported to be ʻlove at first sightʼ.”452 
Before coming into government, Hitch had been the Head of the Economics 
Division at RAND and, together with his colleague Roland McKean, had 
written the “bible of defense economics”453, Economics of Defense in the 
Nuclear Age, which spelled out PPBS, his main innovation in office.454 As his 
Deputy Alain Enthoven later wrote in an obituary for his mentor, “"Hitchcraft," 
as it was affectionately known, was the most important advance in public 
administration of our time.”455 While Hitch was known as the “father of 
defense economics” and of PPBS in its precise form, similar ideas had 
circulated both in and outside of the U.S. Defense Department. Hitchʼs ideas 
ultimately reflected a bipartisan consensus that the defense budget, as it drew 
on a growing share of federal resources, should become more transparent 
and accountable.  
First applied to the 1963 budget, PPBS was essentially a planning tool 
to define national security objectives and to break these objectives into 
missions and functional areas (through so-called Draft Presidential 
Memoranda or DPMs). Before, the budget had been allocated on a yearly 
basis and according to service-specific inputs, for instance personnel or 
logistics costs. Under the new system, services budgets were allocated 
according to their ability to achieve the stated objectives in the most cost-
efficient way and were calculated over a five-year period in order to capture 
the total cost of programs, which invariably spread over many years. When 
McNamara presented his first budget in the spring of 1962, newspaper 
headlines recognized the transformative nature of the changes and 
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announced “Kennedy Fights the Generals” while the stories underneath noted 
that McNamara had “virtually abolished separate budgets and it was he and 
not the Joint Chiefs of Staff who explained the new military strategy to 
Congress.”456 
By placing ultimate budgetary authority in the hands of civilian 
agencies of the Defense Department, namely with the Comptroller, rather than 
the services, PPBS eroded the servicesʼ power. PPBS required that each 
service submit its budget through its Chief rather than its Secretary, which de 
facto stripped the Service Secretary positions of their power and made them 
organizationally redundant. As a result, Service Secretary positions became 
“parking lot” positions for Kennedyʼs friends: Secretary of the Navy Fay, for 
instance, was mostly remembered for his time on the golf course.457 When he 
left, he was replaced with Paul Nitze as a way of short-circuiting Nitzeʼs long-
term ambitions to replace Gilpatric as Deputy Secretary of Defense.458 
 
In principle, under PPBS, the budget was open-ended and not bound by the 
set budgetary ceilings that had capped the budgets of McNamaraʼs 
predecessorsʼ. In practice, the reforms were designed with a cost-cutting 
agenda at their core and forced civilian authorities, mainly the President, to be 
more modest in setting strategies and national ambitions. Enthoven and Smith 
explained, "A frequently stated but mistaken view of setting strategy and force 
requirements is that the process is one of starting at the top with broad 
national objectives and then successively deriving a strategy, force 
requirements, and a budget. It is mistaken because costs must be considered 
from the very outset in choosing strategies and objectives."459 
The whole system of forward planning and budgeting was designed to 
align the Defense Departmentʼs resources and planning more effectively with 
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the rest of government. As a result, the budgetary process was coordinated 
with the Bureau of Budget whose director not surprisingly praised the first 
budget, noting that it made “enormous advances in concept, clarity and logic” 
that were “literally revolutionary” although “there is much more to be done, as 
Secretary McNamara knows better than any of us, but the improvement in the 
degree of rationality which can be applied to military planning and budgeting 
is already tremendous.”460  
However, as they were implemented further, the steps to rationalize 
and reduce defense expenditures ruffled many feathers not least in the 
services. The services were the principal target of cuts and the reforms 
challenged their authority most. The State Department was also often 
unsupportive. Looking back on this period, Paul Nitze asserted that if 
McNamaraʼs “belief in forward planning, in particular time phased logistic and 
financial planning was close to absolute”, it also sometimes lacked “tactical 
and broad judgmental vision.”461 
For the services and the Defense Department, cost-cutting first came in 
the shape of the 1962 Defense Department Cost Reduction Program, which 
included standardizing logistics and procurement and especially military base 
closures.462 To support his effort, McNamara created a set of dedicated 
offices within the OSD, notably the Defense Supply Agency, which was 
responsible for procurement and the Defense Contract Audit Agency. Base 
closures were especially complicated politically because many of the Senators 
in the SASC, which was ultimately responsible for allocating the defense 
budget, were also from states that hosted major bases and defense-related 
operations and so, if nothing else, base closures involved job losses for their 
constituents.  
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Congress and the Iron Triangle 
From the start, McNamaraʼs relations with the congressional Armed Services 
Committees were ambivalent. On the one hand, the conservative Democrat 
Chairman of the SASC Richard Russell had pushed through the Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1958 and thus welcomed the reforms that McNamara 
promised to implement. On the other, like many on his committee, he was 
prone to adding wasteful projects to the defense budget for political, rather 
than operational, reasons.  
 In an oral history, McNamara described some of the tensions that 
blighted his congressional relationships. He explained that the members of 
the Armed Services Committees in the House and Senate at the time “were 
not representative of the people” and “were disproportionately Southerners”, 
where many military installations were located. He added, “Southerners, as 
we all know, have had a different view of the military requirements of the 
nation and the national security of the nation, and how it might best be 
achieved, than have the rest of the people.” Moreover, the committees were 
“dominated by reserve officers” who were “spokesmen for military interests as 
opposed to the national interest. They saw things through the narrow 
parochial views of the military.” He ended on one of the main points of 
contention in his congressional relations, namely how they got in the way of 
his cost reduction programs: “There was at that time a situation difficult for 
many people to imagine today: a desire in the Congress to spend far more 
than the Secretary of Defense and the President wished to spend on 
defense.”463 
 McNamaraʼs remarks raised many issues but especially Eisenhowerʼs 
concern in his now-famous farewell address about the “iron triangle” between 
industry, the military and congressional leaders or what the President called 
the “military-industrial complex”. Ironically, Eisenhowerʼs remarks were also a 
reaction to Kennedy and Symingtonʼs accusations during the campaign that 
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he had been “weak on defense”464 and reflected not just on the failures of 
congressional oversight but also on the novelty of a major military 
establishment in the U.S. experience. In later years, Yarmolinsky echoed 
Eisenhowerʼs views and complained about the “military-industrial-labor-
congressional complex”. He argued that Congress “since World War II” had 
“to a considerable extent abdicated” its oversight role of the armed services in 
part because of the growing complexity of military issues and programs but 
also because of “self-interest in major contracts” which produced “wasteful 
development and procurement procedures.”465 
All the same, from McNamaraʼs vantage point, PPBS and his sheer 
strength of character could be enough to short-circuit congressional 
manipulations that would undermine an efficient allocation of federal 
resources to clear defense purposes. He claimed not to “share Eisenhowerʼs 
concerns” suggesting that the “influences” could only affect national security 
policy “to the extent that the President and/or Secretary of Defense wants to 
be influenced.”466 In office, he did not shy away from following through with 
the logic of PPBS and overruling the servicesʼ military judgment on costly 
procurement decisions for new weapon systems, precisely the kind of 
program their allies in Congress tended to defend.  
However, this led to acrimonious arguments between the OSD and the 
Senate and services, most notably over the so-called TFX fighter jet. The Air 
Force and Navy were meant to jointly procure and operate the TFX fighter. 
Despite both servicesʼ reservations, the OSD pushed the program in an effort 
to pool resources, encourage inter-Service cooperation and, in so doing, cut 
costs. The OSD also chose General Dynamics over Boeing to build the jet, a 
choice that overruled the servicesʼ recommendations. The whole program 
became even more controversial as cost overruns dented McNamaraʼs effort 
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to showcase its cost-efficiency logic and when the Senate openly challenged 
McNamaraʼs competence by initiating an investigation into his decision.  
The TFX incident was emblematic of relations between McNamara and 
the services and their allies in Senate and highlighted their resistance to 
McNamaraʼs reforms. Within the OSD it also crystallized a confrontational 
attitude towards the Chiefs and the Senate and contributed to the 
deterioration of trust and goodwill between the two. Writing about the incident 
to Sorenson, Gilpatric was angry:  
“The only feasible method of handling this situation as far as the 
Defense Department is concerned is to shift the basis for the debate. 
Every effort must be made, of course, to establish the fact. But this will 
not do the job that must be done. Somehow, the debate must be 
shifted from a question of merits (which the public is incapable of 
deciding) to a question of whether the military, in conjunction with large 
weapons systems producers, will be able to dominate the responsible 
officials of our Government who, under our Constitution, are supposed 
to be in charge. […] What we are really dealing with in the TFX 
investigation is the spectacle of a large corporation, backed by Air 
Force Generals, using the investigatory powers of Congress to 
intimidate civilian officials just because it lost out on a contract.”467 
Gilpatricʼs letter betrays both the extent to which the OSD, by 1963, was in a 
confrontational relationship with the services and their friends in the 
Congress, but also the extent to which McNamara and his colleagues saw 
themselves as serving the public interest in spite of, if not against, them.  
The battle lines in this confrontation were actually between the 
executive, through the Presidentʼs advisors, and the military and legislative 
branches of government. In the short-term term, the confrontation hinged on 
the latterʼs resistance to any cuts in the defense budget. In the longer term, it 
reflected a deeper rift over McNamaraʼs attempts to break through their 
entrenched interests in the status quo and more broadly, his efforts to move 
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foreign and defense policy making into civilian and specifically the Presidentʼs 
hands.  
 
The defense budget and Keynesianism 
While the Armed Services Committee was relatively spendthrift, the same was 
not true across Congress especially after 1962 when Kennedy announced his 
intention to pass a personal and corporate tax cut to kick-start the ailing 
economy. In the wake of the Berlin Crisis in 1961, Kennedy had planned on 
proposing a tax increase to match increases in defense spending but his 
economic advisors, including Sorensen and Walter Heller, the Chairman of 
the Council of Economic Advisors, convinced him otherwise. By the summer 
of 1962, when Kennedy finally settled on the tax cut, he met with almost 
immediate resistance from Republicans in the House and conservative 
Democrats in the Senate who wanted to force the administration to match the 
proposed tax cuts with cuts to federal expenditures.468  
 The administrationʼs decision to push for a tax cut and increases in 
defense spending rather than spend directly on social programs, as 
Kennedyʼs more Keynesian advisors would have preferred, hinged on issues 
of political feasibility. Kennedy concluded that it was, “probably easier, given 
the mood of Congress and the country, to obtain the necessary economic 
stimulus through tax reduction than through expenditure increases.”469 
Similarly, given the relative invulnerability of the defense budget to cuts, the 
Kennedy administration concluded that “spending for national security, with its 
remarkable sanctity from attack by pressure groups, including business 
[should take] the place of massive public works.”470  
Whereas Eisenhower had added 7 billion to federal spending between 
1953 and 1961, Kennedy added 17 billion in three years. Three quarters was 
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allocated to defense471 but the Defense Departmentʼs funds were also used 
for social purposes: in addition to creating jobs, the ill-fated civil defense 
program morphed into a civilian infrastructure project and McNamara 
spearheaded civil rights issues in the Defense Department specifically to 
compensate for the lack of congressional action.472 McNamara also used the 
Departmentʼs clout over industry to intervene in the domestic economy. For 
instance, when in 1961 steel companies flouted the administrationʼs 
suggested price guidelines that were designed to stem inflation, McNamara 
threatened to switch the Departmentʼs steel providers forcing them to back 
down. Overall, Kennedyʼs liberal critics failed to appreciate the way the 
defense budget was used, albeit as a second-best option, to influence the 
domestic economy and to push social spending through a resistant congress. 
 
Fiscal conservatism 
At the same time, Kennedyʼs liberal critics were correct in their suspicion that 
he was more fiscally conservative than they would have liked. Even before his 
decision to pass the tax cut, Kennedy sought to balance the budget. In fact, 
the CEA remembered his “bombshell” just after the inauguration when he 
agreed with leaders of the Democratic Party in both houses to balance his 
budget as soon as feasible. He would have achieved a balanced budget as 
early as FY63 were it not for weak economic indicators in 1962.473  
Moreover, he chose Republicans to fill two of the most important 
positions for federal spending, namely Treasury and Defense. C. Douglas 
Dillon, with his background in finance at his fatherʼs investment bank, Dillon, 
Read & Co. where the late James Forrestal had also begun his career, and 
McNamara were both nominal Republicans disposed to balanced budgets. 
The Council of Economic Advisors, which was filled with Keynesian 
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economists, complained about Dillonʼs influence on the President.474 Although 
Dillon later explained that in Kennedyʼs view the Treasury and Defense 
positions should be apolitical, he also described himself as Kennedyʼs “Chief 
Financial Officer” and accepted that he usually had the last word on most 
economic issues.475 
 In addition, Kennedy gave both Dillon and McNamara operational 
control of his attempts to limit federal spending. In an attempt to reduce 
expenditures across the board and on defense in particular, Kennedy charged 
Dillon with a government-wide cost-cutting effort. Dillonʼs principal ally in this 
campaign was McNamara who enthusiastically supported the agenda against 
both the State Department and servicesʼ advice. As one of McGeorge Bundyʼs 
principal advisors Carl Kaysen observed at the time, McNamara used “the 
pressures Dillon […] generated as a means for pushing through various 
reorganizations that he had in mind in any event.”476 
McNamara enthusiastically jumped on Dillonʼs bandwagon for a 
number of reasons but especially because Defense Department expenditures 
had increased exponentially since the end of the Second World War and were 
at the heart of expanding federal expenditures. One of the Presidentʼs notes 
on the budget and debt from January 1963 put it simply: in response to “what 
causes the budget deficit?” it answered “first, the cost of national security.”477 
According to official estimates, by 1963 the defense budget represented 
approximately 50% the federal budget478 but national security expenditures 
generally, including space, raised that number to over 70%.479 In other words, 
if the administration was going to cut federal expenditures and especially 
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expenditures abroad, the first and most obvious place to begin was the 
Defense Department. 
 
Conclusion 
Kennedy had campaigned on a platform that suggested that he would 
overturn Eisenhowerʼs fiscal conservatism, both in respect of the federal 
budget and of the defense budget in particular. However, much to the chagrin 
of his more liberal advisers, he was far more fiscally conservative than they 
had anticipated and chose Republicans for both the Treasury and Defense 
positions. Even if defense expenditures increased in absolute terms in the 
short-term, McNamaraʼs reforms were geared towards economies in the 
longer-term. To a large extent, his professional reputation at the OSD was 
built on his abilities as a cost-cutter.  
Part I of this thesis explained how McNamara sought to align Defense 
Department resources to civilian objectives and strategies but this was also 
true in the economic sense. As envisaged in the Defense Reorganization Act, 
McNamaraʼs major reforms, including PPBS, were aimed at matching the 
Departmentʼs resources in the most cost-efficient way possible and with 
domestic, economic concerns in mind. At the same time, McNamara 
confronted entrenched interests in the status quo, including from the services 
and Congress, which made defense spending easier to access. As a result, 
the administration drew on the defense budget to support programs that were 
only tangentially relevant to it, for instance on civilian infrastructure projects 
and eventually in Vietnam. 
The two conflicting types of pressures played a part in McNamaraʼs 
policies for Vietnam. On the one hand, the ready availability of resources 
propelled McNamara and his Department into a leading role on Vietnam. On 
the other, the President, Dillon and McNamaraʼs fiscal conservatism as well 
as McNamaraʼs concerns about the costs associated with Vietnam explain 
why he favored a more modest commitment and eventually withdrawal. 
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CHAPTER 8 – ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS 
 
A central but overlooked part of Kennedyʼs foreign policy and, in turn, of his 
defense policy was that other countries needed to bear a greater share of the 
burden for their security.480 Although Kennedy had criticized Eisenhower for 
“putting fiscal security ahead of national security”481 during the election 
campaign, once in office, he too was concerned that the United Statesʼ 
international responsibilities were beginning to weaken its economic 
foundations. The Second World War and the ensuing Cold War spawned new 
treaty obligations and defense installations across the world that, in turn, 
produced the United Statesʼ persistent balance of payments deficit.  
McNamara may have been, as David Halberstam described, the “can-
do man in the can-do society in the can-do era”482, by 1962, he and Kennedy 
were also more modest. Their experiences in the Bay of Pigs, the Berlin 
standoff and the Cuban missile crisis had had a sobering effect and brought 
home the United Statesʼ vulnerabilities, not least in its economic 
foundations.483 Part of this vulnerability stemmed from slow growth in the U.S. 
economy and nagging unemployment figures that coincided with Premier 
Khrushchevʼs own economic plan that promised to overtake the U.S. 
economy by 1970.484 But especially it came from the balance of payments 
problem and the threat it posed to the dollar as the international reserve 
currency. As Kennedyʼs economic advisor Seymour Harris explained, “We 
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have now become like all other nations- a nation that has to watch its balance 
of payments. We were free of that particular responsibility for a long time.”485 
The benefit of hindsight has arguably colored both diplomatic 
historiansʼ reading of McNamaraʼs early contributions on Vietnam, and 
economic historiansʼ assessment of the Kennedy administration. Diplomatic 
and military historians have depicted an upward trajectory in U.S. involvement 
in Vietnam and in McNamaraʼs hawkish recommendations in the early 1960s; 
many economic historians have glossed over the fiscal and economic 
constraints facing the Kennedy administration with a retrospective judgment 
that balance of payments and gold outflow concerns only became salient later 
in the decade. However, from the vantage point of the early 1960s, neither 
was true and economic constraints determined the timing and shape of the 
CPSVN in the 1962-1963 period. McNamaraʼs calendar for the 1962 period 
offers insight about people who may have influenced his understanding of the 
economic impact of commitments such as that in Vietnam, in particular the 
economist John Kenneth Galbraith. 
 
The balance of payments and gold 
Confirming Francis Gavinʼs work, and contrary to the conventional wisdom 
that the balance of payments and gold outflow would not surface as an issue 
until much later in the decade, the economic historian Barry Eichengreen used 
data mined from official documents to show that balance of payments 
concerns had a greater level of saliency in the 1962-1963 period than at any 
other point including the “crisis years” of 1968 and 1971 when the Bretton-
Woods system eventually collapsed. Figure 1 in Appendix 1 illustrates his 
results and quantifies references to terms such as “gold outflows” and 
“balance of payments” in key documents throughout the 1959-1971 period.486 
Eichengreen has also shown that the first dollar crisis occurred not at 
the end of the decade as scholars have traditionally assumed, but at the end 
of 1960 just as the Kennedy administration prepared to take office. Two 
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related trends converged to undermine the dollar at that moment. First, in that 
year, the traded value of an ounce of gold on the open markets shot up to $40 
whereas the dollar converted at $35, a moment the Kennedyʼs Council of 
Economic Advisers later described as “the gold flutter”.487 Galbraith wrote to 
Kennedy in October of that year that the increase had been “unprecedented” 
and that the “counterpart of this is a weakening of the dollar”, which could 
precipitate a devaluation of the dollar.488 Second, the period of 1958 to 1960 
was the first period since 1945 during which the United States experienced a 
balance of payments deficit, which would persist for the remainder of the 
decade, and a gold outflow of 1.7 billion in 1960 alone. As a result, 1960 was 
the first year where dollar claims exceeded the United Statesʼ gold reserves. 
As foreign holders of U.S. dollars, primarily Western Europeans, began to 
trade in their dollars for gold, fears about an eventual run on the dollar spread.  
The recollections of Kennedyʼs colleagues suggest that gold loss 
issues were not just salient across government but had a special impact on 
President Kennedy who feared that by undermining the role of the U.S. dollar 
as a reserve currency, gold losses posed a direct threat to U.S. power. 
According to Carl Kaysen, who was the main point-man on these issues in the 
NSC staff, “The President was occupied, and in the judgment of some of his 
professionally knowledgeable advisors, over-occupied with the problem of 
balance of payments and gold for the whole of his term in office.”489 Similarly, 
Paul Nitze, from the vantage point of the Defense Department, recalled that: 
“President Kennedy […] felt that this was one of the most important things that 
had to be controlled; that if we didnʼt control this gold outflow, there could be a 
run on the dollar and this would be a disaster, forcing us to currency control 
and all kinds of things which were unattractive.”490  
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For many, the specter of the 1933 Banking Crisis loomed large: facing 
similar circumstances, the Democrat Roosevelt administration was forced to 
devalue amidst a major financial crisis that many blamed on a lack of clear 
government policy.491 Kennedyʼs first State of the Union made it clear that the 
administration would not devalue and that it would address the deficit head-
on. He explained: “This Administration will not distort the value of the dollar in 
any fashion. And this is a commitment. Prudence and good sense do require, 
however, that new steps be taken to ease the payments deficit and prevent 
any gold crisis. Our success in world affairs has long depended in part upon 
foreign confidence in our ability to pay.”492 
 
Dillon and the business community 
Secretary Dillonʼs recollections are also interesting because they explain the 
nature of Kennedyʼs concern just as they elucidate why he might have 
selected Republicans as Secretaries of Defense and Treasury. In addition to 
his background in finance, Dillon had served as Eisenhowerʼs Ambassador to 
France at a time when France was disengaging from Indochina and offloading 
the warʼs costs onto its ally, the United States. Following his Paris posting, 
Dillon moved to the State Department where, as Undersecretary of State for 
Economic Affairs, he oversaw the administrationʼs aid program. In addition, as 
a member of the establishment, Dillon was a close personal friend of John D. 
Rockefeller and many others in the business world, which gave him valuable 
access for a Democratic administration. 
 Dillon explained Kennedyʼs “particular” concern over the balance of 
payments and the offer of the Treasury position: “He was afraid that there was 
a lack of confidence in the U.S. and that nobody knew what the new policies 
would be. He said that I could render substantial assistance because I was 
known in Europe and was known to believe in the maintenance of the value of 
                                                
491 Gary Richardson, Alejandro Komai and Michael Gou, “Rooseveltʼs Gold Program,” Federal 
Reserve History (2003). Retrieved online November 2, 2014, Federal Reserve History 
Resources: http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/DetailView/24. 
492 Message to the Congress on the State of the Union” (speech, Washington, DC, January 
30, 1961). Retrieved online November 2, 2014, American Presidency Project: 
lhttp://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8045 
	   164 
the dollar and in a sound dollar, which he very much believed in himself.”493 In 
and of itself, a balance of payments deficit was not a problem and as the 
administration itself explained in a press release in February 1961, “early 
deficits in our balance of payments were, in fact, favorable in their world 
effect” since they had spurred growth and thus new markets, especially in 
Europe.494 The danger came if dollars were converted into gold, which would 
threaten the stability of the dollar as the international monetary systemʼs 
reserve currency. 
 From the outset, the administration was alerted to “speculative fears 
concerning the future of the dollar”495 and especially, as Galbraith suggested 
to Kennedy, the risk that “Republican bankers” might seek to “embarrass the 
administration” by provoking a run on the dollar.496 Since devaluation was not 
an option for a President who had pledged to “maintain the value of the 
dollar”, Kennedy chose to reassure those who might initiate a speculative 
attack.497 
 As a result, Dillon became the administrationʼs envoy to the business 
community whose confidence was needed and which was suspicious of an 
administration considered too liberal and intellectual for its liking. The 
administration had “started afoul” with business clashing in 1961 over steel 
prices and making staffing choices that accentuated fears: in the Eisenhower 
administration, 36% of appointments were from the business community, in 
Kennedyʼs, only 6% were.498  
Dillon reached out, among others, to his friend Rockefeller whose 
advice to the new President was that “the only way to achieve a solid solution 
to our balance of payments problem […] is through time honored methods”, 
namely an expansion of exports, manipulating interest rates and, crucially, 
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“through maintaining confidence (both here and abroad) in the soundness and 
integrity of the dollar.” He ended by explaining to the President that 
confidence could be encouraged with “more effective control of expenditures 
and a determined and vigorous attempt to balance the budget.”499 
Rockefellerʼs letter suggests that the administrationʼs fiscal prudence was not 
just an intellectual preference but also the product of real and perceived 
constraints, not least the specter that the U.S. business community could use 
underlying economic weaknesses to embarrass it.  
 
The perfect storm of 1962 
By July 1962, at the same time as McNamara initiated his withdrawal plans 
from Vietnam, the balance of payments situation became particularly 
alarming: as Dillon informed the President, “Whereas in 1961 only about one-
third of our over-all deficit was reflected in a gold loss, so far in 1962 almost 
60 percent of our deficit has been reflected in a gold losses.”500 Moreover, 
these developments coincided with a weak domestic economic picture. In 
June 1962, in the second largest financial crash on record, the U.S. stock 
market had lost a quarter of its value against the backdrop of an economy just 
beginning to recover from a lingering recession that kept unemployment 
figures around the 6% mark. 
For the Kennedy administration, this looked like a perfect storm. As 
Rockefeller had suggested the “time honored” and easy method to get 
claimants to hold their dollars would have been to increase interest rates but 
this was not possible for an administration that had pledged to kick start the 
economy in the face of a recession.501 In 1961, the Treasury introduced a 
gimmick that reconciled competing interest rate needs. It was called 
Operation Twist. As the name suggests, it twisted the interest rates to keep 
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long-term interest rates low but short-term interest rates high. On gold, Dillon 
used his clout as someone “known in Europe” to create the London Gold Pool 
at the end of 1961 whereby the United States, together with seven European 
countries, agreed to collaborate on a joint gold pool to prevent prices from 
going up as they had during the “gold flutter of 1960”. In addition, in July 1963, 
the administration passed the Interest Equalization Tax, which essentially 
taxed U.S. investments in foreign countries. Combined with other “buy 
American” programs, by 1963 the administration seemed to have created a 
comprehensive program to address its economic concerns. 
However, all of these steps and Rockefellerʼs other suggestion that the 
administration should boost trade, could not ultimately compensate for the fact 
that it was not trade but defense installations abroad that drove the balance of 
payments deficit. In fact, trade had expanded as European economies 
recovered in the preceding decade and the United States ran a “very 
substantial, unusually large, export surplus.”502 Services drove the deficit. As a 
Federal Reserve report at the time concluded, over 38% of the deficit could be 
traced back to “services in connection with the maintenance of installations 
abroad.”503  
Similarly, during the presidential campaign, in a speech given in 
Philadelphia in October 1960 on the balance of payments, then Senator 
Kennedy had explained that the “first” contributor to the balance of payments 
was the “heavy commitments abroad for military and economic aid, and for 
the support of our own overseas military forces.”504 Newspapers at the time 
echoed his remarks and warned that “the cost of preserving Americanʼs world-
wide defense commitments, particularly the lavish establishment in Europe, 
has been a major cause of the outflow of gold and foreign currency, now 
threatening the stability of the dollar.”505  
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 Given McNamaraʼs background as an economist and his focus on 
economical defense as well as his efforts to align defense resources and 
capabilities to national priorities, he turned to the issue of the balance of 
payments with renewed vigor. It shaped his approach to ruthless cost cutting 
in all operations abroad and especially on Vietnam. 
 
John Kenneth Galbraith 
Economist John Kenneth Galbraithʼs letters to Kennedy offer further insight 
into the type of considerations that informed McNamaraʼs proposed solutions 
and primarily his decision to begin troop withdrawals, including in Vietnam. In 
April 1962, McNamara met with John Kenneth Galbraith for three hours, a 
long time for someone who customarily scheduled, at most, 40 minutes for his 
meetings. They knew each other well having met while McNamara was 
teaching at Harvard University and later collaborated on a book on corporate 
structures when McNamara was at the Ford Motor Company. (The only longer 
meeting during this period was with Robert Thompson, the British 
counterinsurgency expert.)506 Whereas historians have tended to focus on 
Galbraithʼs dovish influence or lack thereof on President Kennedy, his thinking 
filtered more clearly into McNamaraʼs decisions and dovetailed with a strategy 
that depended on Vietnamese self-help and counterinsurgency. 
After his meeting with McNamara, Galbraith wrote to President 
Kennedy that they were in “basic agreement” over Vietnam. Galbraith and his 
friend the now Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs Harriman were part 
of a vocal minority of civilian advisors who argued that the United States was 
entering into a continuum of external aggression in Vietnam that was doomed 
to fail.507 Although McNamara shied away from making this kind of sweeping 
                                                
506 Robert McNamara Calendar, Folder: Calendar, 1962, Box II:66, RSM Papers, LoC. 
507 Harriman was more ambivalent than Galbraith on Vietnam. While he, like Galbraith, 
argued “against the value of the introduction of American troops to strengthen morale” 
because this could produce a “certain adverse political reaction, particularly when a country 
has just emerged from colonial rule,” he did not argue for disengagement either. For instance, 
in October 1963, in trying to make the case that intervention in South Vietnam was more 
viable than it had been in Laos, he explained to Arthur Schlesinger, “South Vietnam is quite 
different [to Laos] as the logistics are in our favor and that country is of enormous political, 
strategic and economic importance.” Harriman to Schlesinger, October 17, 1963, Folder: 2 
Vietnam Security, 1961, Box 128a, POF, JFKL. 
	   168 
geopolitical judgment, he knew and respected Galbraithʼs judgment and would 
have agreed with another letter where Galbraith warned: 
“Our present deployment is based on tradition, accident, the mystique 
of conventional force, and the recurrent feeling that, in the absence of 
any other feasible lines of action, the movement of troops might help. (I 
hasten to allow for rational factors as well.) On the whole dollars have 
not entered the calculation at least until lately. It is much better that 
they enter as a consideration now than on some subsequent day when 
we run out. At least why not have a high-powered team draw up a 
deployment strategy designed to minimize the dollar outlays. The 
logistical framework and small forces would remain forward. Behind our 
dollar account would be the troops (and their families) with great 
emphasis on mobility and air-lift. We might, as compared for example 
with the sterile commitment in Korea, find it a lot better.” 
In the same letter, Galbraith also attacked the aid program to Formosa and 
Korea and wondered how “economical” these were and whether the United 
States was funding “excessively expensive military establishments.”508 
Returning to the dollar and gold outflow problem, he cautioned, “We should 
remind ourselves that our commitments here were established when dollars 
were plentiful. A dollar shortage would have been good for Mr. Dulles.”509 
 
Reshaping US presences around the world 
Faced with a “dollar shortage”, or at least a perceived one, Kennedy did what 
Galbraith suggested and on June 22, 1962 created a “high-powered team”, 
the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments with Douglas Dillon as its 
Chairman and McNamara as the driving bureaucratic force behind it. Not only 
were these two men among the most “high-powered” in the administration, 
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they were also the only members of the Cabinet that interacted with Kennedy 
socially, who were “friends” whom he trusted.  
Within a month and with his habitual application, McNamara suggested 
a list of steps to reduce the Defense Departmentʼs impact on the balance of 
payments. These included encouraging the sale of U.S. military equipment 
primarily to Europeans, coordinating in-country programs with AID, and 
working towards removing any redundancies or inefficiencies in the field 
especially by urging regional countries (such as Japan) to shoulder a greater 
burden of the costs. In Vietnam, his recommendations coincided with 
Operation Switchback and the Defense Departmentʼs absorption of many of 
AIDʼs programs as well as the first draft of the CPSVN. 
McNamaraʼs reassessment of troop deployments ran in parallel to the 
CPSVN and accelerated at the same time as did the CPSVN. In July 1962, 
McNamara instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to produce a five-year 
deployment plan, an audit of sorts of existing bases abroad “with a view to 
eliminating all non-essential units” and asked that “this plan should be 
developed by country, by service, by unit, and fiscal year.”510 This came five 
days after he had asked for a first draft for the CPSVN. Later, in March 1963, 
Kennedy asked his advisors to “bring our accounts into balance in a shorter 
period of time” and that all AID and Defense programs abroad should be 
examined on an urgent basis.511 By April 1963, McNamara asked the JCS to 
further shorten the CPSVNʼs phase-out timeline while he also produced a new 
report for the Cabinet Committee where he described measures aimed out 
“thinning out our deployments.”512 
 In Vietnam as elsewhere, McNamara rationalized many of the troop 
withdrawals using Galbraithʼs exact logic, namely that the administrationʼs 
heavy investments in air and sea-lift had removed the need for massive 
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forward positioning of troops. As he explained to Kennedy: “I do not believe 
the proposed force redeployments will weaken significantly our ability to 
respond to Communist aggression. The increase in the procurement of Army 
equipment, airlift aircraft, and the increase in the ferry range of such aircraft 
have greatly increased our ability to deploy both air and ground forces from 
the U.S. to theaters of operation within a period of strategic warning.”513 In the 
wake of the Berlin Crisis, McNamara had stepped up investments in strategic 
lift capabilities and initiated a series of exercises culminating in the Big Lift 
exercise in the fall of 1963 whose purpose was “to test our system” but also to 
“demonstrate dramatically our redeployment capabilities to our Allies and to 
the Soviets.”514 In other words, the exercises were designed to reassure Allies 
that technological advances, which would allow for the rapid deployment of 
troops in the event of a crisis, could offset troop withdrawals. As a result, by 
the end of 1963, following the logic of cost-cutting the Comptroller projected a 
worldwide troop reduction of 15% over two calendar years.515 
 
Reconsidering US presences in Europe and in Asia 
As Francis Gavin has shown, in Europe the underlying rationale for troop 
withdrawals was essentially one of fairness: that Europeans should shoulder a 
greater share of the burden for their own security especially given the new 
defense policy of flexible response. Kennedy was particularly harsh with 
European Allies. In notes from a December 1961 meeting with the JCS in 
Palm Beach, Kennedy predicted that the administration would “face the 
question in 1963” but maintained that he “always felt we could force the 
Europeans to do more by pulling some of our forces out.”516 In the absence of 
real movement on that front, Kennedy returned to his criticism of European 
countries in 1963. Hilsmanʼs notes of a private meeting read that Kennedy 
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complained that, “We have to make Europe pick up their burden. Ridiculous 
that they are not doing their part. We have pursued a very generous policy in 
the past. We have to get tougher about this. We must keep our economic 
house in order.”517  
On the other hand, European states – especially Western Germany 
and France – also had significant leverage over the United States as they 
were major holders of dollar reserves.518 Throughout 1962, going hand in 
hand with negotiations on troop withdrawals, McNamara accelerated a 
program of military equipment sales to European countries designed to 
“offset” the balance of payments deficit.519 He launched a “buy American” 
program, reducing local purchases at the defense installations abroad, and he 
repatriated dependents or support staff in many of the bloated defense 
installations. These programs were especially successful in Germany and 
Italy: by 1963, by spending on U.S. military equipment and services, the cost 
of the U.S. presence in these countries had almost entirely been offset.520 
In Asia, the dynamic was different: here, in the preceding decade “Mr. 
Dulles” had fixed the United States to a number of expensive and “sterile 
commitments”, which Dillon and McNamara argued were more expensive 
than needed. Therefore, McNamaraʼs priority was to unstick open-ended and 
growing commitments and to favor instead a greater burden-sharing 
arrangement that presaged what would become the Guam Doctrine in the 
Nixon administration. Paradoxically, although the historiography is richer on 
the impact of the balance of payments in Europe, it was in Asia that Galbraith 
and McNamaraʼs criticisms were particularly acute.521  
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For both Galbraith and McNamara, the commitment to Korea was the 
most outdated and disproportionately expensive. Whereas by 1963 Japan had 
transitioned to an economic state where the administration could reasonably 
conclude that it “must depend more on its own self-defense capabilities in the 
future”522, Korea appeared to be stuck in a position of dependence. By June 
1963, McNamara wrote to Kennedy: “I believe we should prepare plans for a 
time-phased reduction of U.S. Army forces in the ROK from 52,400 to about 
17,000 by the end of CY65 and a reduction in ROK ground forces from 536,00 
to 450,000 by the end of CY67. If this reduction were accomplished, the MAP 
for Korea could be reduced from the $200 million level programmed for FY64 
to an annual level of no more than $150 million by FY68.”523 He noted that 
that with a programmed increase in airlift capability of 300%, troops could be 
redeployed quickly from the West Coast. All in all, for McNamara, these 
changes made sense not only from a balance of payments perspective but 
also for the military assistance program discussed in later chapters. Moreover, 
he justified a reduction of the military presence “in view of the Sino-Soviet split 
and the resulting picture of somewhat deteriorating Chinese Communist 
capabilities”, presumably a euphemistic reference to the Great Leap 
Forwardʼs devastation.524 
 
State Department and JCS objections 
However, whether in Europe or Asia, the State Department and Joint Chiefs of 
Staff stymied McNamaraʼs efforts. They argued that they were too politically 
explosive and that they potentially undermined the credibility of U.S. 
commitments around the world. Even McNamaraʼs more modest suggestion 
to remove dependents from overseas bases riled the Chiefs who 
“consider[ed] this entirely unacceptable” and worried that it would strike a 
“mortal blow to recruiting and would be viewed as the last unbearable step in 
                                                
522 McNamara to Armed Services Secretaries, July 16, 1963, Folder: Reading File, July 1963, 
Box 118, RG200, RSM Papers, Reading Files, NARA. 
523 CY is Calendar Year. “Force Reductions in Korea”, McNamara to Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Taylor, November 6, 1963, Folder: Reading File, November 1963, Box 119, 
RG200, RSM Papers, Reading Files, NARA. 
524 Ibid. 
	   173 
the subordination of military to civilian needs, with predictable consequences 
in Congressional outrage.”525 
Paul Nitze, the Secretary of the Navy, who had played a part in the 
buildup in Korea as Head of the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department 
from 1950 to 1953, argued that troop withdrawals were “simply impossible”, 
especially in the Far East and Germany.526 In part, his concern stemmed from 
a fear that troop reductions “would make it necessary for us to commit 
ourselves to an immediate nuclear response in the event of any serious threat 
in Korea and probably elsewhere in the Far East.”527 In other words, echoing 
Ruskʼs arguments against troop withdrawals in Europe, a confrontation could 
quickly become a nuclear exchange in the absence of another credible 
deterrent.528 
Meanwhile, George Ball, the Undersecretary of State for Economic 
Affairs, angrily wrote to his predecessor Dillon that publicly announcing 
redeployments for balance of payments reasons would be seen “as a sign of 
weakness” and warned of “grave dangers” in these “matters of life or death.” 
More pointedly, he reminded Dillon that it would “be particularly unbecoming 
for the Kennedy administration to announce that it was adjusting its defense 
arrangement for balance of payments reasons, since the President played a 
leading role in ʼ58 in chastising the Eisenhower administration for – as he put 
it – placing “fiscal security ahead of national security.””529 
On the same day, October 3rd 1963, that the administration announced 
its phase-out plan from Vietnam, Rusk expressed his concerns about troop 
withdrawals to President Kennedy in dramatic terms. While he accepted that 
some withdrawals would be necessary, he argued that McNamaraʼs plans for 
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Korea and Japan as well as Europe would create “immense political problems 
which no amount of effectively devised and assiduously implemented 
diplomacy and public relations will be able to contravene.” He ended 
ominously: “I would be derelict in my responsibility to you if I did not advise 
you that, in my considered judgment, the implementation of the DoD 
proposals […] would be the gravest sort of mistake, fraught with adverse 
political and psychological consequences, perhaps out of all proportion to the 
intrinsic military significance but, nevertheless, carrying a real danger of 
jeopardizing our entire national security posture.”530 
Ruskʼs “firm[ness] in his unwillingness to accept any major force 
reductions”531 had some impact: they stalled withdrawals from Korea and may 
have spurred the efforts of European Allies to offset U.S. expenditures.532 
Also, in keeping with the State Departmentʼs objections, McNamara conceded 
that it was “entirely acceptable” to him that withdrawals, when they happened, 
should “not be presented as a "package" implying U.S. withdrawal from its 
commitment to maintain the integrity and freedom of the Free World" and that 
they should be done in a discrete fashion in order to give countries "no basis 
for believing that the program is forced upon us by our balance of payments 
position."533 In November 1963, he instructed the JCS that while the plan was 
still to cut overseas deployments by 15% in the next two years, “wherever 
possible action of low visibility should be taken without public 
announcement.”534 
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Vietnam as a variable cost 
The OSDʼs planned troop withdrawals played an important part in the timing 
and scope of the withdrawal plans for Vietnam. In July 1963, as McNamara 
reviewed the "concerted effort during the past two years to reduce the net 
adverse balance of the Department of Defense transactions entering the 
international balance of payments” he could proudly point to impressive 
achievements and statistics, for instance that "gross expenditures overseas 
less receipts, was reduced by approximately $850 million - from 2,334 million 
to 1,477." However, he also acknowledged that “political constraints” got in 
the way of even greater “successes”.535 One of the main producers of those 
constraints, George Ball, later reflected on McNamaraʼs efforts: “Because Bob 
was prepared to distort any kind of policy in order to achieve some temporary 
alleviation to the balance of payments, which again to my mind was a function 
of his preoccupation with quantification.”536  
With the bureaucracy firmly against him, McNamara considered that 
the troop deployments in Europe and Korea had effectively become “fixed 
costs” for the time being and turned to controlling those, like Vietnam, that 
could still be considered “variable costs”. Balance of payments issues were on 
McNamaraʼs mind both before and after his key trip to Vietnam in October 
1963. During the October 1963 NSC meetings, when National Security 
Adviser McGeorge Bundy asked McNamara “what [was] the point” of 
announcing a phase-out, McNamara responded, “We need a way to get out of 
Vietnam. This is a way of doing it. And to leave forces there when theyʼre not 
needed, I think is wasteful and complicates both their problems and ours.”537 
For McNamara, the “waste” and “complications” related, in the short-term, 
primarily to the beleaguered Military Assistance Program that financed 
Vietnam operations, and more broadly to the balance of payments deficit.  
The day before McNamara left for Vietnam in September 1963, during 
a White House meeting on the balance of payments, he agreed that the DoD 
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would develop “specific, detailed country proposals for reductions” the timing 
and tactics of which would be coordinated with State.538 Although these 
reductions were primarily aimed at Europe, it is difficult to imagine that 
McNamara would not have applied the same cost-cutting logic to Vietnam on 
the eve of his departure especially since he had always applied broader fiscal 
considerations to U.S. policy in Vietnam. Ultimately, troop withdrawals in 
Vietnam and in other places reflected McNamaraʼs sentiment that the OSD 
“should ruthlessly eliminate all activities, the cost of which is not 
commensurate with their contribution to our national defense.”539  
In addition, as the next chapter shows, troop withdrawals from Vietnam 
specifically chimed with a more economical strategy aimed at getting Allies to 
assume a greater share of the responsibilities for their defense, or in his 
words, a strategy that recognized that the “proper support of indigenous 
forces on the scene would give a greater return to collective defense than 
additional U.S. military forces.”540 Where this thesis has treated military 
strategy and its economic dimensions separately, in practice, McNamaraʼs 
supported a strategy of counterinsurgency and self-help because it promised 
an economically sustainable model for U.S. leadership at a time when its 
responsibilities around the world were proliferating. 
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CHAPTER 9: THE ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF THE 
VIETNAM STRATEGY 
 
The economic backdrop facing the administration casts McNamaraʼs support 
for withdrawal and the October 3, 1963 press announcement in a different 
light. The administrationʼs defense policy reflected its economic priorities and 
constraints. In Vietnam specifically, the chosen strategy reflected a sense of 
modesty born of a confrontation with new threats and challenges, rather than 
the omnipotence and optimism that historians typically ascribe to McNamara 
and the Kennedy administration. Strategies that hinged on counterinsurgency 
were de facto cheaper as they did not rely on the same amount of logistical 
support as conventional deployments and because they presupposed self-
help on the part of the countries battling the insurgency, that is, it was the 
South Vietnamese themselves who would do the fighting. 
 As a result, McNamara led efforts in the administration to redefine the 
problem in Vietnam in a way that could ensure a more limited commitment: as 
long as it was an internal, insurgency problem, it would not require the type of 
support and long-term commitment that he had inherited at the Defense 
Department for Korea. As Gilpatric remembered, counterinsurgency was not 
necessarily McNamaraʼs “dish of tea”541 but he welcomed its economic 
implications as a more sustainable model for U.S. leadership internationally 
and for the Defense Department specifically. It leveraged the Departmentʼs 
new investments, notably in air and sea-lift capabilities and in the Special 
Forces, without demanding the type of permanent stations abroad that drove 
the balance of payments deficit.  
As he did with the Korea commitment, McNamara argued that new air 
and sealift capabilities removed the need for massive pre-positioning of troops 
in Vietnam. Following Alain Enthovenʼs advice, which was subsequently 
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confirmed in a RAND report542, he held discussions to concentrate the Armyʼs 
forces in “hubs” in Thailand and in the Philippines from which, if necessary, 
the United States could intervene in the case of outright aggression, in other 
words a conventional invasion of North Vietnamese forces.543 The forces 
need not be in Vietnam; they could intervene from these “hubs”. 
 
Modesty rather than omnipotence 
In November 1961, at precisely the same time as he was receiving the Taylor-
Rostow missionʼs recommendations to introduce ground troops into Vietnam, 
which garnered the support of most of his advisors including McNamara, 
President Kennedy took up another more modest theme in both his public and 
private pronouncements. In a speech delivered on November 16 at the 
centennial celebrations of the University of Washington, Kennedy said, “We 
must face the fact, that the United States is neither omnipotent nor omniscient 
– that we are only 6 per cent of the worldʼs population - that we cannot impose 
our will upon the other 94 per cent of mankind – that we cannot right every 
wrong or reverse each adversity – and that therefore there cannot be an 
American solution to every problem.” He warned against those who “urge 
upon us what I regard to be the pathway to war. […] If their view had 
prevailed, we would be at war today, and in more places than one.” Also, he 
refused the polarizing tendency whereby “each side sees only “hard” and 
“soft” nations, hard and soft policies, hard and soft men. Neither side admits 
its path will lead to disaster – but neither can tell us how or where to draw the 
line once we descend the slippery slopes of either appeasement or 
intervention.” 544 
While it is plausible that Kennedyʼs speech spoke to other issues or 
situations than the one in Vietnam, Arthur Schlesinger used the speech to 
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subsequently explain that, “he thought, and often said, that we were 
“overcommitted” in Southeast Asia” and that he was “quite prepared to cut 
losses and never felt that he had to prove his manhood by irrational 
bellicosity.”545 Crucially, it was the views of advisors such as Sorensenʼs that 
prevailed on Vietnam strategy. Quoting directly from the University of 
Washington speech to make his case, on November 24, 1961, a week after 
the speech was delivered, Sorensen wrote to Kennedy: “this battle must be 
won at the village level; and thus only the Vietnamese can defeat the VC, we 
cannot do it for them. Troops of a different country, color and culture are not 
as suitable and effective.” As for the U.S. role, “we can supply the weapons, 
training and financing – no more should be needed” and, in a line straight 
from the speech, he warned that “we are not omnipotent or omniscient” and 
there “cannot be an American solution to every world problem.”546 
Throughout his time in office, from the inaugural address onwards, 
Kennedy returned to the idea that the United States, like all countries, faced 
constraints on what it could hope to achieve. In an interview in December 
1962, in which he assessed his first two years in office, Kennedy described 
what he had learned about power and responsibility. He remarked: “In the first 
place, I think the problems are more difficult than I imagined they were. 
Secondly, there is a limitation upon the ability of the United States to solve 
these problems. […] There are greater limitations on our ability to bring about 
a favorable result than I had imagined there would be. And I think thatʼs 
probably true of anyone who becomes President.”547  
 
When military problems become financial problems 
Although Sorensen may have perceived the problems in Vietnam as military 
or political problems, in reality, they were inextricably linked to economic 
realities. As the Defense Departmentʼs Comptroller Hitch had written, “All 
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military problems are, in one of their aspects, economic problems in the 
efficient allocation and use of resources.”548 When McNamara referred to 
“waste” in Vietnam or when Galbraith spoke about the French precedent, they 
viewed the problem through their own lens, an economic one. 
 In Galbraithʼs letter to Kennedy after meeting and being in “basic 
agreement” with McNamara in April 1962, he wrote: "There is a consequent 
danger we shall replace the French as the colonial force in the area and bleed 
as the French did. [...] We should measurably reduce our commitment [...] 
[and] resist all steps which commit American troops to combat action and 
impress upon all concerned the importance of keeping American forces out of 
actual combat commitment. [...] Americans in their various roles should be as 
invisible as the situation permits."549 His reflections speak to military strategy 
and specifically to preventing militarizing the U.S. commitment but what 
Galbraith, an economist, meant when he wrote “bleed as the French” could 
presumably just as well have been an economic point. 
As men like Galbraith and especially Dillon recalled, economic realities 
and decisions in the Treasury compelled the French withdrawal (and resulting 
American involvement) from Indochina. Echoing Hitchʼs remarks, Pierre 
Mendes-France, who as Prime Minister of France oversaw the countryʼs 
withdrawal from Indochina, remarked that, “Every problem eventually 
becomes a financial problem. Such was the situation in Indochina: it got off on 
the wrong foot politically, militarily and morally but its problems became 
especially acute on a budgetary level.”550 In the period of 1945 to 1954 when 
France eventually abandoned its colonial ambitions in Indochina, the war 
swallowed up over 10% of all state expenditures and Mendes-France 
explicitly presented withdrawal as a way of getting French finances in order.551  
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Moreover, successive French governments had sought cost-cutting 
measures in Indochina by introducing very similar steps to those McNamara 
now encouraged. These included attempts to internationalize the war, using 
Special Force-type forces to train ethnic and religious minorities, and pursuing 
a policy of “self-help”. The policy that later became known as Vietnamization 
had a precursor in the French policy of jaunissment or “yellowing”, which 
shifted fighting responsibilities to local and regional troops. Moreover, France 
built up and trained national armies in each of the countries of Indochina as 
an alternative to deploying troops from continental France.552 
 
Self-help and counterinsurgency as economical defense 
Disengagement from Vietnam was part of a general trend that encouraged 
“self-help” in countries. In many ways, this policy of self-help or relying on 
local forces presaged what later became the Nixon Doctrine with 
Vietnamization as its flagship program. During the Kennedy administration, a 
policy of self-help in the developing world was a way of reconciling the 
existing economic constraints with the administrationʼs interest in guerrilla 
warfare and wars of national liberation. The policy recalled Kennedyʼs 
inaugural address where he indicated that the administration would prioritize 
aid programs designed to help “people in the huts and villages of half the 
globe […] help them help themselves.” Also, as McNamara explained while 
preparing his first budget, “The main responsibility against subversion and 
guerrilla warfare must rest on indigenous populations and forces, but given 
the great likelihood and seriousness of this threat, we must be prepared to 
make a substantial contribution in the form of forces trained in this type of 
warfare.”553  
A report on the administrationʼs military assistance program explained 
how training geared towards self-help could fulfill a force multiplying function: 
“Through military assistance, we have sought to strengthen the will and 
                                                
552 Ibid., pp 119 for detailed statistics. 
553 “Report to the President on FY1962 Budget by Secretary McNamara”, February 20, 1961, 
Folder: FY1962 Budget, Box 10, RG200, RSM Papers, Defense Programs and Operations, 
NARA. 
	   182 
capacity of recipient countries to resist Communist aggression. We have 
pursued this objective largely by developing local forces for self-defense. And, 
by linking many of these forces in a system of regional alliances with U.S. 
participation or pledged support, we have attempted to augment strength 
through joint defense activities.” For guerrilla wars, the report further 
described that, “A strong case can be made that internal security programs 
are cheaper and more effective where major a guerrilla threat does not 
already exist.”554  
In theory, the idea that local forces could be tied into regional networks 
was promising; in practice, it had limited success. Nevertheless, it formed the 
bedrock of the administrationʼs policy for Southeast Asia. In a letter to Prime 
Minister Diem in October 1962, Kennedy wrote: “As Viet-Nam gains its victory 
over adversity and aggression, it will be in a position increasingly to devote its 
energies to achieving closer cooperation among the community of free 
Southeast Asian states. Each of these nations has its unique character and 
philosophy. In common they are confronted not only by grasping Communism 
but also by the chance to develop together. By sharing the development of 
their individual capacities they can multiply their mutual strength. The task is 
as difficult as it is necessary.”555 
While placing the onus on local and smaller forces made sense from a 
strategic point of view for an administration that was interested in 
counterinsurgency, it also made economic sense for a President and 
Secretary of Defense who were concerned with the costs of the United Statesʼ 
international obligations. McNamara defended the military assistance program 
in Vietnam by using similar cost-efficiency logic. He explained, “One of the 
main conclusions we draw […] is that proper support of indigenous forces on 
the scene would give a greater return to collective defense than additional US 
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military forces.”556 Moreover, the administration justified a training program 
geared towards policing-type operations, rather than military ones, specifically 
with the issue of costs in mind. Conventional military deployments necessarily 
came with an “extensive staff and logistic support”557: in Vietnam, in later 
years, only about 35% of the forces in the field were involved in actual 
combat.558 
Ultimately, the strain from the balance of payments deficit produced a 
shift towards a policy of self-help but the counterinsurgency thinking 
reinforced this strategic reorientation. In a classified oral history, McNamara 
described the CPSVN as specifically falling within this understanding of 
guerrilla war. In his words: 
“I believed that to the extent that we could train those forces, we should 
do so, and having done it, we should get out. […] I believed we should 
not introduce our military forces in support of the South Vietnamese, 
even if they were going to be “defeated”. Consistent with that belief, 
some time in the latter part of 1963, following my return from a trip to 
South Vietnam, I recommended to President Kennedy that we 
announce a plan to begin the removal of our training forces. […] I 
believed that we had done all the training we could, and whether the 
South Vietnamese were qualified or not to turn back the North 
Vietnamese, I was certain that if they werenʼt, it wasnʼt for lack of our 
training. More training wouldnʼt strengthen them; therefore we should 
get out. The President agreed.”559 
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McNamaraʼs explanation for the CPSVN in the remarkably candid interview 
was also prominent in his and Taylorʼs October 1963 report. One of its 
conclusions read that the advisory effort “cannot assure ultimate success”; 
this was a “Vietnamese war” which could “be run solely by the 
Vietnamese.”560 
 
McNamara redefines the problem in Vietnam 
In order to justify a policy of training, and training alone, the administration 
had to define the war as “their war” and had to downgrade the relative 
importance of Vietnam to the struggle against international communism. By 
1962, both Harriman and McNamara led the administration-wide effort to 
redefine the situation in Vietnam along these lines.561 McNamaraʼs assistant 
for public affairs Sylvester reminded returning officers that in their speaking 
engagements they should insist that the “U.S. is not fighting this war – it is 
their war.”562 Harriman repeated this advice to CINCPAC the following month. 
He insisted that it could not “be overstressed” in the “conduct and utterances 
in public and private of all US personnel” that the war was “Viet-Namʼs war 
with the Viet-Cong” and that “the responsibility remains with the GVN.”563  
That ceiling on U.S. responsibility to Vietnam also became prominent in 
the administrationʼs communications with Diem. In a July 1962 letter, Kennedy 
reminded Diem that “the struggle is Vietnamese at is center, not American”564, 
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an idea that was repeated in a subsequent draft letter in September 1963.565 
In its final form, the September 1963 letter left out a key phrase “this is a 
Vietnamese conflict and all the United States can do is help.” McNamara 
communicated this in person to Diem during his trip.566 
In addition, McNamaraʼs strategy required defining the problem as 
internal to South Vietnam as opposed to external (i.e. North Vietnamese 
aggression) which would imply a host of international obligations under the 
1954 Geneva Accords and the United Nations Charter. In the fall of 1961, as 
part of efforts to encourage the introduction of ground troops, the State 
Department had commissioned the so-called “Jorden Report” that described 
the situation in Vietnam as one of aggression from the North. As Rostow 
explained, “The object of all this, as I have indicated, would be to seize the 
international community of this problem, develop our case, and lay the basis 
for the actions that we ourselves may have to take.”567  
By contrast, from 1962 onwards, both in private and in public, 
McNamara described the situation in South Vietnam as mostly 
“indigenous”.568 In a March 1962 press conference, he tellingly spoke about 
being “very much encouraged” by the South Vietnamese Government 
improvements to its “own forces” and described the conflict as a “classic 
guerrilla fight” not an external threat but rather a “threat to their internal 
stability.”569 In January 1963, before Congress, he reiterated that the program 
in Vietnam was one of “training only” and that the country faced “no direct 
aggression.”570 In June 1963, he explained that, “The emphasis is on internal 
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guerrilla warfare and subversion in Vietnam.”571 That conclusion was at odds 
with many in the bureaucracy including the State Department and NSC staff.  
In terms of downgrading the relative importance of Vietnam or 
distinguishing between what Senator Mansfield had called “marginal” and 
“essential” interests, this was more difficult to do publicly at a time when the 
domino theory still held sway.572 Kennedyʼs interview with CBS in the fall of 
1963, which many historians have treated as evidence that he would not 
withdraw, in fact included a very ambiguous statement. On the one hand, he 
insisted that, “In the final analysis it is the people and the government [of 
South Vietnam] who have to win or lose this struggle. All we can do is help.” 
On the other hand, he also said that he did not agree with those “who say we 
should withdraw” characterizing this as a “great mistake”.573  
McNamaraʼs statements were much less ambivalent. During the 
Appropriations Hearings in the Senate when Vietnam was discussed, he 
shrewdly quoted Mansfieldʼs report at length, reciting that U.S. interests were 
“best serviced by a policy which helps to bring about internal peace in 
Vietnam but maintains, scrupulously, our advisory capacity.” He noted that, 
“This is exactly our objective.”574 Indeed, the administrationʼs objective, just as 
Mansfield had suggested upon his return from Vietnam in February 1962, had 
shifted from protecting the South Vietnamese at all costs to leaving the 
“primary responsibility […] with the South Vietnamese.”575 By co-opting 
congressional language, he effectively protected the administration.576 
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Implicit in this redefinition was the view that Vietnam was not of 
paramount importance to the United States. McNamaraʼs edits to the October 
1963 report are telling in this regard.577 In addition to insisting that the end 
date of 1965 remain in the report – implying that these were the Presidentʼs 
instructions578 – one key line was edited three times: “the security of South 
Vietnam remains important to U.S. security” [emphasis added]. William 
Bundy, the principal drafter had initially described South Vietnamʼs security as 
“vital”, another advisor had crossed this out to read “crucial” but McNamara 
insisted on the rather more ambiguous “important”.579 
 
The balance of payments deficit was a core issue for both President Kennedy 
and McNamara. It was also the backdrop against which the Kennedy 
administration adapted its defense policy and sought new models for 
intervention that relied relatively more on local “self-help” capabilities. In many 
ways, the counterinsurgency doctrine was a cost-cutting strategy, which, the 
administration rationalized, would be expensive in terms of aid and training in 
the short-term but would provide a more economically viable strategy for 
dealing with conflicts in the developing world in the longer-term. 
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Bureaucratically, McNamaraʼs leading part in addressing the balance of 
payments made a lot of sense. McNamaraʼs PPBS and other budgetary 
systems had always been designed to match strategic ambitions spelled out 
in the White House, NSC and State Department with appropriate capabilities 
and within economic constraints. McNamaraʼs long conversations with 
economist John Kenneth Galbraith in the spring of 1962 hinged especially on 
the economic costs inherent to the Chiefsʼ tendency to favor conventional 
responses to crises and conflict. 
In the shorter-term, the administration also faced a congressional 
onslaught against its military assistance program especially in Asia. This had 
the dual effect of spurring the OSD to press MACV and the Chiefs for 
accelerated CPSVN plans and in the second instance, to seek alternative 
funding sources for operations in Vietnam. The latter would have fateful 
consequences in the transition into the Johnson administration. If the military 
problems were economic problems in the long-term, they were also budgetary 
problems in the shorter-term. 
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CHAPTER 10 - VIETNAM AS A BUDGETARY 
PROBLEM 
 
In 1962, as McNamara reflected upon the planning for his defense budget and 
Vietnam, he recognized Mendes-Franceʼs observation that every military 
problem eventually becomes a budgetary problem. If counterinsurgency 
promised to alleviate some of the pressures on the balance of payments and 
provide a more economically sustainable model for intervention in the 
developing world, it did not solve McNamaraʼs more immediate budgetary 
concerns. By contrast, a policy of phasing-out, as envisaged in the CPSVN, 
could reduce the more urgent pressures on the Military Assistance Program 
(MAP), which financed the bulk of operation in Vietnam and which, by early 
1963, had come under attack from the SFRC that appropriated that part of the 
defense budget and that threatened to apply a “meat ax” cut to it.580  
 For McNamara, the lesson from the Korean commitment was also a 
budgetary one and provided the lens through which he perceived the growing 
commitment in Vietnam. When he tried to reduce troops or aid to the Republic 
of Korea because of balance of payments concerns, Secretary Rusk argued 
that any troop withdrawals would need to be offset by additional aid “without 
which the Korean economy could not survive.”581 In effect, the immovable 
commitment to Korea weighted down the MAP. Ultimately, it was ISA, the 
office that was created to oversee the MAP, that also oversaw the CPSVN 
plans and the pressures it applied on military planners to accelerate the 
CPSVN between the spring of 1962 and the fall of 1963 were driven as much, 
if not more, by budgetary concerns as they were by realities on the ground. 
 
Operation Switchback  
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Operation Switchback, the process by which the Defense Department 
restructured operations in Vietnam under its command between 1962 and 
1963, was also at its core a funding story. As earlier chapters described, 
many in the administration were concerned about CIA operations in Vietnam, 
including the Special Forcesʼ training the CIDG forces. On one level, the 
concerns were about bringing order and control: Gilpatric, who oversaw the 
Task Force on Vietnam until 1962, recalled that the CIA “was really operating 
as a quasi-military organization” without proper oversight.582 The CIA 
representatives echoed this sentiment explaining that “in principal I am favour 
of getting CIA out of this business as much as possible” but that the problems 
in the past were “largely [about] funding procedures.”583 On another level, 
therefore, the problems were about funding: the Defense Department had 
ready access to a greater pool of funds. 
The CPSVN detailed the rationale behind transferring the irregular 
forces to the Defense Department: “To the extent that it is possible to do so, 
the functions now performed by irregular forces should be assumed by 
regularly constituted military forces which are appropriately responsive to 
normal channels of command and which are provided US advice and US 
assistance through normal MAP channels.”584 Transferring CIA programs to 
the Defense Department was part of a general process, with CPSVN at its 
core, designed to streamline and “normalize” both budgetary and 
organizational procedures in Vietnam in order to eventually phase them out. In 
practice, the Defense Department had been financing most of the paramilitary 
programs from the start but only indirectly by providing a budget line item that 
ambiguously indicated that the funds were for joint CIA programs and later 
just “Operation Switchback” programs. The Department of the Army had paid 
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the Special Forcesʼ salary and equipment costs; the MAP covered training 
costs.585  
Despite the advantages of providing order and clearer budgetary 
processes, many of Kennedyʼs advisors recognized that there were trade-offs 
to Defense Department control even from a cost-limitation perspective. The 
CIA Station and State Department officials in Washington, and at times 
General Harkins himself, were concerned that integrating the paramilitary 
forces into the DoD would make the programs “overly formalized” and thus 
more expensive and that they would extend the “stay of U.S. advisers and 
trainers in Viet-Nam.”586 However, even if the DoD was more cumbersome 
and could end up increasing the costs of these programs, the CIA could not 
afford them anymore.587  
The CIAʼs concerns echoed similar complaints from the USOM office, 
the AID program in Vietnam that also financed “information campaigns” and 
other programs within the strategic hamlets. Although AID expressed unease 
with the militarization of programs in Vietnam, they also felt “no issue be made 
of [it] now because of much more pressing and immediate problems which 
require resolution.”588 These “more pressing problems” were the broader 
attack on AID and DoDʼs offer to take over budgetary authority for AID 
programs that had a military application.589 In the end, both agencies could 
not afford a large-scale counterinsurgency program even if this program was 
supposed to have a civilian rather than military focus. 
 At the same time, even if the Defense Departmentʼs budget was more 
open-ended than either the AID or CIAʼs, it was also constrained, not least by 
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its relative transparency. As Gilpatricʼs successor on the Vietnam Working 
Group, Chalmers Wood, concluded, “CIA does not have the personnel to 
carry on this rapidly expanding operation”, but “DoD does not have the funds 
and its own regulations hamper its flexibility in using funds to carry on this 
unorthodox work.”590 As a result, the CIA retained only the most limited 
number of “non-Switchback” forces, forces it could financially sustain for the 
long-term and which the Defense Department could not absorb for political 
reasons, primarily because they involved operations outside of South 
Vietnamʼs legal borders.  
 
Congress and funding limits 
While funding from the Department of Defense seemed relatively more 
secure, by 1963 it too came under pressure. The pressure increased in the 
spring when planning began for FY64, an election year, and when a number 
of trends converged to make Vietnam operations especially vulnerable. First, 
the administrationʼs competing aims of getting the tax cut while maintaining a 
degree of fiscal balance produced inevitable strains on the budget. In May, 
McNamara told Kennedy that he “fear[ed] next year, a campaign year”, a 
“wide deficit” was “likely a problem” and that the defense budget could rise by 
$1 billion “with no increase in programs.”591 The AID mission in Vietnam also 
felt the pinch and worried that “questions and concerns are probably going to 
be worse this year because of the proposed tax cut and a very large deficit 
has been budgeted for.”592  
The second and more important trend was what Kennedy called “the 
worst attack on foreign aid that we have seen since the beginning of the 
Marshall Plan”, which had direct implications for Vietnam.593 During the 
Kennedy administration, Vietnam operations were largely financed through 
the MAP. The program had its origins in World War II but was formalized in 
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the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which consolidated existing government 
aid programs. In particular, it set up the USAID program for purely economic 
programs and created the MAP for defense-related programs.  
Unlike the other OSD programs that were confirmed through the SASC, 
the SFRC appropriated the MAP. The latter included liberal Senators, 
including Senators Fulbright, Mansfield and Morse who were the most virulent 
critics of U.S. operations in Asia and in Vietnam especially. For instance, after 
one hearing, McNamara noted that Senator Fulbright was “very critical of the 
massive aid programs to Vietnam, Taiwan and Korea”: Fulbright complained 
that the United States had “not accomplished a thing in Korea with all of our 
aid,” suggesting “that if we gave the 500 million-odd program for Korea and 
spread it around Africa, Latin America, India and Egypt, it would do much 
more good.”594  
Another Committee member, Senator Mansfield, the Irish-American 
Senate Majority Leader and former professor of Far Eastern history, published 
a scathing report following his visit to Vietnam in February 1962.595 Like 
Kennedy during his Senate years, Mansfield had been an early supporter of 
Ngo Dinh Diem but now found it, “Most disturbing […] that Viet Nam now 
appears to be only at the beginning of a beginning in coping with its grave 
inner problems. All the current difficulties existed in 1955, along with hope and 
energy to meet them. But it is seven years later and $2 billion of United States 
aid later.”596 
The Senators were also concerned with the size of the defense budget. 
Morse, for instance, used the hearings to argue for cutting back the defense 
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budget at a minimum by 15%.597 McNamara played on Morseʼs criticism, 
suggesting in his hearings that if it was “essential for some reason to cut the 
total defense budget, it should cut those portions other than the military 
assistance portion because the military assistance program is the tightest 
portion of the entire budget”, although the SFRC had no appropriative 
authority over the rest of his budget.598 Although, for the most part, these 
Senators were favorable to the administrationʼs aid program, with the power of 
the purse on their side, they used the MAP hearings as an opportunity to 
voice their criticism of what they saw as overbearing role of Defense 
Department in U.S. foreign policy and sought to curtail the administrationʼs 
programs in countries like Vietnam. 
Furthermore, the Senators used balance of payments concerns to 
justify cutting back the MAP program. In response, McNamara and the 
Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lyman Lemnitzer and later Maxwell 
Taylor insisted that the MAP was a cost-effective program and that while 
“military efforts” abroad did contribute to the deficit, the MAP “per se does not 
contribute to our adverse balance of payments” but instead could have a 
favorable impact on the balance through military equipment sales.599 
Speaking to Morseʼs criticism, McNamara insisted, “dollar for dollar, these 
programs [for countries on the periphery] contribute more to the security of the 
free world than corresponding expenditures in our defense appropriations.”600 
 
The Clay Committee  
The issue of reducing the MAP program came to a head in 1963 with the 
publication in March of the Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free 
Worldʼs report (most commonly referred to as the “Clay Committee”). In 
December 1962, hoping to achieve bipartisan support for the MAP program 
and thus to meet the SFRCʼs objections, Kennedy charged the former Military 
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Governor of West Germany and a prominent “Eisenhower Republican”, 
General Lucius Clay with reviewing the administrationʼs foreign aid strategy.  
The Committee was asked to investigate the administrationʼs repeated 
arguments that aid produced a sound investment for U.S. security, or as its 
mission statement read: “to determine whether [the military and economic 
assistance programs] were contributing the optimum security of the United 
States and the economic and political stability of the free world.”601 Although 
Kennedy recognized that the Committee was heavily weighted with 
Republicans, he hoped that this might help him garner bipartisan support and 
that it “would somehow get respectable people who would bring pressure to 
bear on Congress and middle of the road people to do what his experts told 
him really ought to be done, but which the country didnʼt seem ready to do.”602  
Instead of producing a policy that helped the administration, the Clay 
Committeeʼs “miserable document” as one official described it603, called for 
major reform of aid and especially of the MAP where it suggested a 
“substantial tightening up and sharpened objectives in terms of our national 
interests.” Although the report echoed McNamaraʼs statements that aid 
provided a sound investment in the United States and its Alliesʼ security, it 
was nevertheless scathing in its assessment of the program and echoed 
many of the SFRCʼs criticisms, some of which were particularly relevant for 
Vietnam.  
While the Clay Committee welcomed the reforms to the aid program, it 
also argued that, contrary to McNamaraʼs suggestions, the aid program was 
contributing to the balance of payments crisis, which, it warned, undermined 
the United Statesʼ “role of political, economic and financial leadership in the 
free world.” Moreover, its criticisms of recipient countries were particularly 
biting. For instance, it cautioned that, “many of the countries which have 
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received our aid have not fully performed their part of the assistance bargain”, 
namely by showing “an internal expression of will and discipline.” Also, in a 
way that echoed McNamaraʼs qualms about the OSD on Vietnam, it 
complained that aid programs were particularly weak in countries plagued “by 
the absence of trained manpower and adequate local institutions.”604 
Crucially, in keeping with its recommendation for “tightening up” the 
MAP program, the report also called for a budget ceiling of $1 billion by no 
later than fiscal year FY68.605 FY68 was also the cut-off date for the final 
CPSVN phase-out.606 The link between the withdrawal plans and the MAP 
became so clear that MACV submitted a revised version of the CPSVN to 
CINPCAC in January 1963 with an introduction that advised that: “In view of 
the close relationship between the plan and the Military Assistance Plan, they 
should not continue to be treated as separate entities.”607 Figure 2 in 
Appendix 1 shows the overall MAP program and Vietnamʼs relative share 
according to the CPSVN. The orange dotted line denotes Clay Reportʼs 
suggested the $1 billion cap, which Senate leaders supported as did 
McNamara in the aid hearings and Dillon in planning for the FY64 budget.608 
McNamara explicitly used the SFRCʼs pressures to accelerate the 
CPSVN process. Whereas in September 1962, MACV had suggested that 
“previous MAP ceilings donʼt apply”, by December 1962 there had been a 
volte face and now planning was being made with “funding limitations” in 
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mind.609 Also, whereas some training functions had been initially scheduled to 
continue until 1971, by May 1963, CINCPAC recognized that all programs, 
including training programs, should be accelerated to end by 1968. In his 
hearings in front of the SFRC, McNamara proudly explained the steps his 
office had taken to implement Clayʼs recommendations especially on Vietnam. 
He told the Senators, “As a matter of fact, Admiral Felt came in the day before 
yesterday from the Pacific and brought with him new estimates of the 
requirements for South Vietnam. […] I told [him] I doubted very much that 
funds would be available to support a program that large and urged him to 
reconsider, which he agreed to.”610 
 
The Korean analogy as a budgetary lesson 
For both McNamara and the SFRC Senators, their experience with the 
Korean commitment colored their concerns about the MAP program for 
Vietnam, namely that the United States was stuck with an expensive and 
open-ended commitment in Korea.611 Moreover, whereas the MAP program 
was designed as a cost-efficient tool to deal with situations around the world, 
it was dominated by expensive commitments in Asia.  
The commitment in Korea and its impact on McNamaraʼs motivation for 
the CPSVN, was obvious. In a recording of a private conversation with 
Kennedy in May 1963, McNamara explained the CPSVN as follows: 
“I calculate that we can get it under control, it may take two years, three 
years possibly but we should now be looking at a time when weʼll have 
a normal military program there. Instead theyʼre proposing a fantastic 
military assistance program. […] And if youʼre looking toward a normal 
relationship so we donʼt build up another Korea. When I look at whatʼs 
                                                
609“Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam”, Harkins to MAAG, September 8, 1962, Folder: 
September 1962 1-14, Box 8, Newman Papers, Research Materials, JFKL. 
610 “Statement by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara”, 88th Congress 1 (May 15, 
1963) (Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriation), pp. 83. Hearing ID: HRG-1963-
HAP-0043, US Congressional Hearings Digital Collection Historical Archives, 1824-2003. 
611 See footnote 20 for the different meanings of the “Korean analogy”. The focus here is 
relatively more on the legacy of the Korean War, in terms of the commitment to the ROK, 
rather than the experience of the Truman administration with the Korean War. Which is not to 
say that the latter did not have an impact, notably on advisors such as George Ball. For 
additional details, see especially: Khong, Analogies at War.
	   198 
happened in Korea and the way the U.S. aid is, and how difficult itʼs 
going to be to scale that aid down, we certainly donʼt want another 
Korea developing in South Vietnam and weʼre well on our way to doing 
that.”612 
McNamara had applied his five-year budget planning to the MAP and found 
that Vietnam would have a “fantastic” effect on the overall budget if current 
growth trends were maintained.613 As the Figure 3 in Appendix 1 shows, 
McNamaraʼs calculations in preparation for the Senate hearing on the MAP 
program showed that the Vietnam program was getting very close to equaling 
Koreaʼs share of the MAP program.  
In addition, it was William Bundy at ISA who wrote much of the October 
1963 Taylor-McNamara report and who was responsible for overseeing the 
Vietnam programʼs implications for MAP and for coordinating policy with 
AID.614 In the preceding months, together with the Deputy Director for Military 
Assistance William Leffingwell, Bundy sent McNamara a number of reports 
describing the impact of the “Southeast Asia emergency” on total MAP costs. 
According to their forecasts, these would rise to $965 million out of a total 
program budget of $2.5 billion in FY62 and 875 million out of $2.2 billion in 
FY64.615 By FY63, the Far East (which also included Korea and Taiwan) 
accounted for over 44% of the total MAP program.616 As a result, a joint State-
Defense program recommended that programs be geared towards “self-
help”617; nowhere was this trend clearer than the October 1963 
recommendations for Vietnam.618 
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South Vietnamese funding 
In endorsing the Clay Committeeʼs recommendations as both “desirable and 
feasible”, the SFRC reminded the administration that each MAP should be 
“temporary and extraordinary” and should be terminated as soon as possible 
or when the “recipient country develops the economic capacity to sustain its 
own defense.”619 In other words, all MAP programs must have a cut-off date. 
Thereafter, financial support for operations should come from the recipient 
country or from elsewhere in government. McNamara argued that the Vietnam 
costs were “temporary” by putting them in a long-term context, noting that 
they had reached a “peak and [would] start to level off.”620  
According to the CPSVN, there would be a Defense Department-
financed delimitated surge in funding from 1963 to 1965 and then as U.S. 
forces withdrew by FY67, the South Vietnamese government would fund its 
military; the AID station (through USOM) and the CIA would take over funding 
for much of the reduced number of paramilitary forces621 as they gradually 
merged into the National Police Force. The process effectively reduced the 
conflict in Vietnam to an internal security problem. Moreover, to preempt any 
further delays from the services, by September 1963 the OSD indicated that 
further funding for Vietnam operations would come from “non-MAP sources”, 
namely the services budgets themselves for instance in the handover of 
materiel that was already in the country.622 
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The configuration of South Vietnamese forces also evolved to reflect 
these budgetary concerns and the focus on counterinsurgency efforts in 
Vietnam. As General Harkins explained to his Vietnamese counterparts, the 
tendency among the Chiefs to build up “excessively expensive military 
establishments” that mirrored their own in partner countries was “extremely 
expensive in both funds and troop support” whereas advisory missions on the 
lower-end of the security spectrum could be more affordable and thus 
sustainable.623 A few months earlier, McNamara had rejected the January 
1963 draft of the CPSVN on the basis that it “too large for the GVN to 
support.”624 
As a result, whereas in earlier drafts the South Vietnamese manning 
levels for each of the services were roughly equal, by the last version in 
November 1963 planned troop strengths for a South Vietnamese Navy 
especially but also Air Force had been drastically cut and a greater onus 
placed on the Army and the paramilitary Civil Guard and Self-Defense Forces. 
The latter were smaller units associated to the strategic hamlet program. In 
absolute terms, the overall manning levels for all forces, including most 
paramilitary groups, were more than halved. 
The reduction in forces reflected South Vietnamʼs dual problems of 
funding and recruitment: as the December 1962 draft of the CPSVN 
explained, the South Vietnamese government did not necessarily have the 
ability to “recruit officers and technical staff without damaging the 
economy.”625 Both MACV and the OSD were concerned about the absence of 
officers trained to take on more skill-intensive roles envisaged under earlier 
plans. As a result, the plans were designed to redefine the problem in 
Vietnam as one of fighting an insurgency and policing. This was relatively 
cheaper, easier to train for and required smaller force levels. 
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As for transferring the costs to the South Vietnamese government in 
the long-term, it was not clear that it could finance the various units as the 
phase-out took hold especially in the face of MAP cuts.626 The Director of 
USOM in Vietnam, Joseph Brent, commented on an earlier version of the 
CPSVN that “the force levels being contemplated after 1966, when the 
insurgency will have supposedly been contained, will result in either an 
intolerable deficit or an impractically high aid level.”627  
Another report concluded gloomily that: “Vietnam is essentially in the 
same position as Korea, in that the country is not presently viable and that the 
U.S. aid program essentially makes up the current account deficit through 
grants.”628The Embassy in Saigon raised similar concerns, noting that it was 
“hardly surprising that the GVN is overwhelmed with its budgetary problem” 
considering that “about 18% of GNP” for 1962 was allocated for “security.” “In 
the US,” the telegram read, “This would be comparable to about $100 billion 
for defense, or approximately double our present budget.”629 
McNamaraʼs experience and frustrations with untangling the “sterile 
commitment” in Korea explain his impatience with rolling back the United 
Statesʼ commitment to Vietnam before it became what the Foreign Office 
called a “normality” which would make it “more difficult for the Vietnamese […] 
to achieve true independence.”630 This is what McNamara meant when he told 
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the NSC that, “To leave forces there when theyʼre not needed, I think is 
wasteful and complicates both their problems and ours.”631 It would 
“complicate” Vietnamese self-reliance and would “waste” finite MAP 
resources.  
 
Military servicesʼ funding 
In the short term, as the Clay Committee first recommended, the OSD looked 
into transferring some of Vietnamʼs costs to the services.632 In moves that 
presaged McNamaraʼs later manipulations to the defense budget during the 
war, he sought ways to transfer costs or hide their full effect. For instance, in 
May 1963, he asked that military planners “turn over material in place at no 
cost to the country MAP program”633 in effect burying materiel costs in the 
servicesʼ budgets. 
McNamara also recommended that ISA explore transferring all the 
costs of Vietnam operations to the servicesʼ budget as he anticipated 
substantial cuts in FY64. He suggested that this would have a “highly 
desirable tactical effect” as it could help reduce overall MAP to the $800 
million mark (under Clayʼs recommended $1 billion) by FY65.634 William 
Bundy tentatively reached out to Senator Richard Russell635 to see whether 
he would support such a move but pre-empted any criticism by saying that 
                                                
631 Transcript NSC meeting, October 3, 1963: Tape 144/A49, Cassette 2/3, Folder: Fog of 
War, background and research materials, Box II:114, RSM Papers, LoC. 
632 General Clay testimony in front of Senate Foreign Affairs Select Committee, April 25, 
1963, Folder: President's Message, Rusk Statement & Legislation, 1963, Box 29, RG200, 
RSM Papers, Defense Programs and Operations, 1961-67, NARA. 
633 “FY65-69 MAP Plan for Republic of Vietnam”, CINCPAC to Director of Military Assistance, 
OSD, July 31, 1963, Folder: July 1963 15-27, Box 13, Newman Papers, Research Materials, 
JFKL. 
634 “Revisions in the Military Assistance Program Budget Presentation”, McNamara to 
President Johnson, December 3, 1963, Folder: Defense Budget 1/2, Box 45, Sorensen 
Papers, Subject Files 1961-64, JFKL. 
635 In a letter to State and AID, McNamara wrote that the “legal and practical feasibility of 
these transfers has not yet been fully considered with the Department of Defense.”  
McNamara to Department of State/AID Administrator Bell, November 14, 1963, Folder: 
Reading File, October 1963, Box 119, RG200 RSM Papers, Reading Files, NARA. 
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this would be an “exception to the general rule.”636 He wrote to the Chairman 
of the SASC,  
“The fundamental reason for these changes is our belief that military 
assistance is an essential element of our total national defense effort 
and should be considered as a part of the budget of the Department of 
Defense itself. […] We believe on balance that it would be sound to 
transfer this funding responsibility to the DoD budget. A secondary 
factor is that this would give General Harkins and the field command 
somewhat greater administrative ease in calling the items they believe 
are required to produce success.”637 
However, the temporary expedient of shifting the costs for Vietnam onto the 
services had far-reaching consequences. By removing the MAP program for 
Vietnam away from SFRC oversight, McNamara also lost much of the 
rationale for cutting back costs on operations in Vietnam in the short-term, 
and in the long-term, de facto removed one of the biggest sources of “push-
back” on U.S. operations in the country. Moreover, as George Ball suggested, 
by moving the MAP program in Vietnam away from a coordinated platform 
with State, it also opened the door for the program in Vietnam to increasingly 
ignore the AID program and instead follow military imperatives. 
The paradox of the Kennedyʼs administrationʼs predilection for fighting 
“new” wars, namely counterinsurgencies that relied heavily on “self-help” 
models was that they were designed to be cheaper and thus economically 
more sustainable in light of the United Statesʼ growing list of commitments 
and the resultant balance of payments deficit. However, since they relied on 
MAP funding as well, they also drew on a much tighter budget line, one where 
an activist SFRC was determined to cut back commitments altogether. The 
SFRCʼs activism eventually pushed McNamara and the OSD to seek 
continued funding for Vietnam elsewhere, namely in the military budget, and 
in so doing inadvertently produced pressures to militarize operations in 
                                                
636 “Realignment of the MAP Program for FY1965”, William Bundy to Bureau of Budget, State, 
AID, White House, November 22, 1963, Folder: Defense Budget 1/2, Box 45, Sorensen 
Papers, Subject Files 1961-64, JFKL. 
637 Ibid. 
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Vietnam. Just as the OSD taking on a leading role in Vietnam under Operation 
Switchback swamped out the AID program, putting the financing for the 
Vietnam program increasingly under the servicesʼ budget raised their role in 
policy-formulation. 
Throughout this period, McNamara saw the Vietnam conflict through its 
fiscal impact on the MAP program and its economic impact. McNamara was 
never really concerned with designing strategy for Vietnam but the 
counterinsurgency strategies fit neatly with his cost-cutting agenda. His 
reforms at the OSD, especially the PPBS, were about control and about 
bridging ambitions and strategy laid out in the White House or the State 
Department with existing limitations of which economic limitations were at the 
forefront.  
 
Conclusion 
McNamara was a mathematical man, more concerned with budgetary issues 
than with geopolitics. His particular mindset and his very personal definition of 
his “job” as Secretary of Defense explain why he led the withdrawal plans 
from Vietnam under the Kennedy administration as aggressively as he did. 
Although it was Kennedy and his counterinsurgency advisors who provided 
the overall strategy for Vietnam, McNamara welcomed its corollaries. 
Specifically, that the strategy would significantly reduce the military role of the 
United States in Vietnam (i.e. the costs for the DoD) especially at a time when 
the Senate was squeezing the relevant budgetary allocation, the MAP. In so 
doing, it could forestall “another Korea” which for McNamara was a budgetary 
nightmare: a situation that required significant financial outlays and from 
which it was almost impossible to extricate his Department. As McNamara 
saw it, the United Statesʼ responsibilities in places such as Korea were 
undermining the United States economically. Understanding the importance of 
these economic issues is central to understanding the credibility of the 
withdrawal plans. 
McNamaraʼs evaluation of the budgetary impact of Vietnam drove his 
support from the CPSVN from July 1962 onwards and his insistence that the 
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administration publicize the plans in October 1963. The public relations 
aspects of the October 1963 announcements, specifically the 1,000-man 
troop withdrawal, were important: they addressed congressional pressures on 
the MAP and sent a message to the Vietnamese that they should take greater 
responsibility for the war. However, other long-term concerns drove the larger 
issue of withdrawal and the CPSVN. In particular, the CPSVN reflected 
Kennedyʼs counterinsurgency advisorsʼ pessimistic reading of the unfolding 
situation in Vietnam and their concerns that U.S. involvement had become 
over-militarized. In turn, this strategy dovetailed with the OSDʼs institutional, 
primarily economic concerns. 
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PART III: AFTERMATH AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
CHAPTER 11: MCNAMARAʼS TRANSITION INTO THE 
JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION 
 
John Lewis Gaddis has written that, “Our responsibility as historians is as 
much to show there were paths not taken as it is to explain the ones that 
were.”638 That is precisely this chapterʼs objective: to identify how and why the 
path to continue with the CPSVN was not taken. Despite public assertions, 
President Johnson understood the Vietnam policy that he had inherited from 
Kennedy, and the presidential tapes make clear that McNamara had informed 
him of the rationale behind the policy of phasing out the U.S. presence in 
Vietnam. When the administration strayed from that policy, key advisors 
including Roger Hilsman loudly remonstrated and finally, like most of the 
counterinsurgency experts from the Kennedy administration, left.  
President Johnson knowingly changed U.S. policy on Vietnam in the 
early months of his administration. This chapter focuses on this period and 
particularly the period leading into the spring of 1964 when the administration 
set itself on a course where, to use Andrew Prestonʼs terminology, escalation 
became probable rather than just possible.639 Johnson played a key role in 
pushing the withdrawal plans aside. Already during his first meeting on 
Vietnam on November 24, 1963, the new President framed the issue in far 
starker and more traditionally military terms than Kennedy had been inclined 
to do. Moreover, he publicly committed the United States to the survival of 
South Vietnam; something his predecessor had been more ambiguous and 
ambivalent about.  
In the months that followed, Johnson virtually dictated many of 
McNamaraʼs memoranda to him. This was especially true of McNamaraʼs 
                                                
638 Gaddis, The Landscape of History, pp. 141. 
639 Preston, “The Soft Hawks' Dilemma in Vietnam,” pp. 66. 
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March 1964 report, which historians often point to as a turning point in the 
escalatory momentum towards a military solution to the situation in Vietnam. 
Johnsonʼs bullish, if not bullying, personality and search for a consensus also 
influenced McNamaraʼs disinclination to do more than imply reservations 
about the administrationʼs policy.  
 Johnson also had an effect on the underlying economic rationale that 
had underpinned the CPSVN. Responding to changed economic conditions 
as well as his own philosophical bent, within days of becoming President, 
Johnson made it clear to his advisers that he was less bothered by the 
balance of payments than Kennedy had been and more committed to 
Keynesian economics. Many of Kennedyʼs advisers had complained that he 
was overly concerned with the gold outflow and insufficiently Keynesian, and 
thus applauded the new President as he launched the Great Society 
programs. Faced with new domestic commitments that stretched the 
administrationʼs resources, McNamara started down a slippery slope of 
manipulating budgetary figures to underplay the costs of conflict on Vietnam 
while also, in recognition of the changed nature of the United Statesʼ 
commitment to Vietnam, transferring budgetary oversight away from the MAP 
and the SFRC to the SASC. This further encouraged the trend toward military 
solutions to the problems in Vietnam. 
As well, Johnsonʼs influence on the decisions to escalate in Vietnam 
was indirect. This was particularly true of the way that he shaped decision-
making in his administration: he avoided open debate around core issues and 
relied on a different set of advisers to inform his Vietnam policy. Specifically, 
he was more inclined to receive the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
allowed Secretary of State Rusk to play a leading role on Vietnam policy 
where, during the Kennedy years, both had been largely excluded. In addition, 
key counterinsurgency experts, most notably Roger Hilsman, were pushed 
aside.640 
                                                
640 For a detailed analysis of Johnsonʼs decision-making style, his search for consensus, and 
the way it influenced the JCS recommendations to him, see especially: H.R. McMaster, 
Dereliction of Duty. 
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Ultimately, if on the surface and in public, McNamara became 
responsible for the war, behind the scenes his role was remarkably consistent 
across the two administrations: he did not articulate strategy per se; he 
implemented policy and he acted as a bridge between the strategy and 
ambitions determined by the White House and State Department and existing 
capabilities and constraints. The constraints that most troubled him were, as 
always, economic and budgetary ones but more surprisingly, given that he 
became the face of the administrationʼs “credibility gap”, the need to be more 
transparent in order to garner public support as the administration escalated 
its role in Vietnam. In spite of his private concerns, McNamara produced the 
key documents that made escalation in Vietnam more likely and slid into the 
role of scapegoat for a policy that he, sooner than most, considered flawed. 
 
The existing narrative on the transition 
The traditional narrative of McNamaraʼs role in the Johnson administration 
and specifically his contribution to the administrationʼs decisions to escalate in 
the period between 1964 and 1965 relies on a particular interpretation of his 
position in the Kennedy administration and on a tendency to minimize the 
importance of the CPSVN plans. Within this historiography, the withdrawal 
plans are usually described as either secret, tentative or the product of 
Kennedyʼs vision alone; a mere blip in the otherwise inevitable upward 
trajectory of U.S. involvement in Vietnam.641 However, this view conveniently 
ignores the complicating fact that McNamara led Kennedyʼs withdrawal plans 
and that they were publicized, budgeted for and set within an intellectual 
framework, a strategy of sorts, even if that strategy was doomed to fail as the 
situation in Vietnam unraveled. 
 McNamara himself appeared to confirm the orthodox interpretation of 
his role in escalating the war in Vietnam in his memoirs, In Retrospect. 
However, earlier drafts of the memoirs suggest that the published text 
                                                
641 George Herring in his seminal book on Vietnam, for instance, wrote: “The extent to which 
Kennedy was committed to withdrawal remains quite unclear, and there is not a shred of 
evidence to support the notion of a secret plan for extrication.” Herring, Americaʼs Longest 
War, pp. 114. 
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reflected Brian VanDeMarkʼs perspective more than McNamaraʼs. A 
prominent historian of the Vietnam War, VanDeMark removed key passages 
that would have recast the CPSVN in a way that was less consistent with his 
existing work. In particular, in his first draft McNamara explained that publicly 
announcing a timetable for disengagement from Vietnam in October 1963 had 
been controversial and added that, “I recognized the possibility that the 
decision could be overturned. I urged that the decision be publicly announced, 
thereby setting it in concrete.”642 This disproves VanDeMarkʼs assertion in Into 
the Quagmire that Johnson “consciously continued his predecessorʼs Vietnam 
policy […] to demonstrate his resolve by standing firm in Vietnam”643 or Larry 
Bermanʼs assertion that “Johnson never heard of the secret plans for getting 
out.”644 
A comparison of McNamaraʼs first comments on the transition for In 
Retrospect with the eventual published text reveals that it is precisely the 
issue of withdrawal and the premises for withdrawal that were most heavily 
edited by VanDeMark.645 In his first drafts, McNamara emphasized that 
Kennedy believed that a successful intervention in Vietnam relied on having a 
strong South Vietnamese political base and, in the absence of a reliable 
partner, moved towards a policy of withdrawal. McNamara identified a number 
of occasions during the Johnson administration – particularly, November 1964 
and most of 1965 – when withdrawal could have been considered on the 
same premise.  
In their discussions and interviews, VanDeMark nudged McNamara to 
highlight certain variables in the decision to escalate in Vietnam more than he 
was initially inclined to. These included McNamaraʼs change of heart at the 
                                                
642 In Retrospect first draft, Folder: In Retrospect Drafts & Notes, 1993-1994, Box II:100, RSM 
Papers, LoC. 
643 VanDeMark, Into the Quagmire, pp. 7. 
644 Berman, Planning a tragedy, pp. 30. 
645 Although Adam Yarmolinsky, McNamaraʼs Special Assistant and his confidant warned 
VanDeMark that there would be nothing of value in the official memoranda, that he should 
look at the presidential recordings instead, VanDeMarkʼs research was primarily limited to the 
FRUS volumes on the basis of which he explained to McNamara that there was no 
documentary evidence to support his more controversial claims, especially on the issue of 
withdrawal. Interview between Brian VanDeMark and Adam Yarmolinsky, April 1, 1993, 
Folder: Yarmolinksy 1993, Box II:104, RSM Papers, LoC. 
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end of 1963 rather than the influence of President Johnsonʼs views on 
Vietnam; the significance of the Chiefsʼ repeated appeals to introduce troops 
which had existed before Johnson came to power; and the deteriorating 
situation in Vietnam. None of these factors would have been given as much 
importance as they received in the final draft of In Retrospect if VanDeMark 
had focused, as McNamaraʼs had suggested, on his conviction that the issue 
of having a sound political base mattered first and foremost in Kennedyʼs 
strategy in Vietnam.646  
 
Continuing Kennedyʼs policy 
The suggestion that Johnson deliberately continued Kennedyʼs policy relies 
on an inaccurate reading of the Kennedy administrationʼs policy. The end-
point for U.S. involvement as laid out in final draft of the CPSVN, in NSAM 
263 as well as in the press statement that emerged from the October 1963 
NSC meetings, would come when: “the insurgency has been suppressed or 
until the national security forces of the Government of South Viet-Nam are 
capable of suppressing it.”647 Johnson knew that the objective was or not and. 
He also knew that McNamara had led efforts to make the second objective the 
pre-eminent one, that is, that he supported a movement towards self-help and 
felt that this was a war that could only be won by the South Vietnamese 
themselves. 
 In January 1964, an exchange of letters between Senator Mansfield 
and Johnson spurred a discussion within the administration about the limits of 
the United Statesʼ commitment to Vietnam. Echoing the same arguments 
McNamara had made in the preceding months, Mansfield addressed the 
danger of “another China in Vietnam” and noted, “Neither do we want another 
Korea. It would seem that a key (but often overlooked) factor in both situations 
was a tendency to bite off more than we can chew. We tended to talk 
ourselves out on a limb with overstatements of our purpose and commitment.” 
He ended by warning the President that “there ought to less official talk of our 
                                                
646 Robert McNamara, interview by Brian VanDeMark, September 10, 1963, Folder: In 
Retrospect First Draft, Ch. 5-8, Box II:100, RSM Papers, LoC.  
647 Pentagon Papers, Part IV.B.4, pp. 42. 
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responsibility in Vietnam and more emphasis on the responsibilities of the 
Vietnamese themselves.”648  
When Johnson forwarded this memo to McGeorge Bundy and 
McNamara for comment, the former spoke about the “catastrophic impact” it 
would have across the region while the latter used language and arguments 
that were both entirely new to his repertoire and completely at odds with what 
he said before and after. At first, McNamara responded in a relatively 
consistent manner, noting that “we should certainly stress that the war is 
essentially a Vietnamese responsibility, and this we have repeatedly done, 
particularly in our announced policy on US troop withdrawal.” However, he 
then added that “we cannot disengage US prestige to any significant degree” 
because “the whole history of support of South Vietnam going back to 1954 
makes it inevitable that the US is deeply involved, and this would have been 
true even if we had not made the decision to intervene on a substantial scale 
in the fall of 1961.” He ended by writing that “important security interests […] 
unquestionably call for holding the line against further Communist gains. And, 
I am confident that the American people are by and large in favor of a policy 
of firmness and strength in such situations.”649 Rarely had McNamara 
sounded so little like himself and so much like Johnson. 
 However, one presidential recording of a conversation between 
Johnson and McNamara on February 25, 1964 makes clear that McNamara 
had communicated the standing policy on Vietnam to Johnson, in detail, and 
that he continued to lean towards the policy recommended by Mansfield. In 
the exchange, which is worth quoting at length, Johnson, like a good student, 
reiterated “what [McNamara] said to [him]” and revealed his particular lens 
and points of view. On the policy of self-help, Johnson explained: 
“And itʼs their war, itʼs their men, and weʼre willing to train them, and we 
have found that, over a period of time that we kept the Communists 
from spreading like we did in Greece and Turkey with the Truman 
                                                
648 “Vietnamese Situation”, Mansfield to President Johnson, January 6, 1964, Folder: 
Vietnam, 10/2/63 – 1/14/64, Subject Files 1961-64: Box 55, Sorensen Papers, JFKL. 
649 McNamara to President Johnson, January 7, 1964, Folder: Vietnam, 10/2/63 – 1/14/64, 
Subject Files 1961-64: Box 55, Sorensen Papers, JFKL. 
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Doctrine. […] Weʼve done it there by advising; we havenʼt done it by 
going off dropping bombs, we havenʼt done it by going out and sending 
men to fight and we have no such commitment there. But we do have a 
commitment to help the Vietnamese defend themselves. And weʼre 
there for training and thatʼs what weʼve done.” 
Later in the conversation, he added, “All right then the next question comes is 
how in the hell does McNamara think, when heʼs losing a war, that he can pull 
men out of there. Well McNamaraʼs not fighting a war, heʼs training men to 
fight a war and when he gets them through High School, they will have 
graduated from High School. […] And if he trains them to fight and they wonʼt 
fight, he canʼt do anything about it.” Johnson understood that Kennedy and 
McNamaraʼs policy was one of training and training alone.650  
Meanwhile, in public and before Congress, McNamara continued to 
defend the validity of his policy arguing that it was still on track. He explained, 
“I donʼt believe we should leave our men there to substitute for Vietnamese 
men who are qualified to carry out the task, and this is really the heart of the 
proposal. I think it was a sound proposal then and I think so now.”651  
At about the same time, other key advisers including Theodore 
Sorensen and Roger Hilsman, were reminding Johnson in writing about both 
the limited character of the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam and, for 
Hilsmanʼs part, the counterinsurgency aspects of the strategy there. In 
January 1964, for instance, Sorensen suggested that “you can continue to 
emphasize that the South Vietnamese have the primary responsibility for 
winning the war – so that if during the next four months the new government 
fails to take the necessary political, economic, social and military actions, it 
will be their choice and not our betrayal or weakness that loses the area.”652 
Hilsman complained bitterly that the administration was straying from the 
strategic concept for South Vietnam because he believed that “if we can ever 
                                                
650 MC LBJ Presidential Recordings: February 25, 1964, WH 6402.21, Conversation 2191. 
651 Pentagon Papers, IV B.4. 
652 Sorensen to President Johnson, January 14, 1964, Folder: Vietnam, 10/2/63 – 1/14/64, 
Subject Files 1961-64: Box 55, Sorensen Papers, JFKL. 
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manage to have it implemented fully and with vigor, the result will be a 
victory.”653 
 
Changed circumstances in Vietnam 
Even if Johnson recognized that he was changing Kennedyʼs policy, 
historians have suggested that he was merely responding to new intelligence 
and to changed circumstances on the ground. The period that followed Diemʼs 
assassination produced a particularly heightened sense that South Vietnam 
was on the verge of collapse and that projects, notably the strategic hamlets 
program, were falling short of their aims. As McNamara had feared in the 
summer and fall of 1963, the coup leaders had not “made this thing work” and 
instead almost immediately descended into acrimonious divisions over the 
assassinations of Diem and his brother Nhu.654 The gamble had not paid off 
and each of the problems that had undermined existing programs in South 
Vietnam throughout 1962 and 1963 – the countryʼs shaky economic viability, 
leadership, military focus and coherence as well as its “will to win” - worsened. 
This situation would have unsettled any administrationʼs plans to 
disengage from Vietnam. In December 1963, following his first trip back to 
Vietnam after the assassinations of President Diem and Kennedy, McNamara 
found the situation “very disturbing” and warned that “current trends, unless 
reversed in the next 2-3 months, will lead to neutralization at best and more 
likely a Communist-controlled state.” 655 In his private notes from the trip he 
worried that the “greatest weakness is an indecisive, drifting government” 
                                                
653 “Last Will and Testament: South Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia”, Hilsman to Secretary of 
State Rusk, March 10, 1964, Folder: Chronological File – 1/64-3/64, Memoranda of 
Conversations, Box 6, Hilsman Papers, JFKL. 
654 William Colby and Ellen Hammer, in particular, have emphasized Diemʼs leadership 
qualities as a nationalist leader who, if the United States had continued to support him, could 
have provided the stability and unity that was needed to “win” in South Vietnam. Ellen J. 
Hammer, A Death in November: American in Vietnam, 1963 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
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655 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Memorandum for the President, "Vietnam 
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while “a second major weakness is a country team which lacks leadership, is 
poorly informed and is not working to a common plan.”656  
At about the same time, John McCone, the Director for the CIA who 
travelled to Vietnam with McNamara, wrote that, “It is abundantly clear that 
statistics received over the past year or more from the GVN officers and 
reported by the US mission on which we gauged the trend of the war were 
grossly in error.” In reference to the Delta region that had disturbed 
McNamara only two months earlier, McCone wrote, “Conditions in the delta 
and in the areas immediately north of Saigon are more serious now than 
expected and were probably never as good as reported.”657 
  However, concerns about Vietnamese leadership, the lack of 
cooperation in the U.S. country team, the overextension of the strategic 
hamlet program or poor intelligence, even while they may have been 
heightened in the aftermath of Diemʼs assassination, were not new. By way of 
a reminder, during the October 1963 NSC meetings, President Kennedyʼs 
“only reservation” with announcing the planned phase-out in Vietnam was that 
“if the war doesnʼt continue to go well, it will look like we were overly 
optimistic.”658 McNamara responded to Kennedyʼs reservation by saying “Iʼm 
not entirely sure” that the insurgency could be brought under control by 1965 
“but I am sure that if we donʼt meet those dates in the sense of ending the 
major military campaign, we nonetheless can withdraw the bulk of our U.S. 
forces according to the schedule weʼve laid out, worked out, because we can 
train the Vietnamese to do the job.”659  
 There were two aspects of the NSC October 1963 meetings that could 
have kept the CPSVN on track regardless of the situation on the ground. First, 
that the objective continued to be to help the South Vietnamese fight the 
insurgency themselves and, as a corollary to this, that the United States 
                                                
656 Handwritten notes by Secretary McNamara, South Vietnam Visit, December 22, 1963, 
Folder: South Vietnam trip, Defense Programs and Operations, Box 63, RSM Papers, RG200, 
NARA.  
657 Highlights of Discussions in Saigon, December 18-20, 1963, Folder: South Vietnam trip, 
Defense Programs and Operations, Box 63, RSM Papers, RG200, NARA. 
658 Transcript NSC meeting, October 3, 1963: Tape 144/A49, Cassette 2/3, Folder: Fog of 
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government resisted the urge to take on a greater role in fighting the 
insurgency itself despite repeated recommendations in Washington and from 
the field missions to do so. One field report in October 1963 for instance had 
warned that, “The current war in Vietnam is too important a business to leave 
to the Vietnamese politicians particularly in view of the fact that it is being 
waged at the expense of the U.S. taxpayer.”660 Despite an expanded 
assistance mission, the administration had set a red line that, “In the final 
analysis it is the people and the government [of South Vietnam] who have to 
win or lose this struggle.”661 
Second, the NSC October 1963 meetings and the subsequent press 
statement had been designed to create bureaucratic momentum behind a 
policy of disengagement with the hope that it would prove irreversible. At the 
time, while McNamara accepted that “there may be shades of difference”, 
President Kennedy reasoned, “I think it ties it all down” or, as McGeorge 
Bundy explained: “by God we hang everybody in every department on to it.” 
McNamara was adamant about and succeeded in having a press statement 
out in order to “peg” everyone behind a policy of disengagement.662 
As McNamara scribbled in his first notes for In Retrospect: “[Kennedy] 
was willing to supply limited support – in the form of logistics and US military 
trainers and advisors to help the Vietnamese help themselves with the clear 
objective of withdrawing that support after it had been long enough to help the 
Vietnamese develop a capability to help themselves if they were capable of 
doing so. By July-October 1963, he and I agreed that time had come.”663 As 
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the preceding chapter explained, the October 1963 announcement of a 
phased withdrawal was not premised on an optimistic reading of the situation 
in Vietnam but rather it hinged on a number of variables, notably the Kennedy 
administrationʼs interest in counterinsurgency. McNamaraʼs suggestion in the 
final draft In Retrospect that it was only in December 1963 that he realized 
that “earlier reports of military progress had been inflated” was, at best, 
disingenuous.  
 
President Johnsonʼs leadership style 
On one level, the decision to escalate U.S. involvement in South Vietnam as 
the situation there unraveled was a product of bureaucratic machinery rather 
than an individualʼs decision. Yet, as Larry Berman has written, “The dominant 
variable of any advisory system is the personality of the President.”664 Given 
McNamaraʼs strict conceptions of loyalty, the President was in fact “the” 
determining variable in understanding his shift. And while it may be unfair to 
caricature Johnsonʼs approach to Vietnam as less sophisticated than 
Kennedyʼs, this was precisely McNamaraʼs assessment. In an interview with 
Brian VanDeMark, he explained that Johnson had removed key qualifiers to 
the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam, notably a strong political base and the 
ability of the South Vietnamese to win the war themselves. He added, “In that 
sense, I think his view was what I termed more simplist [sic]. I donʼt like the 
term but, for the minute, it conveys my thought.”665 
President Johnsonʼs rather more “simplistic” understanding of Vietnam 
shaped the terms of the debate and the scope of the recommendations that 
McNamara presented to him. In one telling exchange with McNamara on 
March 2, 1964, Johnson instructed McNamara: “I want you to dictate to me a 
memorandum of a couple of pages, uh four letter words and short sentences 
and several paragraphs so I can read it and study it and commit to memory 
                                                664	  Berman, Planning a Tragedy, pp. 4.	  
665 VanDeMark Interview of Robert S. McNamara, September 10, 1993, Folder: In Retrospect 
First Draft, Ch. 5-8, Box II:100, RSM Papers, LoC. 
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[…] the Vietnam picture if you had to put in 600 words or maybe a thousand 
words if you have to go that long. But just like youʼd talk.”666 
Often the presidential recordings of conversations between President 
Johnson and McNamara reveal a hierarchical relationship confirming 
McNamaraʼs Special Assistant Adam Yarmolinskyʼs view that if McNamaraʼs 
relationship with Kennedy had been one of “real mutual trust and affection”, 
Johnson “was his boss, and he was Johnsonʼs most useful servant.”667 
Whereas McNamara often interrupted Kennedy and at times dominated their 
conversations, Johnson lectured and dictated, instructing McNamara that, “Iʼll 
tell you what Iʼd say about it.” In exchanges that sometimes appeared 
excessive, Johnson complimented McNamara, calling him “McCan-do-man” 
or his “executive VP”, somebody he valued because “I need to issue 
instructions and see that theyʼre carried out.”668 McNamaraʼs old colleagues 
and friends, particularly Robert Kennedy, were “outraged by McNamaraʼs 
servility” and the “humiliations” he endured “out of deference to Johnson or his 
office.”669 Ultimately, McNamaraʼs relationship to Johnson reflected his 
ambivalent depiction of Johnson as someone who was “by turns open and 
devious, loving and mean, compassionate and tough, gentle and cruel […] a 
towering, powerful, paradoxical figure.”670 Their relationship also explains 
McNamaraʼs role during the transition. 
In spite of his flattering remarks, Johnson allowed and even 
encouraged McNamara to become the public face of escalation in Vietnam. In 
the key period of the spring of 1964, Senator Morse first designated the war in 
Vietnam as “McNamaraʼs war”, a moniker President Johnson reveled in. The 
presidential recordings are replete with references to Johnsonʼs amusement 
with the notion: he laughed that it was unfair that it was “only McNamaraʼs 
war”671 or described the situation as “your war in Vietnam.”672 For his part, 
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McNamara in his loyal servant role took responsibility for the complicated 
situation because it would “take a lot of heat off of you Mr. President.”673 
When, in September 1964, press reports first started pointing the finger at 
Johnson for the administrationʼs policy in Vietnam, he teased McNamara that 
it “looks to me that John Connally, the two of you got together and transferred 
it from McNamaraʼs war to Johnsonʼ war”, that he had “never heard a word 
about Johnsonʼs war until the two of you got together”, and mused that “I kind 
of enjoyed Goldwaterʼs talk about McNamaraʼs war.”674 Ultimately, just as 
Kennedy had made McNamara the public face of the withdrawal plans and 
charged him with the organization of a policy for Vietnam, Johnson ensured 
that McNamara was also identified with the decision to escalate. 
Johnson had defined the parameters of the discussion on Vietnam with 
his almost immediate commitment to “win” in Vietnam.675 McNamara wrote 
that, “President Johnson made clear to Lodge on November 24 [1963] that he 
wanted to win the war, and that, at least in the short run, he wanted priority 
given to military operations over “so-called” social reforms. He felt the United 
States had spent too much time and energy trying to shape other countries in 
its own image. Win the war! That was his message.”676 Although in an 
interview with CBS in the wake of that meeting, Ambassador Lodge, stated 
that “policy [was] unchanged and that “it was not a decision-making type 
meeting”, Johnsonʼs “message” influenced the shape of policy in the ensuing 
months.677  
Within weeks, Johnson wrote to General Taylor that, “The more I look 
at it, the more it is clear to me that South Vietnam is our most critical military 
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area right now” [emphasis added].678 In turn, this fed into the type of advice he 
demanded from McNamara. During McNamaraʼs first trip back to Vietnam in 
December 1963, his teamʼs terms of reference as he communicated them to 
Ambassador Lodge were to plan for “varying levels of pressure all designed to 
make clear to the North Vietnamese that the US will not accept a communist 
victory in South Vietnam and that we will escalate the conflict to whatever 
level is required to insure defeat.”679 
In the same February 25, 1964 tape where Johnson spelled out the 
Kennedy/McNamara policy, he also revealed his distinctive perspective and 
biases. For instance, he told McNamara, “We have a commitment to 
Vietnamese freedom. Now, we could pull out of there, the dominos would fall, 
that part of the world would go Communist.” This was a stronger commitment 
than McNamara had allowed in his October 1963 report.680 It was also the 
only exchange where Johnson directly addressed the withdrawal plans and 
his remarks challenge the idea that he chose to continue Kennedyʼs policy in 
Vietnam. He said: “I always thought it was foolish to make any statements 
about withdrawing. I thought it was bad psychologically. But you and the 
President thought otherwise and I just sat silent.”681 
During his “silent” years as Vice President, and on the rare occasions 
when he was consulted, Johnson had encouraged “tougher” responses. 
Famously, during a trip to South Vietnam in May 1961, in which he called 
Diem the “Churchill of Asia”, he promised that the United States would stand 
“shoulder to shoulder” with South Vietnam and in a seemingly unprompted 
way asked Diem if he needed U.S. or SEATO intervention.682 In his trip report, 
he reiterated the domino theory and argued that, “The failure to act vigorously 
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to stop the killing now in Viet Nam may well be paid for later with the lives of 
Americans all over Asia.”683 Even while he recognized the dangers of finding 
the United States embroiled in a “jungle war”, he argued for a substantial 
increase in economic aid and a more active military role. He ended his report 
to the President ominously: “There is a chance for success in Viet Nam but 
there is not a moment to lose. We need to move along the above lines and we 
need to begin now, today, to move.”684 Kennedy and McNamara largely 
ignored the Vice Presidentʼs warnings and recommendations. 
 
McNamara reassesses Vietnam 
The documentary record supports the notion that McNamara became a 
leading force behind the Johnson administrationʼs decision to escalate in 
Vietnam. At the same time that McNamara was insisting on the limited 
character of Kennedyʼs commitment to Vietnam, his memoranda encouraged 
aggressive policies that represented a clear break with the policies he had 
supported until then. As early as December 1963, armed with his negative 
appraisal of the situation in Vietnam, McNamara recommended that the 
administration should be “preparing for more forceful moves.”685 By March 
1964, in his first joint trip back to South Vietnam with Maxwell Taylor, his 
already pessimistic appraisal of the situation darkened further and he came 
out even more forcefully in favor of the very same military response that he 
had resisted during the Kennedy administration.  
His trip report was riddled with contradictions and reflected the same 
bureaucratic conflicts that had existed during the Kennedy years. McNamara 
wrote that the policy of phased withdrawal and of considering the conflict as 
one for which “the South Vietnamese must win and take ultimate 
responsibility” was “still sound.” At the same time, he inferred that this was no 
longer a substitute for victory in the traditional sense. Now he wrote, “The U.S. 
at all levels must continue to make emphatically clear that we are prepared to 
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furnish assistance and support for as long as it takes to bring the insurgency 
under control.”686  
Ten days after his return from Vietnam, in a speech delivered in 
Washington DC, McNamara reiterated this shift towards a more open-ended 
commitment. Whereas the October 1963 announcement promised a 
commitment until “the insurgency has been suppressed or until the national 
security forces of the Government of South Viet-Nam are capable of 
suppressing it”, he now pledged a U.S. commitment for “as long as it 
takes.”687 
The March reportʼs suggested policy directions were equally 
contradictory. On the one hand, it stated the “so-called ʻoil spotʼ theory is 
excellent” and reiterated the key role for pacification and counterinsurgency 
programs. On the other, it recommended preparing for graduated “air 
pressure” over North Vietnam.688 Until this point, the counterinsurgency 
strategy had been designed as a substitute to conventional force and 
precluded a bombing program. Even if the report made due reference to 
neutralization and withdrawal, it just as quickly rejected them as viable policy 
options. As a result, within ten days of submitting the report, planning for the 
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam was formally, though not publicly, 
terminated.689 When the 1,000-man withdrawal did go ahead, it was done on 
the basis of “efficiencies” rather than as part of a larger program of phasing 
out. 
 
However, David Ormsby-Goreʼs notes from a dinner with McNamara the night 
before he departed on this March trip, suggest that even while McNamara 
was publicly expanding the commitment to South Vietnam and proposing 
policy options that would extend “American military commitments”, in private, 
he still held on to a policy he later ascribed to Kennedy, namely that there 
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would be no point in expanding the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam 
without a viable political base in the country. The Ambassador found 
McNamara “more despondent about the situation there than I have ever seen 
him” and very concerned about South Vietnamʼs new leadershipʼs ability to 
“restore moral and achieve growing popular support.” Later, he wrote: “He 
was not in a belligerent mood and although he has spoken to me previously 
about examining the possibilities of hurting the North Vietnamese, I gained the 
strong impression that unless he came back feeling that there was a 
reasonable chance of pulling the situation round in South Vietnam, there 
would be no value in risking a further extension of American military 
commitments in the area such as would result from trying to carry the conflict 
over the border into the North.”690  
 Instead, as William Bundy recalled, as Assistant Secretary of State for 
Far Eastern Affairs and with help from his colleagues in the State Department 
and White House, he had written most of the March report and McNamaraʼs 
subsequent speech in Washington before the latter had even left for 
Saigon.691 In a particularly revealing presidential tape recorded just days 
before the trip, Johnson basically dictated what would eventually became the 
reportʼs policy suggestions: “Iʼd like you to say that there are several courses 
that could be followed.” These were: sending in troops, neutralization that 
would result in “Commies […] swallow[ing] up South Vietnam”, pulling out 
which would result in dominos falling throughout the region or continuing 
training.692 In other words, the crucial March 1964 report was not so much a 
reflection of McNamaraʼs views as it was what Johnson said heʼd “like 
[McNamara] to say.”  
As such, the mood that Ormsby-Gore had observed on the eve of the 
trip was likely less a reflection of McNamaraʼs concerns about what he might 
                                                
690 Ormsby-Gore to Caccia, March 6, 1964, Prime Ministerʼs correspondence, PREM 
11/4759, UK National Archives, Kew. 691	  Shapley, Promise and Power, pp. 298.	  
692 MC LBJ Presidential Recordings: March 2, 1964, WH 6403.01, Conversation 2301. 
	   223 
find in South Vietnam and more about the momentum he could see was 
gathering in Washington around the option of using military force.693 
By May 1964, when McNamara returned again to Vietnam, he told 
MACV that the main priority was winning the war and that they would have 
everything they needed to achieve that objective. Meanwhile, in Washington, 
a bureaucratic consensus around bombing North Vietnam emerged. Even if 
McNamara had been inclined to support bombing to support 
counterinsurgency operations in South Vietnam until 1963, the new policy shift 
was not his: it did not originate within the Defense Department but in the 
White House and the services. A recording on April 30, 1964 is particularly 
revealing in this regard. Before McNamaraʼs trip to Vietnam, Johnson 
indicated that, “What I want is somebody that can lay up some plans to trap 
these guys and whoop hell out of them, kill some of them, thatʼs what I want to 
do,” to which McNamara responded, “Iʼll try to bring something back thatʼll 
meet that objective.”694  
In May 1961 and again in May 1964, for Johnson “winning” could only 
be achieved by the use of traditional military means; something neither 
McNamara nor even Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell Taylor 
recommended.695 Even though he described the Chiefs as “fools”696, in April 
1964, Johnson asked McNamara if he had “anybody [who] has a military mind 
that can give us a military plan for winning that war?” This represented a 
break in policy on Vietnam because until this point the Chiefs had very little 
say in designing policy.697 
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Johnson appeared to fall into the trap Galbraith had warned of in the 
spring of 1962, namely “the mystique of conventional force, and the recurrent 
feeling that, in the absence of any other feasible lines of action, the movement 
of troops might help.”698 Despite lacking an overarching strategy, McNamaraʼs 
May 1964 report and the NSC discussion that followed set the administration 
on a path to conventional war against North Vietnam. In reference to the 
overall objective to “win”, McNamaraʼs trip report warned that, “We are 
continuing to lose. Nothing we are now doing will win.”699 However, in the 
NSC discussions, it was McCone (“we should go in hard and not limit our 
actions to pinpricks”) and McGeorge Bundy who argued most vehemently for 
planning a bombing program against the North.700 In the next days, Bundy 
reiterated his conviction that military planning should move forward within a 
“larger framework – the U.S. national interest and the future of Southeast Asia 
– that I hope we will all be thinking as the discussion goes on.”701 
With this framework in mind, and at Johnsonʼs request to have “a 
military mind” give “a military plan for winning the war”, McNamara led a 
meeting in Honolulu in June 1964 with CINCPAC and MACV commanders 
where the full range of military plans and contingencies were considered. 
These included the use of tactical nuclear weapons. At that meeting, 
McNamara agreed to begin planning for the graduated escalation bombing 
program that became known as Operation Rolling Thunder.702  
McNamara agreed to this even if the presidential recordings, even 
more than the written record, reveal that he questioned its effectiveness and 
bemoaned the Armyʼs Chief of Staff Earl Wheelerʼs emphasis on “planes”. He 
explained to Johnson: “And the planes, Max Taylor agrees, are not the 
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answer to the problem. Whether we should have more planes is another 
question but itʼs not going to make any difference in the short-term, thatʼs for 
certain.” In a further indication of Johnsonʼs increased inclination to involve 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in designing strategy or at least tactics for Vietnam, 
Johnson replied, “Well letʼs give him more of something. Because Iʼm going to 
have a heart attack if you donʼt give him more of something.”703  
The difference of views held by President Johnson and McNamara 
about the proper role of military authorities was particularly evident where 
staffing in South Vietnam was concerned. In June 1964, when Westmoreland 
replaced General Harkins, discussions turned to replacing Ambassador Lodge 
who had been widely criticized within the administration for his failure to 
manage the country team in South Vietnam. President Johnson favored 
Maxwell Taylor, suggesting, “Taylor can give us the cover we need with 
country, conservatives and Congress.” McNamara tried repeatedly to stall 
Taylorʼs selection by suggesting George Ball as his “first choice.” He also 
proposed Roswell Gilpatric, McGeorge Bundy and even himself. Echoing 
complaints that had followed the creation of MACV in the spring of 1962, 
McNamara worried that Taylorʼs selection would spark criticism that the 
administration was “putting [Vietnam policy] in the hands of the military” and 
that there were inherent “problems with a military man.” Rather than respond 
to the substance of McNamaraʼs criticism, Johnson curtly dismissed it saying 
“well thatʼs what it is.”704 
 
Changes in Washington 
The change in President during the transition was a critical variable. Johnson 
framed the terms of the debate on U.S. policy towards Vietnam and at times 
dictated the recommendations so that he limited McNamaraʼs scope for 
influence. Just as the October 1963 policy and the CPSVN flowed from a 
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policy framework set out by President Kennedy, McNamaraʼs increasingly 
hawkish recommendations in the spring of 1964 flowed from Johnson. In 
addition, Johnsonʼs reorganization of national security decision-making had 
an indirect influence on policy outcomes: not only did he want more military 
advisors involved in decision-making, he thrust Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
into a key role on Vietnam policy to the detriment of key counterinsurgency 
experts, including Roger Hilsman.  
In the October 1963 NSC meetings, when the Kennedy administration 
agreed on an administration-wide policy for Vietnam and committed itself 
publicly to a policy of disengagement, Hilsman and Harriman, not Rusk, 
represented the State Department. In fact Rusk was in Europe at a NATO 
summit at the time. Not only was he absent from the key NSC meetings, he 
was only brought up to speed on the policy after the public announcement had 
been made. Since the strategy that underpinned McNamaraʼs withdrawal 
plans stemmed from advisors like Roger Hilsman rather than Rusk, their 
subsequent removal from decision-making on Vietnam was also a variable 
even if it was only indirectly affected by the change in President. 
The changes in personnel at the less visible levels of government are 
also significant from a historiographical perspective because, in part, the idea 
that Johnson continued Kennedyʼs policy has relied on stressing the continuity 
of personnel. The reality is that key advisors were quickly sidelined including 
Robert Kennedy who had led the Special Group on Counterinsurgency and 
Averell Harriman who was made roving Ambassador for African Affairs. Other 
advisors like Theodore Sorensen, Michael Forrestal and Roger Hilsman, who 
had signaled early on to Johnson that the administration was not keeping to 
the Kennedy administrationʼs policy, were also set aside.  
Theodore Sorensen, who had alerted Johnson to the limits of 
Kennedyʼs commitment and who had suggested ways of disengaging from 
Vietnam in a way that would not endanger U.S. credibility, was the first to go. 
Sorensen had been particularly affected by Kennedyʼs assassination and in 
January indicated that he “didnʼt want to come back” to the White House, 
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which he described as a “very sad place.”705 In private, he spoke harshly 
about Johnson: “to me he personified the kind of hyperbole and hypocrisy that 
defined the worst aspects of politics in my eyes.”706 These comments suggest 
that his reasons for leaving were personal.707 
 Michael Forrestal was also sidelined. He eventually left. In the early 
days of the transition, Forrestal had gone along with the administrationʼs 
escalatory moves: at McGeorge Bundyʼs behest, he produced an economic 
and political program to match McNamaraʼs planning for graduated 
escalation. However, he was ambivalent about the administrationʼs proclivity 
to define the conflict in increasingly conventional military terms. By the spring 
of 1964, he broke with McGeorge Bundy and wrote, “What we are dealing with 
is social revolution by illegal means, infected by the cancer of Communism.” 
He also went back on his suggestion that physical security achieved through 
military means was a prerequisite for the other social and economic 
programs, and now said that: “I believed this, too, until after the third or fourth 
trip to Vietnam. But the problems are not separable. The Viet Cong know this. 
It is why they are winning. To the extent we manage our economic assistance, 
our military action, and our political advice so as to perpetuate a social and 
economic structure which gave rise to the very problem we are fighting, we 
will fail to solve the problem.” Ultimately, by January 1965, he too left the 
administration, disillusioned and depressed.708 
As for Roger Hilsman, under the new administration he reaped the 
consequences of his antagonistic relationship with both the military and his 
boss, Dean Rusk, whom he had continuously circumvented in the past. 
Although Hilsman was a Texan and felt that he and President Johnson 
“should have gotten along”, he became isolated in the new administration as 
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the protection that President Kennedy had given him was removed.709 Rusk 
later said, “I fired him because he talked too much at Georgetown cocktail 
parties.”710 General Taylor explained that Hilsman was dismissed because he 
had antagonized military advisors by second-guessing their recommendations 
– “it just shows what happens when you put a West Pointer in the State 
Department” – and because he “drove McNamara mad.”711 In an effort to 
avoid a noisy departure, he was offered the Ambassadorship in the 
Philippines where he had spent part of his childhood. He chose instead to 
resign.712 Despite the administrationʼs attempts to contain the news of his 
resignation, it made the front page of the New York Times of February 25, 
1964 where he insisted, “I am not quarreling with policy” and praised Johnson 
for his “vigor and sureness.”713  
 
Change in strategy 
Not one to keep his opinions to himself, Hilsman protested loudly within 
corridors of power that the administration was not continuing Kennedyʼs policy 
and he continued to voice this opinion after he left government.714 In a 
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document entitled “Last Will and Testament: South Viet-Nam and Southeast 
Asia”, which he sent to Secretary Rusk on March 10, 1964, Hilsman reacted 
to the administrationʼs gradual move away from the counterinsurgency 
strategy he had helped to design. He reminded his former boss that the 
strategy rested on the “Strategic Concept for South Vietnam”, though he did 
not mention that the “Strategic Concept” was his work. He described the 
strategy as still “basically sound” even while he acknowledged its failings on 
the field. He also responded to the administrationʼs choice to consider more 
traditional, military tools and wrote: “In sum, I think we can win in Viet-Nam 
with a number of provisos. The first is that we do not over-militarize the war – 
that we concentrate not on killing the Vietcong and the conventional means of 
warfare, but on an effective program for extending the areas of security 
gradually, systematically and thoroughly. This will require better team work in 
Saigon than we have had in the past and considerably more emphasis on 
clear and hold operations and on policy work than we ourselves have given to 
the Vietnamese.”715 
Echoing views he had expressed in 1962, Hilsman cautioned that a 
counterinsurgency strategy called “for using military forces in a different way 
than orthodox, conventional war.” Both McNamara and Taylor buttressed this 
claim by arguing that ground troops might not work for the type of conflict in 
Vietnam even after Johnson had decided to send in the Marines. Although the 
Marines had landed in Da Nang on the 8th of March, in a conversation on 
March 30th, McNamara warned the President against the recommendations 
coming from the Chiefs to send additional forces. He explained that Taylor 
believed that ground troops would have “great difficulty” in a 
“counterinsurgency role” and concluded that, “Our troops, while admirably 
trained, are poorly trained as counter-guerrilla.”716 
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However, despite these recommendations, the President and Dean 
Rusk showed little interest in counterinsurgency. In the field, where many 
irregular forces had already been subsumed under military command, the 
“conventionalization” of forces began in earnest: one Special Forces history 
explained how “very few hamlet militia were trained after November 1963, 
almost none after April 1964.”717  
The administrationʼs other prominent counterinsurgency expert, Robert 
Thompson, sought in vain to revive the strategic hamlet program into the first 
months of 1964. By May 1964, he was forced to acknowledge that the new 
administration was no longer listening to him and that “his usefulness had 
come to an end.” The British advisory mission closed at the end of 1964 by 
which time Thompson had concluded that the war was no longer winnable 
and the administration should move to negotiations.718 In a scathing analysis 
of the Johnson administration, he explained how, in the early months of 1964, 
in part because the new President relied “too much” on military advisors and 
“tradition” rather than advisors like him, the “original position, in which the 
United States was merely helping the South Vietnamese to win its own war, 
was gradually changed, to one in which it had to interfere in South 
Vietnam.”719 
 Ultimately, all the key individuals who questioned the administrationʼs 
decisions on Vietnam or provided the intellectual rationale for a 
counterinsurgency strategy were pushed out. McNamara, who could have 
kept their voices alive within national security decision-making chose to be 
loyal to the President. By March 1965, after the introduction of the first troops 
and the initiation of Operation Rolling Thunder, McNamara reassured 
Johnson that the administration was in general agreement and that leaks to 
the press were less likely now. He noted, “Thereʼs been more unity both 
beneath and above surface on Vietnam in the last few months than at any 
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time in the last several years. And more unity in the upper levels than you did, 
letʼs say in the Hilsman/CIA/Defense Department wrangle.”720 
 
President Johnsonʼs economic priorities 
The administrationʼs move towards a more open-ended commitment to 
Vietnam had important repercussions on the fiscal and economic issues that 
had also underpinned the CPSVN. The counterinsurgency strategy had 
dovetailed with McNamaraʼs efforts to tackle the balance of payments deficit; 
the CPSVN addressed the SFRCʼs onslaught against the MAP as well as the 
Kennedy administrationʼs general tendency toward fiscal restraint. By 
contrast, Johnson embraced Keynesian economics and was willing to run 
large deficits. Even while the administration moved to a more “forceful” 
program in Vietnam that no longer fell within the limited purview of a traditional 
military assistance program, Johnson encouraged McNamara to cut costs and 
especially to undervalue costs for Vietnam lest they scuttle his domestic 
ambitions by provoking a congressional debate over his ambition to have both 
“guns and butter”. Given his bridging role at the OSD, McNamara recognized 
sooner than most the tensions inherent in the White Houseʼs competing 
ambitions. 
 The administrationʼs widening and increasingly military commitment to 
Vietnam had important budgetary repercussions, not least that it resulted in 
shifting the budgetary responsibility for the war to the service Chiefs and 
under the supervision of the SASC. In so doing, a major constraint on funding 
for Vietnam was removed. On March 1, 1965, just under a year after planning 
for withdrawal had been suspended and, with it, pressures to decrease funds 
allocated to Vietnam, McNamara wrote to the Service Chiefs: “Occasionally, 
instances come to my attention indicating that some in the Department feel 
restraint imposed by limitations of funds. I want it clearly understood that there 
is an unlimited appropriation available for financing aid to Vietnam. Under no 
circumstance is lack of money to stand in the way of aid to that nation.”721 In 
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addition, in recognition of the fact that operations on Vietnam were shifting 
from a training mission to a more conventional military engagement, 
McNamara began to remove most Vietnam funding from the MAP, officially 
completing the process on March 25, 1966.722 
 McNamara remained reluctant, however, to call the situation in Vietnam 
a “war”. By keeping the Defense Departmentʼs peacetime accounting, it was 
relatively easier for him to underestimate the true costs of the war. In the first 
months of the administration, Johnsonʼs instructed McNamara to 
underestimate his annual budget requests for the Department and for Vietnam 
specifically. McNamara submitted the budget to Congress in the fall knowing 
full well that he would submit a supplementary request in the spring. Even 
while he had suggested this technique to President Johnson, already by 
December 1963 McNamara was concerned that it might “screw up the 
integrity of the budgeting process here.”723 Both the supplementary requests 
and his creation of an “Emergency Fund, SEA” in 1965724 were within his 
authority as Secretary of Defense. However, they eventually became focal 
points for congressional anger over the administrationʼs policies in Vietnam 
because they had blurred the costs of operations in Vietnam.  
The SASC also quickly understood that the budget was undervalued 
and that it relied on problematic assumptions. In his testimony to the SASC, 
McNamara admitted that he used “somewhat arbitrary assumptions regarding 
the duration of the conflict in Southeast Asia”, namely that the rate of activity 
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in the field would be constant and that the war would end by June 30 of the 
given fiscal year. In a further manipulation of the budgetary process, 
McNamara used a “reimbursement” technique within the services: he would 
avoid stockpiling equipment as had been done during the Korean War and 
instead rely on existing servicesʼ stocks. Using this technique to provide 
support to forces in the field allowed many of the costs of operations in 
Vietnam to appear to be coming out of the services normal operating 
budgets.725 
Although McNamara had worried that manipulations of this sort might 
“screw up” his accounting, he nevertheless went ahead with them. His change 
of heart on budgetary issues is explicable when set against the backdrop of 
the administrationʼs broader economic policies. Unlike Kennedy, who erred on 
the side of fiscal conservatism and, in so doing, angered his liberal economic 
advisors, Johnson was applauded for his willingness to embrace 
Keynesianism. He proceeded with Kennedyʼs planned tax cut in 1964 even as 
he significantly increased federal spending on social programs as part of his 
Great Society. To Walter Heller, the Chairman of the CEA, he explained that 
he was a “Roosevelt New Dealer” and “to tell you the truth, John F. Kennedy 
was a little too conservative to suit my taste.”726 While Kennedy had ruled out 
the possibility of expanding spending on the back of the balance of payments 
deficit and faced greater resistance from the business community as well as 
Congress, Johnson was relatively unbothered by these constraints.727  
Paradoxically, the business community seemed reassured by 
President Johnson and, as some of the offset programs with European allies 
and a “buy American” program within the Defense Department began to take 
effect, the balance of payments crisis seemed to have subsided by 1964. 
Also, as Secretary Dillon, who stayed on for the first year of the Johnson 
administration recalled, “Now Mr. Johnson had plenty of other things to do 
                                                
725 McNamara began this manipulation in the last month of the Kennedy administration. It 
would also add fodder for a Republican attack against he administration in the late 1960s with 
accusations that the administration had allowed troops and stock to be depleted around the 
world. Anthony S. Campagna, The Economic Consequences of the Vietnam War (New York, 
NY: Praeger, 1991), pp. 32. 
726 Caro, The Passage of Power, pp. 397. 
727 Harris, Economics of the Kennedy Years, pp. 234. 
	   234 
and he didnʼt have this sort of interest. He knew it was important. He 
supported our effort in helping international monetary cooperation – and later 
on I think he developed a real interest in it when we had more time. But that 
came, I guess, after Iʼd left.”728  
Dillon, who had benefited from an unusually close relationship with 
President Kennedy and encouraged him to err on the side of fiscal prudence 
saw his influence wane in the transition and recalled a President who “wasnʼt 
interested in what was going on” on the economic front.729 In December 1963, 
he tried in vain to attract the new Presidentʼs attention to defense outlays 
overseas and was irritated when Johnson went further than his predecessor in 
promising to keep six divisions in Europe “so long as they are needed” adding 
“and under present circumstances there is no doubt that they will continue to 
be needed.” He warned the President that the Republicans could use the 
need to reduce overseas deployments, not least for balance of payments 
reasons, as a campaign issue and that it was time for substantial troop 
reductions especially in Europe.730  
Johnson promised Senator Byrd, the Senate Finance Committeeʼs 
Chairman, a reduction in federal expenditures to below the $100 billion mark 
in exchange for the passage of the Kennedy tax cut.731 Although this 
reduction had largely been agreed upon between Secretary Dillon and 
President Kennedy, it allowed Johnson to “appear even more conservative in 
cutting expenditures than maybe he really was.”732 In order to keep 
expenditures down while moving ahead with the costly Great Society 
programs, Johnson had to cut back elsewhere, notably on the defense 
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budget. Although the PPBS program was explicitly designed not to have 
budgetary ceilings in mind de facto, McNamara reintroduced them to fit 
Johnsonʼs guidelines: as he explained to Johnson in a private discussion 
about the FY1964 budget, the JCS wouldnʼt “know that I set the dollar limit 
first.”733  
Kennedyʼs liberal critics praised the “spectacular savings” made to the 
defense budget and what they saw as the reallocation of funds to welfare 
spending. They also applauded Johnsonʼs “great skill in dealing with 
Congress.”734 The published numbers were impressive: McNamara cut the 
defense budget by almost 2.5bn in FY1964 and a further 1.2 billion in both 
FY1965 and FY1966. He achieved these cuts by moving ahead with his base 
closure and cost reduction programs both initiated under the Kennedy 
administration, but more problematically by delaying procurement 
decisions.735  
McNamaraʼs work in cutting the defense budget and in keeping 
Vietnam off the radar by eschewing a congressional debate on the 
administrationʼs policies, allowed Johnson to move ahead with his Great 
Society. However, McNamaraʼs manipulations were inherently risky, 
something he recognized earlier than most. As McNamaraʼs special assistant 
Adam Yarmolinsky later explained, by expanding the commitment to Vietnam 
while moving forward with the Great Society, Johnson “launched the American 
economy on the first wave of inflationary surge” not to speak of its effect on 
the balance of payments deficit that was just beginning to improve.736 That 
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said, for a time, the manipulations seemed to work: in June 1965, the Great 
Society legislation passed as did a further tax cut. Within months however, 
even Johnsonʼs liberal Council of Economic Advisors worried that the 
administration could not push through with the Great Society programs, the 
war in Vietnam and keep inflation down without a tax increase.737  
 McNamaraʼs creative bookkeeping was inevitably a short-term solution. 
It could only be sustained if the war was brought to a swift end or if the budget 
was adapted to the reality that the United States was in fact fighting a “war” in 
Vietnam. As a result, it is perhaps not surprising that he repeatedly 
recommended a little more candor from the administration, especially in its 
dealings with Congress. In the key May 1964 discussions, McNamara argued 
that any planning for a bombing program should also involve an information 
program for the public and Congress; Rusk argued that doing this could put 
the President in a “precarious position.”738 Again in June 1964, McNamara 
suggested to Johnson that, “many of us agree” that “if weʼre going to go up 
the escalating chain, then weʼre going to have to educate the people Mr. 
President and we havenʼt done so yet.” Johnson refused, remarking, “Theyʼre 
going to be calling you a warmonger.”739 
 
McNamara as Secretary of Defense 
The documentary record largely validates Johnsonʼs prediction that 
McNamara would be judged to be a “warmonger” and since this record is the 
main source of material for historians, the historiography has constructed a 
narrative about McNamaraʼs pre-eminent role in the escalation of war in 
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Vietnam. When Brian VanDeMark began his work on In Retrospect, Adam 
Yarmolinsky warned him that: “The written record […] tends to be defensive, 
and it provides rationalizations rather than reasons [….] so that it could never 
be said that there was disagreement between the Pentagon or the Secretary 
and the President. Well, of course, there was disagreement.”740 Daniel 
Ellsberg explained that memoranda in the OSD were written, and often 
misleadingly marked as “drafts”, on the understanding that “other people 
could see them; that they could be leaked”, that they primarily were designed 
to provide “talking points” or rationalizations even if the drafter thought it was 
“terrible idea.”741 Given these inherent problems with the written record, the 
Johnson Library tapes are invaluable and cast a very different light on the 
period of escalation and especially on the nature of McNamaraʼs eventual 
disillusionment with the war. The oral record is crucial when examining the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations just as it is when considering 
McNamara. This is also true of sources such as McNaughtonʼs diaries; one of 
McNamaraʼs few advisers that was not “kept in the dark” are important.742 
 Historians have suggested that McNamara was wildly optimistic in 
announcing a plan for phasing out from Vietnam in October 1963 and for 
believing in 1964 that a bombing program could achieve U.S. objectives in 
Vietnam. But this interpretation fails to acknowledge that it was McNamaraʼs 
job to defend the policy just as it was his responsibility to ensure that the 
administrationʼs decision to intervene in Vietnam cost as little as possible. In 
other words, as he defined it, it was his job to concern himself with tactics and 
with organizing for the execution of policy, not to design strategy itself. 
McNamaraʼs narrow definition of his function precluded a role in articulating 
strategy: PPBS, DPMs and all of his innovations at the OSD were explicitly 
designed to plan for force requirements in support of a strategy articulated in 
the White House or the State Department.  
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In other words, from a bureaucratic perspective, if strategy is the 
broader articulation of the objectives to be achieved by the application of 
military force, a theory on the use of those forces, according to McNamaraʼs 
view of the bureaucratic process, should have come from the State 
Department and White House. His role as Secretary of Defense was to think 
about tactics, namely translating strategy into a series of military exchanges in 
the cheapest possible way. As he explained in an oral history for the OSD, the 
Secretary of Defenseʼs role was only to “comment on the military 
implications.”743 
 As such, it is not surprising that his eventual, overt disillusionment with 
the war and falling out with the administration hinged on what he saw as a 
lack of an overarching strategy that could justify escalating costs within his 
Department with a clearer end-point. In March 1965, while Johnson praised 
the “psychological impact” of sending the Marines rather than the “Sunday 
school stuff” that had preceded it, McNamara complained that the 
administration needed a clearer plan. He urged McGeorge Bundy to launch 
more forceful efforts aimed at beginning negotiations than Dean Rusk was 
inclined to, saying, “We need to be less rigid about talks.” To Johnson, he 
explained, “My sense is that weʼre drifting from day to day and we ought to 
have inside government what weʼre going to say tomorrow and then next 
week.”744 Throughout 1965, as the bombing program, which he supported in 
public and in official documents accelerated, he complained about the lack of 
strategy. In September, he expressed concern about the Chiefs bombing 
program, lamenting, “This shows the kind of pressure that is building up. And I 
think irrationality.”745  
As troop numbers and air sorties increased throughout 1965, he 
returned to the ideas of the Kennedy administration and suggested that a 
program in Vietnam might involve alternatives to military force. In December 
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1965, he told Johnson: “I am more and more convinced that we ought to think 
of some action other than military action as the only program here. I think if 
we do that by itself, it's suicide. I think pushing out 300,000, 400,000 
Americans out there without being able to guarantee what it will do is a terrible 
risk and a terrible cost.”746  
Furthermore, although McNaughtonʼs private diaries speak to the 
period of 1966 to 1967 when McNamaraʼs disillusionment with the war 
became more acute and increasingly public and eventually led to his 
dismissal, they also speak to the roots and antecedents of his 
disenchantment. To McNaughton and Cyrus Vance, two of his rare 
confidants, he spoke about “the Kennedy policy”. On February 11, 1966 when 
McNaughton transcribed a particularly on-point comment, McNamara 
explained, “I am prepared to say that the United States should not, in the case 
of covert insurgencies, do more than provide advice and material help to a 
country.”747 Two weeks later, he added “weʼve made mistakes in 
Vietnam…Iʼve made mistakes. But the mistakes I made are not the ones they 
say I made.” I said, “I know.” The fact is that he believes we never should 
have gotten into the combat role out there.”748 
McNamara reflected on the inability of the administration to produce a 
strategy or a policy that relied on the purposeful application of military force or 
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alternatives to military force. He maintained that, “What we need is a theory 
that will limit our role”, that bombing had relied on a gamble that “we could pull 
it off” rather than a strategy per se.749 In a later official history for the OSD, he 
added to this theme by saying that he did not believe bombing in Vietnam 
could achieve political objectives, that “I donʼt think I ever believed that a 
military victory, in the normal sense of the words, was achievable.” In an 
equally revealing statement that followed immediately after his unexpected 
confession of doubt, he asked for assurances that the oral history would 
remain classified.750 
 
McNamaraʼs mistakes in Vietnam were not that he was the pre-eminent 
“hawk”, the key advisor pressuring President Johnson to escalate in Vietnam 
with air power and troops, but arguably that he had a far too narrow definition 
of his job and a too strict concept of loyalty to the President. As the official 
OSD history explains, “McNamara had promised an efficient and affordable 
defense. Vietnam ruined those goals.”751 Given this, perhaps he should have 
spoken out for his own office as well as for the administration, if not for the 
country, as he had been quicker than most to assess the economic costs and 
the strategic weaknesses underpinning Johnsonʼs chosen policy for Vietnam. 
Under a President who valued consensus, he was too quick to parrot 
Johnsonʼs instincts on Vietnam and did not take seriously, as perhaps he 
could have, Johnsonʼs remark that: “I donʼt think anything will be as bad as 
losing and I donʼt see any way of winning but I would sure want to feel that 
everyone person who had an idea, that his suggestion was fully explored.”752 
Too often, as the tapes described in this chapter have shown, McNamaraʼs 
reservations were implicit and hidden from most advisors, if not the President 
himself. 
                                                749	  Diary entry Friday February 11,1966, unclassified personal diary of John T. McNaughton, 
transcribed by Asheley Smith in 2003.	  
750 Robert McNamara OH Interview by the Secretary of Defense Historical Office, July 24, 
1986, Folder: OH 3 for OSD Historical Office, Box I:109, RSM Papers, LoC. 
751 Drea, McNamara, Clifford and the Burdens of Vietnam, pp. 538. 
752 MC LBJ presidential recordings: February 26, 1965, WH6502.06 Conversation 6887. 
	   241 
Ultimately, McNamara was torn between his private views about the 
weaknesses of the administrationʼs policy and his conception of loyalty to the 
Commander-in-Chief and of the role as Secretary of Defense. During the 
crucial period of transition from November 1963 to the spring of 1964, as his 
withdrawal plans were cast aside, he seemed skeptical about the chosen 
strategy for Vietnam but still fostered a sense of alarm as the situation in 
South Vietnam seemed to unravel.  
Given his privileged vantage point, he understood that if the war 
continued its economic costs could not be hidden indefinitely and could scuttle 
his objectives at the Defense Department as well as the administrationʼs 
economic agenda. And yet he could not get past his loyalty to the office of the 
President. As he explained in an interview given after he was fired, “Around 
Washington, there is this concept of higher loyalty. I think itʼs a heretical 
concept, this idea that thereʼs a duty to serve the nation above the duty to 
serve the President, and that youʼre justified in doing so. It will destroy 
democracy if itʼs followed. You have to subordinate a part of yourself, a part of 
your views.”753 
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CHAPTER 12 - CONCLUSION 
 
When McNamara did eventually speak out against the war, both to Johnson 
and in a speech delivered on May 18, 1966 in Montreal, it ultimately led to his 
dismissal. Montreal marked a breaking point in McNamaraʼs relationship with 
the President and the war: it was spurred on by yet another hearing in front of 
the SFRC to defend the MAP program just as expenditures for South Vietnam 
were taken off the MAP balance sheet and, for budgetary purposes, 
operations formally became a military problem. After the hearing, which took 
place in April 1966, McNamara turned to two of his closest colleagues at ISA 
to draft the Montreal speech: Adam Yarmolinsky and John McNaughton. 
McNaughton scribbled a note to Yarmolinsky that read: “RSM will need a 
good speech in May. He intends to dictate a draft this weekend. Would like 
you to work on it. He will be “thinking big” if he can get away with it!”754  
 McNamara may not have “gotten away with it” as it produced 
consternation amongst observers and an irreconcilable rift with his boss, but it 
did spell out his grand vision for “security in the contemporary world”. That 
vision both challenged the administrationʼs stated policies and inferred what 
he may have considered to be his mistakes as the nationʼs eighth Secretary of 
Defense. He questioned the assumption that a planned communist master 
plan drove conflicts in the developing world, and argued instead that 
development was vital. Speaking not far from the Canadian-American border, 
he said: “We still tend to conceive of national security almost solely as a state 
of armed readiness: a vast, awesome arsenal of weaponry. We still tend to 
assume that it is primarily this purely military ingredient that creates security. 
We are still haunted by this concept of military hardware. But how limited a 
concept this actually is becomes apparent when one ponders the kind of 
peace that exists between the United States and Canada.” 
Challenging each of the assumptions and received ideas in turn, he 
added, “Security is not military hardware, though it may include it. Security is 
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not military force, though it may involve it. Security is not traditional military 
activity, though it may encompass it. Security is development. Without 
development, there can be no security.” Returning to the policy he had 
publicly advocated for Vietnam until 1963, he remarked, “Experience confirms 
what human nature suggests: that in most instances of internal violence the 
local people themselves are best able to deal directly with the situation within 
the framework of their own traditions.”755 
 He ended the speech on a measured note; the man who had been 
the spokesperson for “rationality” in government policy now reflected on “Man” 
asking, “Is he a rational animal?” Answering his own question, McNamara 
concluded that, “All the evidence of history suggests that man is indeed a 
rational animal but with a near infinite capacity for folly. His history seems 
largely a halting, but persistent, effort to raise his reason above his animality. 
He draws blueprints for utopia. But never quite gets it built. In the end he 
plugs away obstinately with the only building material really ever at hand his 
own part-comic, part-tragic, part-cussed, but part-glorious nature.”756 After 
more than six years “plugging away” in office, McNamara may have been 
reflecting on his failed “blueprints”. 
A measure of just how far apart McNamara and Johnsonʼs views on 
Vietnam specifically and on military policy more broadly had become, was 
illustrated just the day before McNamara made his speech. Johnson delivered 
a speech in Chicago and in sharp contrast to McNamara, he noted the 
lessons from World War II were that “the road to peace is not the road of 
concession and retreat,” that in Vietnam as elsewhere, “The failure to meet 
aggression means war, not peace.” He complained about “Nervous Nellies” 
who could become “frustrated and bothered and break ranks under the strain, 
and some will turn on their leaders, and on their country, and our own fighting 
men.” He ended with a line that could not have differed more from 
McNamaraʼs view: “The men who fight for us out there tonight in Vietnam – 
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they are trying to find a way to peace. But they know – and I donʼt understand 
why we donʼt all recognize that we canʼt get peace just for wishing for it. We 
must get on with the job until these men come marching home.”757 
 A year later, in November 1967, during his infamous visit to Harvard 
and in a closed meeting with Harvard faculty, McNamara explained the 
rationale behind his Montreal speech: “I got so goddam frustrated that I had to 
have some release. […] Montreal was an immature act. My responsibility is 
not to build my image but to manage a department. In those terms, Montreal 
was a luxury. You donʼt inspire men to obey commands by casting doubt on a 
central doctrine of their reason for being; that is, that security equals military 
power.” When he was asked about the role the speech may have had in 
changing the terms of the debate on Vietnam within the administration, 
McNamara made a telling remark: “Thatʼs not really my problem. What I have 
to worry about is keeping the lid on Vietnam and in that battle, Montreal cost 
me plenty. Iʼm not sorry that I made it.”758  
 
McNamaraʼs frustrations, as articulated in Montreal, speak to “lessons” 
McNamara and his colleaguesʼ drew from their experience working on 
Vietnam that differ from those that were included In Retrospect. For them, the 
lessons were rooted in bureaucracy and in the process of policy-making, 
namely that military solutions were more readily available and funded and 
thus the Defense Department produced centrifugal tendencies. Paradoxically, 
because McNamara was so efficient as a manager, and despite his personal 
reluctance to define problems as primarily military, he made it easier for the 
President to do just that.  
As Part I showed, the militarization of policy in Vietnam was by no 
means inevitable. Organizationally, McNamara had built on Eisenhowerʼs 
reforms to align the Defense Department with a strategy set out by the White 
House and State Department. Groups such as the Special Group CI and 
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individuals that included President Kennedy, Roger Hilsman and Robert 
Thompson, favored a strategy premised on “clear and hold”, civic action, self-
help and the strategic hamlets program at the center of the administrationʼs 
policy for Vietnam. Drawing on new material, especially McNamaraʼs 
calendar, this thesis shows just how heavily Thompsonʼs views in particular 
weighed on McNamara as he turned towards planning for the CPSVN and as 
he made public the administrationʼs plans to disengage from Vietnam in 
October 1963. 
Part II of the thesis illustrates that McNamara embraced 
counterinsurgency for economic reasons. Even if they are treated separately 
in the thesis, strategy and economics are intrinsically connected. Economic 
realities facing the Kennedy administration, and especially the balance of 
payments and threats to the MAP program, had a direct bearing on the 
strategy that McNamara favored and pushed through the bureaucracy. 
 
To conclude, six points are worth restating.  
 
American vulnerability not omnipotence 
First and foremost, this thesis challenges the idea that the Kennedy 
administration saw itself as being at the apex of U.S. power and militancy. It 
disputes the argument that under Kennedy “optimistic America answered the 
summons of the trumpet and went to war in Vietnam”759 and a related point: 
that McNamara advocated or even favored military solutions for Vietnam. It 
suggests the value of a bureaucratic lens to understand McNamaraʼs choices 
and policies for Vietnam because a bureaucratic level of analysis highlights 
the budgetary forces that shaped policy and, for the Kennedy administration in 
particular, shows that getting the right balance between civilian and military 
tools for the purpose of counterinsurgency was as much a bureaucratic 
challenge as it was a strategic one. 
The Kennedy administration chose a limited strategy that was 
contingent on self-help for Vietnam in part because of what Kennedy 
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perceived as “limitations on the ability of the United States” to “bring about a 
favorable result” there.760 By the spring of 1962, the Kennedy administration 
as a whole was humbled by the international crises it had encountered from 
Laos to Berlin to Cuba. However, in many respects, the administrationʼs more 
modest approach to South Vietnam predated these crises and instead 
reaffirmed the central idea of Kennedyʼs inaugural address, which was less a 
“clarion call” for U.S. militancy and more a call for people in the United States 
and abroad to become agents in their own future or in the words of the 
address, “to help them help themselves.”761  
By 1962, refocusing U.S. foreign policy on the notion of self-help had 
gained added urgency with a jump in the balance of payments deficit and the 
gold outflow that resulted. The problem obsessed President Kennedy. Just as 
Eisenhower had before him, Kennedy worried that an unstable economic 
base and international monetary system could undermine every aspect of the 
U.S. power.762 Together with Secretary Dillon, McNamara led efforts to 
redress the deficit. McNamara played a leading part on the balance of 
payments because the Defense Department overseas operations largely 
drove the deficit and because his cost-saving reputation, the quality that 
distinguished him most, was at stake. As a result, the CPSVN timetable 
directly matched the timing and pace of McNamaraʼs efforts to address the 
balance of payments outflow.  
 
The limits of military weapons 
In a revealing exchange in preparation for In Retrospect, Brian VanDeMark 
asked Adam Yarmolinsky, one of McNamaraʼs confidants as well as the 
author of the Montreal speech, “Whatʼs not in the written record that a 
biographer of McNamara should know?” Yarmolinsky replied, “Probably 
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everything. Almost everything. My own view – and I donʼt know that this goes 
to the written record – my own view is that if McNamara is remembered at all 
by history, he will not be remembered as a manager, he will not be 
remembered as the “architect of Vietnam“ although he may be remembered 
unhappily that way, even though I think, in some ways, Iʼm afraid for him. But I 
think he'll be remembered as the person who was, really, the first and most 
effective educator of the American people on the true nature of military 
weapons."763 Certainly, for McNamara, it was a concern about the limitations 
of military power, and overconfidence about its use in the United States, that 
inspired both the CPSVN and his Montreal speech. 
 Robert Kennedyʼs papers, when they are fully available to researchers, 
should shed light on his possible influence or confluence with McNamaraʼs 
disillusionment with the pre-eminence of military tools to deal with the 
situation in Vietnam. A few months after the Montreal speech, McNaughton 
recorded, “Today—after what must have been a work-out at the Kennedy 
compound on the Cape last night—Bob remarked that we seem to be muscle 
bound in our foreign policy—in VN, Europe, Japan, etc.”764 Daniel Ellsberg 
contends that Johnson fired McNamara and assigned him to the World Bank 
because it would prevent him from involvement in domestic politics and 
specifically from accepting Robert Kennedyʼs offer to be his Vice-Presidential 
running mate in a eventual rival campaign to Johnsonʼs.765 Whether or not 
McNamara entertained ambitions to join Kennedyʼs campaign, which seems 
unlikely before Johnson withdrew from the race, he did echo the former 
Attorney Generalʼs views in his private conversations. As early as May 1965, 
Robert Kennedy was complaining to Arthur Schlesinger that he “has found 
himself increasingly unhappy about our Vietnam policy, where he thinks we 
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have construed as a military problem what is primarily a political and 
diplomatic problem.”766 
 As the transition chapter in particular highlighted, the record and the 
telephone recordings especially do not support the notion that McNamara 
believed and championed the idea that military tools could achieve what were 
ultimately political objectives in South Vietnam. In a recently declassified oral 
history, McNamara makes a remarkable admission for someone who, on the 
written record, planned for increased levels of military force: “I donʼt think I 
ever believed that a military victory, in the normal sense of the words, was 
achievable.”767 Because military approaches were easier to fund and the 
Defense Department was better configured to organize complex operations, 
they produced what Yarmolinsky called “centrifugal tendencies”. Ultimately, as 
operations in Vietnam became more extensive and therefore, expensive, the 
more likely it became that responsibility for them would be shifted to the 
Defense Department. Moreover, with a MAP and AID program under attack 
and the CIA unable to fund Special Forces operations as they expanded, the 
budget shifted more and more to the services. This bureaucratic dimension 
was at the heart of McNamaraʼs comments in Montreal. 
 
The State Department and centrifugal forces 
By understanding how McNamara conceived of the OSD in relation to the 
making of strategy, the responsibility for choosing the right or wrong strategy 
shifts away from the Defense Department and towards the State Department 
and White House. In McNamaraʼs schema, his job was to “comment on the 
military implications” and to organize military tools in the service of a chosen 
strategy set elsewhere, even if he preferred and encouraged one strategy 
over another.  
Ultimately, the decisions to escalate militarily in 1965 did not come 
from either the services or the OSD but from the civilian leaders in the State 
Department and the White House. As Roger Hilsman suggested, the 
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responsibility of the White House and especially the State Department was to 
“leverage political aspects”768; something they did not do. In part, as 
Yarmolinsky noted, this was the case because, contrary to Huntingtonʼs 
concerns in The Soldier and the State, civilians had “allow[ed] themselves to 
become militarized”769: President Johnsonʼs suggestion that McNamara 
should “lay up the plans to whoop the hell” out of adversaries in South 
Vietnam speaks to this. Moreover, civilian leaders in the State Department 
failed to represent non-military alternatives forcefully. As CINCPAC put it, 
“State waffles and evades.”770 Another commentator at the time correctly 
assessed that Montreal was also an expression of McNamaraʼs 
“dissatisfaction with the unimaginative and inflexible policies in the State 
Department.”771 
 Yarmolinskyʼs “lessons” from Vietnam are interesting because they are 
situated at the bureaucratic level and speak to additional, structural reasons 
why the Defense Department came to play such a pre-eminent role in 
Vietnam. Faced with “built-in deadlines” that are inherent to crises, 
Presidents, he argued, turned to “what they can do best” which, in the U.S. 
system, was invariably military solutions. With President Johnson particularly, 
military options promised a degree of short-term success to a politician who 
wanted quick-fix solutions that were easily deployable. As an agency that was 
set up to prepare for contingencies and to deal with “large organizational 
problems”, the Defense Department, Yarmolinsky argued, “out-perform[ed] 
State” each time.772 McNamara took over the problems in Vietnam in 1962 
because his department could more easily absorb the costs involved and 
because he and his staff promised to bring order where other agencies, 
especially the State Department, had failed. 
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Both Hilsman and Yarmolinsky suggested that the underlying problem 
was that resources were consistently siphoned to the Defense Department 
rather than to State in the first place, because it was “harder to galvanize 
people” around the State Department that lacked “the constituency or natural 
allies in industry or Congress” that the Pentagon had.773 For Yarmolinsky, 
“flexible response” had actually made the problem worse. Rather than 
“demilitarizing the process”, McNamaraʼs reforms had “only prun[ed] the 
branches of the military tree. It continued to flourish, stunting the growth of the 
civilian organisms that grew in its shadow.”774 Flexible response had made the 
Department of Defense even more ubiquitous by making it at least nominally 
applicable to an even greater range of conflict scenarios. The services first 
became involved in Vietnam precisely because they were encouraged to use 
it as a laboratory for their new responsibilities under flexible response. 
Yarmolinsky wrote that, “So long as the present military means are 
available, situations like Vietnam are going to recur”: without a more 
wholesale reform of the policy process, military solutions would always be 
favored. Only “political leadership that exercises superhuman qualities” could 
prevent it.775 Ultimately, by investing and producing a well-run department, the 
United States had reduced its flexibility in its interactions with the world and 
had produced a Maslowʼs hammer scenario. As Maslow warned, “I suppose it 
is tempting, if the only tool that you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if 
it were a nail.”776 Put simply, from a structural point of view, a bureaucratic 
and budgetary one, it was easier to treat Vietnam as a military problem. 
 
Organizing for counterinsurgency 
As Part I detailed, the Kennedy administration tried to do something new in 
Vietnam. In practice, policy on Vietnam was a product of compromise and 
adaptations to what was organizationally possible in Washington and Saigon. 
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In 1962, the British Foreign Office representatives in Saigon pointedly 
observed,  
“The American idea of government is to define and divide 
responsibilities and then to rely upon the various holders to fight an 
issue out between them. The object is to lay down a “policy” and the 
more protracted and tenacious the fight, the sounder (or so the 
American argument runs) is likely to be the resulting policy. Once 
adopted, it then governs the decisions of all individuals involved in its 
execution until such time as new circumstances have arisen to render 
the policy no longer applicable. The business of reaching agreement 
on a policy is such an undertaking that everyone is anxious to avoid a 
repetition for as long as possible: hence American reluctance until 
disaster threatens to abandon policies even when manifestly out of 
date. […] One of the by-products of this system is that each service or 
agency attaches supreme importance to defining clearly its own sphere 
of activity and refusing to step outside of it, on the understanding that 
the other will do the same.”777 
The October 1963 announcements fulfilled precisely the objective of gluing 
everyone to one policy after a protracted battle. As well, the 
counterinsurgency strategy, which the CPSVN was premised on, struggled 
from the outset because of bureaucratic battles between the military services 
and across military-civilian lines. 
 Although the Kennedy administration made some leeway in terms of 
organizing for counterinsurgency in new, more civilianized ways – for instance 
through the Special Group (CI) – Hilsman and his colleagues always worried 
about the ability of the U.S. government and its fragmented pieces, to work 
together coherently in the field. In November 1963, as the CPSVN took hold in 
Vietnam, Hilsman worried that “once the MACV/CINCPAC/JCS channel was 
set up, it would inevitably become formal, requiring JCS action and Special 
Group action for every move, thus getting us into a somewhat rigid position 
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that would make timing to fit the political situation difficult.”778 Although the 
CPSVN brought order and a degree of secured funding for Hilsmanʼs 
preferred program, it also removed the flexibility and informality that his 
program required operationally.  
 Decision-makers quarreled and struggled to find the right balance of 
responsibility across the different government agencies each step of the way 
in the early years of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. When USAIDʼs programs 
were taken over by the Defense Department under Operation Switchback in 
1962, field officers complained but were silenced as their bosses weighed up 
the budgetary advantages. When the counterinsurgency program was 
gradually dropped in the transition to the Johnson administration, Kennedyʼs 
erstwhile counterinsurgency advisors in the NSC and State Department 
complained. They were impotent faced with a President and Secretary of 
State uninterested in their ideas. In each instance, bureaucrats, with the 
possible exception of Roger Hilsman779, did not want to shake the boat too 
aggressively and held on to the hope that existing bureaucratic arrangements, 
even if they were less than ideal, might work. 
 
Neither a hawk nor a dove 
The final line of the British Foreign Officeʼs statement about avoiding 
“stepping outside” a set “sphere of activity” is especially relevant for 
McNamara. McNamaraʼs “refus[al] to step outside” his personal vision for the 
job led to contradictory outcomes, neither hawkish nor dovish. The 
contradictions were inherent to his office. On the one hand, not least because 
of his domineering personality, the OSD and Defense Department had 
produced centrifugal forces, which tended to produce military solutions. On 
the other hand, as an office that looked inwards at budgetary and economic 
realities since it weighed so heavily on both, the OSD fulfilled a useful checks 
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and balances function, something Eisenhower had intended in his reforms. 
Given this dual outlook, McNamara was among the first to see that over-
ambitious programs in Vietnam could stretch the countryʼs resources, 
especially its economic ones. McNamara favored the self-help program 
because of its favorable impact on the balance of payments deficit. Later 
when he suggested to Johnson that he should raise taxes if he was going to 
choose escalation, it too was for budgetary reasons. 
Although McNamara became the public face of the war as it escalated 
and knowingly accepted, if not encouraged, the label that Vietnam was 
“McNamaraʼs war”, behind the scenes, it was at the OSD, and at ISA 
specifically, that dissent was the strongest. In some respects, ISA was the 
logical place for dissent as it bridged the capabilities of the Defense 
Department and the strategy, or lack thereof, of civilians at the State 
Department. The most virulent complaints emerged at ISA even if they rarely 
went beyond its walls.780 Ultimately, it was at ISA under McNamara that the 
policy of Vietnamization emerged, a policy that eventually provided the basis 
for the eventual U.S. disengagement from Vietnam. Paul Warnke, who played 
a leading part in designing Vietnamization, stayed on to serve both of 
McNamaraʼs successors, Clark Clifford and President Nixonʼs Secretary of 
Defense, Melvin Laird. 
 While these “checks and balances” characteristics, especially insofar 
as they led to McNamaraʼs support for withdrawal, could qualify McNamara as 
a “dove” on Vietnam, his unrepentant defense of using technology throughout 
the war could easily be described as “hawkish”. From the outset, he 
encouraged defoliation programs and applied similar statistical models to the 
bombing campaign in Vietnam as he had done during the Second World War.  
If by April 1966, he had decidedly turned against the war and 
exclaimed, ““I want to give the order to our troops to get out of there so bad 
that I can hardly stand it,”781 just three months earlier he was defending the 
idea of building a barrier between North and South Vietnam. McNaughtonʼs 
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diaries recount a revealing exchange: “I asked him if he thought North 
Vietnamese ingenuity would be able to defeat a barrier. He surprised me with 
a “no.” Before long he was bouncing around the room, looking at maps of SEA 
and of Europe (to compare the Iron Curtain). He said, “Give me $2 billion and 
Iʼll build a barrier no one can get through. Iʼd get Edgar Kaiser and George 
Brown and ʻsix companiesʼ and weʼd build it.” As for the problem of splitting 
Laos, he said he could build a wall north to China for “six billion.” I suspect 
that he will talk about it, maybe with Bobby Kennedy and perhaps others and 
weʼll be off on a serious study of the proposition soon.”782 
 McNamara muffled his and his colleagueʼs dissent in order to fulfill his 
professional obligations to the President as he narrowly defined them. 
McNaughton observed, “So much in government depends upon subordinates 
taking hints and carrying out the mood of the President. Also, under Kennedy 
and in the early Johnson days, I sensed a semi-conspiratorial relationship with 
McNamara—in which things were accomplished despite bureaucratic hurdles 
(State Dept., JCS, AEC, Congress, etc.). Now I sense that the President is on 
the “hard” side of Bob—e.g., on Vietnam, in Europe, regarding Anti-Ballistic 
missiles, etc. Bob (and I) is much less effective if the President is really 
trusting the Chiefs, for example. Such a shift in outlook makes quite a 
difference in the “power” one (ISA) has—whether he is listened to, gets his 
way, etc. Weʼll see how things go.”783 In other words, as he correctly 
assessed, as soon as McNamara stopped parroting the views he knew the 
President wanted to hear, he was sidelined. 
 
Reinterpreting McNamara 
As far as McNamara, the main focus of the thesis, is concerned, two points 
emerge: one methodological and the other substantive. First, by extending the 
research on Vietnam to bring together other bodies of literature, for instance 
economic or bureaucratic histories, another interpretation of McNamara is 
possible. Moreover, new sources, in particular transcripts of the Kennedy and 
                                                
782 Diary entry Sunday, January 29, 1966, McNaughton diary. 
783 Diary entry March, 25, 1966, McNaughton diary. 
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Johnson tapes, especially of the October 1963 NSC meetings, McNamaraʼs 
trip notes to Vietnam in September 1963, his calendar, Yarmolinskyʼs papers 
and McNaughtonʼs diaries shed a different light on McNamaraʼs role on 
Vietnam and provide invaluable evidence that the gap between McNamaraʼs 
public and private persona, and views on the war were wider than was 
heretofore acknowledged.  
Understanding McNamaraʼs strict codes of loyalty are fundamentally 
important to grasp how someone who played such a crucial part in trying to 
keep the United States out of Vietnam could also be held responsible for the 
war. In many respects, he was the perfect “fall guy”, someone who held his 
reservations and concerns quiet notwithstanding his comments in Montreal.  
Although he considered leaving the Johnson administration as early as 
the fall of 1965, he nevertheless stayed on until February 1968.784 So why did 
he stay so long? Was it as he explained in the Harvard faculty meeting that 
his job was “keeping the lid on Vietnam” or as Errol Morris put it, that he was 
like a “Dutch boy with his finger in the dike”? Or did he stay until the threat of 
nuclear holocaust receded?785 In his letter accepting the job of Secretary of 
Defense, he had indicated that he would stay on for as long as he had the 
“closest possible, personal working relationship with the President” and for as 
long as he “receive[d] the Presidentʼs full backing and support.”786 Had he 
concluded that his relations with Johnson had degenerated to the point that 
this was no longer true? In many ways, the question remains open and 
McNamara never satisfactorily answered it. However, just as on the basis of 
new evidence this thesis hopefully provides a new interpretation of 
McNamaraʼs early contributions to the Vietnam War, perhaps future studies 
will answer the question of why he remained at his post until 1968.  
Ultimately, McNamara emerges from this history as a man who does 
not comfortably fall within a hawk-dove dichotomy and who was perhaps more 
                                                
784 Ibid. 
785 Errol Morris, interview by author, London, UK, March 18, 2014.; Richard Neustadt to 
Institute of Politics Members, Faculty Associates and Fellows, undated (November 1966), 
Folder: RSM Visit, Box 53, Yarmolinsky Papers, JFKL. 
786 McNamara to Senator Kennedy, December 12, 1960, Folder: Secretary of Defense letter 
of acceptance, 1960, Box II:46, RSM Papers, LoC.  
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reflexive than conventional interpretations allow. As he acknowledged in 
conversations with McNaughton, “Weʼve made mistakes in Vietnam…Iʼve 
made mistakes. But the mistakes I made are not the ones they say I made. 
[…] The fact is that [McNamara] believes we never should have gotten into 
the combat role out there.”787 This thesis may contribute to posing the 
question about whether McNamara ever believed combat troops were the 
solution to Vietnamʼs problems. 
 
 
                                                
787 Diary entry for Monday February 28, 1966, unclassified personal diary of John T. 
McNaughton, transcribed by Asheley Smith in 2003. 
	   257 
Bibliography 
 
Archives Consulted 
 
Georgetown University Special Collections Research Centre, 
Washington, D.C. 
Paul C. Warnke Papers 
 
Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, MI 
Melvin Laird Papers 
Subject Files, Vietnam, General 
Ambassador Graham Martin Files 
 
Harvard Business School Archives, Baker Library, Cambridge, MA 
Class notes, Robert S. McNamara 
 
Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, CA 
David M. Shoup Papers 
 
John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, MA 
National Security Files, Series: 
Meetings & Memoranda  
Country  
Chester V. Clifton  
Carl Kaysen Papers 
Regional Security Studies 
Subject Files 
Trip and Conferences 
Special Group (CI) 
Presidential Office Files 
Countries File, Vietnam/Vietnam Security  
Departments and Agencies 
Staff Memoranda 
Advisors and Personal Papers
George W. Ball 
McGeorge Bundy  
C. Douglas Dillon 
Bernard B. Fall 
Paul B. Fay 
John K. Galbraith  
Roger Hilsman  
Stanley Karnow 
Nicholas de B Katzenbach 
William W. Kaufmann 
Carl Kaysen  
Lawrence OʼBrien 
Kenneth OʼDonnell 
Pierre Salinger 
Arthur M. Schlesinger 
Theodore C. Sorensen 
James C. Thompson 
Robert Thompson 
Adam Yarmolinsky  
John M. Newman Research Papers 
Presidential Recordings 
Pre-Presidential Papers 
 Richard E. Neustadt Papers 
United States Agency of International Development Records 
 
 
	   258 
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
Manuscript Room 
Averell Harriman Papers 
Curtis LeMay Papers 
Robert S. McNamara Papers 
Paul H. Nitze Papers 
Elliot L. Richardson Papers 
Neil Sheehan Papers 
Senate Room 
Congressional Hearings on Foreign Aid 
Congressional Hearings on Defense 
 
National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD 
RG59:  Records of the Vietnam Working Group 
RG59:  Records of the Special Group (CI) 
RG200:  OSD Files, Robert S. McNamara Papers 
RG218: Joint Chiefs of Staff 
RG263: Central Intelligence Agency 
RG330: Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Files 
RG334: Interservice Agencies 
RG472: United States Forces in Southeast Asia 
 
National Archives, Kew, U.K. 
Foreign Office (FO/FCO) Files 
Prime Ministerʼs (PREM) Files 
Cabinet (CAB) Files 
The United States of America Microfiche Collection: Series 1 and 2 
 
NATO Archives, Brussels, Belgium 
North Atlantic Council: Council Memoranda, Summary and Verbatim Records 
Defence Planning and Policy 
Annual review and defence planning multilateral discussions 
 
Naval Historical Center, Washington D.C. 
Admiral Harry D. Felt Papers and Oral History 
 
Roosevelt Study Center, Middleburg, Netherlands 
Oral History collections (Columbia University, JFKL as below) 
William C. Westmoreland Papers 
Public Papers President 
 
University of Virginia Archives, Charlottesville, VA 
Louis A. Johnson Papers 
 
 
 
 
 
	   259 
Digital Resources 
 
The American Presidency Project 
 http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/. Retrieved December 16, 2014. 
 
Atomic Archive 
http://www.atomicarchive.com/index.shtml. Retrieved December 16, 
2014. 
 
CBS news 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/schedule-of-cbsnewscoms-live-stream-
of-jfk-assassination-broadcast-coverage/. Retrieved December 16, 
2014. 
 
Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS) 
http://gdc.gale.com/products/declassified-documents-reference-
system/. Retrieved December 16, 2014. 
 
Defense Technical Information Center 
 http://dtic.mil/dtic/. Retrieved December 16, 2014. 
 
Digital National Security Archive, George Washington University (DNSA) 
 http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/. Retrieved December 16, 2014. 
 
Dissertations and Theses 
http://search.proquest.com/pqdtft/index?accountid=9630. Retrieved 
December 16, 2014. 
 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
 http://www.stlouisfed.org/. Retrieved December 16, 2014. 
 
Federal Reserve History Resources 
 http://www.federalreservehistory.org 
 
Frontline Diplomacy 
 http://adst.org/oral-history/. Retrieved December 16, 2014. 
  
H-Diplo 
 https://networks.h-net.org/h-diplo. Retrieved December 16, 2014. 
 
John F. Kennedy Presidential Library 
 http://www.jfklibrary.org/. Retrieved December 16, 2014. 
 
Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library 
 http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/. Retrieved December 16, 2014. 
 
 
 
	   260 
LZ Center 
http://www.lzcenter.com/Vietnam%20War%20Documents.html. 
Retrieved December 16, 2014. 
 
The National Bureau of Economic Research 
 http://www.nber.org/. Retrieved December 16, 2014/ 
 
Miller Center, University of Virginia 
 http://millercenter.org/. Retrieved December 16, 2014. 
 
National Public Radio 
 http://www.npr.org/. Retrieved December 16, 2014. 
 
Old Colorado City Communications 
 http://www.oldcolo.com/. Retrieved December 16, 2014. 
 
Open Society Online Archives 
 http://www.osaarchivum.org/. Retrieved December 16, 2014. 
 
Open Vault Archives 
 http://openvault.wgbh.org 
 
The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Mt. Holyoke. 
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/vietnam.htm. Retrieved 
December 16, 2014. 
 
The Pentagon Papers, U.S. National Archives. 
http://www.archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers/. Retrieved 
December 16, 2014. 
 
Texas Tech University: The Vietnam Center and Archive 
 http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/. Retrieved December 16, 2014. 
 
Tom Paulin: John T. McNaughton – Find a Way Out blog 
http://jtmcnaughtonfindawayout.blogspot.co.uk/2011/02/epilogue.html. 
Retrieved December 16, 2014. 
 
U.S. Air Force Historical Agency 
http://www.afhra.af.mil/documents/oralhistorycatalogue.asp. Retrieved 
December 16, 2014. 
 
U.S. Army Center of Military History 
 http://www.history.army.mil/. Retrieved December 16, 2014. 
 
U.S. Congressional Hearings Digital Collection Historical Archive, 1824-2003 
http://congressional.proquest.com.gate2.library.lse.ac.uk/congressional
/search/basic/basicsearch. Retrieved December 16, 2014. 
 
	   261 
U.S. Department of Defense 
 http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/. Retrieved December 16, 2014. 
 
U.S. Department of Defense, Historical Office 
 http://history.defense.gov/. Retrieved December 16, 2014. 
 
U.S. Department of Justice 
 http://www.justice.gov/ag/rfkspeeches/. Retrieved December 16, 2014. 
 
U.S. Marine Corps 
http://www.marines.mil/News/Publications.aspx. Retrieved December 
16, 2014. 
 
White House Historical Series 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2011/assets
/hist.pdf. Retrieved December 16, 2014. 
 
Youtube 
 https://www.youtube.com/. Retrieved December 16, 2014. 
 
 
 
 
Films 
 
“Virtual JFK: Vietnam if Kennedy had Lived.” Directed by Koji Masutani. 
United States: Sven Kahn Films, 2009. DVD. 
 
“The Fog of War.” Directed by Errol Morris. United States: Sony Pictures, 
2003. DVD. 
 
 
 
Oral History Collections 
 
Columbia University Oral History Collection 
General Lucius Clay 
 
Frontline Diplomacy: The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection 
Thomas L. Hughes 
Frederick E. Nolting Jr. 
 
John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Oral History Collection 
George W. Anderson Jr. 
Harold Brown 
McGeorge Bundy 
William P. Bundy 
Arleigh A. Burke 
	   262 
General Lucius D. Clay 
Chester L. Cooper 
Council of Economic Advisers 
George H. Decker 
Paul B. Fay 
Roswell Gilpatric 
Roger Hilsman 
Carl Kaysen 
Robert Komer 
Victor H. Krulak 
Robert A. Lovett 
John A. McCone 
Robert S. McNamara 
Paul Nitze 
David M. Shoup 
Arthur Sylvester 
James W. Symington 
Maxwell D. Taylor 
Earl G. Wheeler 
Adam Yarmolinsky 
Eugene M. Zuckert 
 
John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Robert F. Kennedy Oral History 
Collection 
Maxwell Taylor 
 
Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Oral History Collection 
George Ball 
McGeorge Bundy 
Roswell Gilpatric 
Roger Hilsman 
John A. McCone 
Robert S. McNamara 
Adam Yarmolinsky 
 
MIT Security Studies Program Oral History Program  
Carl Kaysen 
 
Presidency Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia 
 
U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense Oral History Collection 
Robert S. McNamara 
General Maxwell Taylor 
 
 
 
 
 
	   263 
Interviews 
 
Professor Graham Allison. Cambridge, MA, September 11, 2012. 
 
Dr. Daniel Ellsberg. Telephone, January 11, 2013. 
 
Professor Alain C. Enthoven, Stanford University, former DASD and ASD for 
Systems Analysis. Telephone, January 17, 2013. 
 
Errol Morris. London, UK, March 18, 2014 and Cambridge, MA, July 23, 2014. 
 
Thomas S. Paullin, Telephone, November 22, 2012. 
 
 
 
News Sources 
 
The Baltimore Sun 
Boston Globe 
Chicago Daily Tribune 
Christian Science Monitor 
Florida Times 
The Guardian 
Harvard Crimson 
Life Magazine 
Look Magazine 
Los Angeles Times 
The Milwaukee Sentinel 
The New Republic 
New York Herald Tribune 
The New York Review of Books 
The New York Times 
St. Petersburg Times 
The Sunday Times 
Time Magazine 
The Wall Street Journal 
The Washington Post 
Washington Star 
 
 
Published Primary Material 
 
 
Allen, George W. None So Blind. Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee, 2001. 
 
Ball, George. The Past Has Another Pattern. New York, NY: Norton, 1982. 
 
	   264 
Blight, James G., and janet M. Lang. The Fog of War: Lessons from the Life 
 of Robert S. McNamara. Oxford, UK: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005. 
 
Califano, Joseph A. Jr. The Triumph and Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson: The 
 White House Years. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1991. 
 
Colby, William and James McCargar. Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of 
 Americaʼs Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam. Chicago, IL: 
 Contemporary Books, 1989. 
 
Cooper, Chester. The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam. New York, NY: 
Dodd, Meade & Co, 1970. 
 
Ellsberg, Daniel. Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers. 
 New York, NY: Penguin, 2003. 
 
Fay, Paul B. The Pleasure of His Company. New York, NY: Harper & Row, 
 1966. 
 
Galbraith, John K. Ambassador's Journal: A Personal Account of the Kennedy 
 Years. St. Paul, MN: Paragon House Publishers, 1988. 
 
_____. Letters to Kennedy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998. 
 
Harris, Seymour E. Economics and the Kennedy Years and a Look Ahead 
New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1964. 
 
Hoopes, Townsend. The Limits of Intervention: How Vietnam Policy Was 
 Made - and Reversed - During the Johnson Administration. New York, 
 NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 1973. 
 
Hoopes, Townsend and Douglas Brinkley. Driven patriot: the life and times of 
 James Forrestal. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992. 
 
Kennedy, Carolina and Michael Beschloss eds. Jacqueline Kennedy: Historic
 Conversations on Life with John F. Kennedy. New York, NY: Hyperion 
 Audio Books, 2011. 
 
Kennedy, John F. Why England Slept. London, UK: Hutchinson & Co., 1940. 
 
Kissinger, Henry. The White House Years. Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Co., 
 1979. 
 
Lodge, Henry Cabot. As it Was: An Inside View of Politics and Power in the 
 '50s and '60s. New York, NY: Norton & Co., 1976. 
 
Macmillan cabinet papers, 1957-1963 on CD-ROM.  London, UK: Adam 
 Matthew Publications, 1999. 
	   265 
McNamara, Robert S. The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office. London, 
 UK: Hodder & Stoughton, 1968. 
 
_____. Out of the Cold: New Thinking for American Foreign and Defense 
 Policy in the Century. London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing Ltd., 1989. 
 
McNamara, Robert S. and James G. Blight. Wilsonʼs Ghost: Reducing the 
 Risk of Conflict, Killing and Catastrophe in the 21st Century. New York, 
 NY: Public Affairs, 2001. 
 
McNamara, Robert S. and James G. Blight and Robert K. Brigham. Argument 
 Without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy. New York, 
 NY: Public Affairs, 1999. 
 
McNamara, Robert S. and and Brian VanDeMark. In Retrospect: The Tragedy 
 and Lessons of Vietnam. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1995. 
 
Nolting, Frederick. From Trust to Tragedy: The Political Memoirs of Frederick 
Nolting, Kennedyʼs Ambassador to Vietnam. Westport, CT: Praeger, 
1988. 
 
Mecklin, John. Mission in Torment: An Intimate Account of the U.S. Role in 
Vietnam. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965. 
 
Millis, Walter Millis ed. The Forrestal Diaries. New York, NY: Viking Press, 
 1951. 
 
O'Donnell, Kenneth P., David F. Powers and Joe McCarthy. Johnny, We 
 Hardly Knew Ye. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1970. 
 
Palmer, David R. Summons of the Trumpet: U.S.-Vietnam in Perspective. San 
 Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978. 
 
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Available online: 
 http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection.action?collectionCode=PP.
 Retrieved December 16, 2014. 
 
Rostow, Walt W. “The Case for the Vietnam War.” Times Literary Supplement 
(June 9, 1995).  
 
Rusk, Dean. As I Saw it. London, UK: Tauris, 1990. 
 
Salinger, Pierre. With Kennedy. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966. 
 
Schlesinger, Andrew and Stephen. The Letters of Arthurs Schlesinger. New 
 York, NY: Random House, 2013. 
 
	   266 
Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White 
 House. New York, NY: Greenwich House, 1983. 
 
_____. “What Would He Have Done?” The New York Times (March 29, 
 1992).  
 
Sharp, Admiral U.S. Grant. Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect. San 
 Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978. 
 
Sorenson, Theodore C. Kennedy. New York, NY: Smithmark Publications Inc., 
 1965. 
Taylor, General Maxwell D. Swords and Plowshares. New York: Da Capo 
 Press, 1972. 
  
_____. The Uncertain Trumpet. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 
 1974. 
 
Thompson, Robert. No Exit from Vietnam. New York, NY: David McKay 
 Company Inc., 1969. 
 
_____. Defeating Communist Insurgency. London, UK: Chatto & Windus, 
 1967. 
 
U.S. Department of Commerce. The Balance of Payments and the United 
States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990. 
 
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. Foreign Relations of the 
 United States (FRUS) Vol. I: Vietnam, 1961. Washington, D.C.: 
 Government Printing Office, 1988. 
 
_____. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) Vol. III: Vietnam, 
 January-August 1963. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
 1991. 
 
_____. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) Vol. IV: Vietnam, 
 August-December 1963. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
 Office, 1991. 
 
_____. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) Vol. I: Vietnam, 1964. 
 Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992. 
 
_____. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1961-1963 Vol. IX: 
 Foreign Economic Policy. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
 Office, 1995. 
 
U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense. Report of the Office of the Secretary 
 of Defense Vietnam Task Force. Washington, DC: 1967. Available 
	   267 
 online: archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers. Retrieved December 
 16, 2014. 
 
_____. Gravel Edition. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1971. 
Westmoreland, William C. A Soldier Reports. New York, NY: Doubleday, 
 1976. 
 
White, Theodore H. The Making of the President, 1960. Cutchogue, NY: 
 Buccaneer Books, 1961. 
 
 
 
Other primary sources 
 
Unclassified Personal Diary of John T. McNaughton, January 1, 1966 – April 
22, 1967. Thomas S. Paullin. 
 
 
 
Secondary Sources 
 
Ahern, Thomas Jr. CIA and Rural Pacification in South Vietnam. Washington 
D.C.: CIA, 1998. Available online: foia.cia.gov. Retrieved December 16, 
2014. 
 
___. CIA and the Generals: Covert Support to Military Government in South 
Vietnam. Washington D.C.: CIA, 1998. Available online: foia.cia.gov. 
Retrieved December 16, 2014. 
 
___. CIA and the House of NGO. Washington D.C.: CIA, 1998. Available 
online: foia.cia.gov. Retrieved December 16, 2014. 
 
Allison, Graham T. and Philip Zelikow. Essence of Decision: Explaining the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. New York, NY: Longman, 1999. 
 
Army, U.S. Department of. Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961-
1971. CMH Publication 90-23. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army, 1973. 
 
Asselin, Pierre. Hanoiʼs Road to the Vietnam War, 1954-1965. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2013. 
 
____. “Kimball's Vietnam War.” Diplomatic History 30:1 (2006): pp.163-69. 
 
Barnet, Richard. “The Men Who Made the War.” In Washington Plans an 
Aggressive War, edited by Ralph Stavins, Richard Barnet and Marcus 
Raskin. New York, NY: Vintage, 1971. 
 
 
	   268 
Basset, Lawrence J. and Stephen E. Pelz. “The Failed Search for Victory.” in 
Robert J. McMahon Major Problems in the History of Vietnam War. 
Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath & Co., 1990. 
 
Bator, Francis. “No Good Choices: LBJ and the Vietnam/Great Society 
Connection.” Diplomatic History (June 2008): pp. 309-340. 
 
____. “The Political Economics of International Money.” Foreign Affairs 47:1 
(October 1968): pp. 51-67. 
 
Berman, Larry. Planning a Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in 
Vietnam. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Co., 1984. 
 
Bird, Kai. The Color of Truth. McGeorge Bundy and William Bundy: Brothers 
in Arms. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1998. 
 
Bischak, Gregory A. Towards a Peace Economy in the United States. London, 
UK: Macmillan Press, 1991. 
 
Blight, James G., janet M. Lang, and David A. Welch. Virtual JFK: Vietnam if 
Kennedy Had Lived. New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009. 
 
Bradley, Mark Philip and Marilyn B. Young. Making Sense of the Vietnam 
Wars: Local, National and Transnational Perspectives. Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 2008. 
 
Brinkley, Douglas. “Eisenhower the Dove.” American Heritage 52:6 
(September 2011): pp. 58-65. 
 
____. “The Stain of Vietnam: Robert McNamara, Redemption Denied.” 
Foreign Affairs (Summer 1993). Available online: 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/48974/douglas-brinkley/the-stain-
of-vietnam-robert-mcnamara-redemption-denied. Retrieved December 
16, 2014. 
 
Bundy, William P. The Path to Vietnam: A Lesson in Involvement. London, 
UK: Twentieth Century Press, 1967. 
 
Busch, Peter. All the Way with JFK: Britain, the US, and the Vietnam War. 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003.  
 
____. “Killing the 'Vietcong': The British Advisory Mission and the Strategic 
Hamlet Programme.” Journal of Strategic Studies 25:1 (2002): pp. 135-
162. 
 
Buzzanco, Robert. Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the 
Vietnam Era. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
 
	   269 
Callahan, David. Dangerous Capabilities: Paul Nitze and the Cold War. New 
York, NY: Edward Burlingame, 1990. 
 
Campagna, Anthony S. The Economic Consequences of the Vietnam War 
New York, NY: Praeger, 1991. 
 
Campbell, Craig. “Kennedyʼs international legacy: fifty years on.” International 
Affairs 89:6 (2013): pp. 1367-1378. 
 
Caro, Robert A. The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Passage of Power. New 
York, NY: Vintage Books, 2012. 
 
Casey. Steven. Selling the Korean War: propaganda, politics and political 
opinion in the United States 1950-1953. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2008. 
 
Catton, Philip E. Diemʼs Final Failure: Prelude to Americaʼs War in Vietnam 
Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2003. 
 
Cha, Victor D. Alignment despite antagonism: The US-Korean-Japan Security 
Triangle. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999. 
 
Chapman, Jessica M. Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United 
States, and the 1950s Southern Vietnam. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2013. 
 
Clarfield. Gerard. Security with Solvency: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the 
Shaping of the Military Establishment. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999. 
 
Clarke, Jeffrey. U.S. Army in Vietnam. Advice and Support: The Final Years, 
1965-1973. Washington, D.C.: US Army Center of Military History,1988. 
 
Cohen, Eliot A. Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in 
Wartime. New York, NY: Anchor Books, 2002. 
 
Dallek, Robert. John F. Kennedy: an unfinished life, 1917-1963. London, UK: 
Allen Lane, 2003. 
 
Divine, Robert A. “Historiography: Vietnam Reconsidered.” Diplomatic History 
12 (Winter 1988): pp. 79-93 
 
Dockrill, Saki. Eisenhowerʼs New-Look National Security Strategy, 1952-61. 
New York, NY: St. Martinʼs Press, 1996. 
 
Dorwart, Jeffrey M. Eberstadt and Forrestal: A National Security Partnership, 
1909-1959. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1991. 
 
	   270 
Dumbrell, John. Rethinking the Vietnam War. New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012. 
 
Eichengreen, Barry. “From Benign Neglect to Malignant Preoccupation: U.S. 
Balance-of-Payments Policy in the 1960s.” In George L. Perry and 
James Tobin eds. Economic events, ideas, and policies: The 1960s and 
after. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000. 
 
____. Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System (2nd 
ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008. 
 
Eisenberg, Carolyn. “The New Cold War” Diplomatic History 29:3 (June 2005): 
pp. 423-427. 
 
Elliot, Mai. RAND in Southeast Asia: A History of the Vietnam War Era. Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2010. 
 
Enthoven, Alain C. Defense Planning and Organization. Santa Monica, CA: 
 RAND, 1961. 
 
_____. Alain C. Enthoven, “Reason, Morality and Defense Policy.” America 
 108:14 (April 13, 1963), pp. 494-502. 
 
_____. “Tribute to Charles J. Hitch.” OR/MS Today 22:6 (December 1995). 
 Available online: http://www.orms-today.org/orms-12-95/hitch-
 tribute.html. Retrieved December 16, 2014. 
 
Enthoven, Alain C. and K. Wayne Smith. How Much is Enough? Shaping the 
Defense Program, 1961-1969. New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1971. 
 
Fall, Bernard. Last Reflections on a War. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967. 
 
Fall, Dorothy. Bernard Fall: Memoirs of a Soldier-Scholar. Dulles, VA: 
Potomac Books, 2006. 
 
Farris, Scott. Kennedy and Reagan: Why Their Legacies Endure. Gulford, CT: 
Lyons Press, 2013. 
 
Federal Bank of St. Louis. “The United States Balance of Payments, 1946-
 1960.” Monthly Review 43:2 (March 1961). Available online: 
 https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/frbslreview/rev_stls_1961
 03.pdf. Accessed December 16, 2014. 
 
Fieleke, Norman S. “The Buy-American Policy of the United States 
Government: Its Balance of Payments and Welfare Effects.” New 
England Economic Review (July/August 1969): pp. 2-18. 
 
	   271 
____. “Unilateral international transfers: unrequited and generally unheeded.” 
New England Economic Review  (Nov/Dec 1996): pp. 27-39. 
 
Fitzgerald, Frances. Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in 
Vietnam. New York, NY: Back Bay Books, 2002. 
 
Freedman, Lawrence. Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam. 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
 
____. “Vietnam and the Disillusioned Strategist.” International Affairs 72:1 
(1996): pp. 133-151. 
 
Fulbright, William J. The Arrogance of Power. London, UK: Penguin Books, 
1966. 
 
Futrell, Robert F., and Martin Blumenson. The U.S. Air Force in Southeast 
Asia: The Advisory Years to 1965. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force 
History, 1981. 
 
Gaddis, John Lewis. “The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins 
of the Cold War.” Diplomatic History 7 (Summer 1983): pp. 171-90. 
 
____. The Landscape of History: How Historians May the Past. Oxford, UK: 
 Oxford University Press, 2002. 
 
____. Strategies of Containment. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
 
Galbraith, James K. “Exit Strategy.” Boston Review (October/November 
2003). Available online: 
http://new.bostonreview.net/BR28.5/galbraith.html. Retrieved December 
16, 2014.  
 
Galbraith, John K. How to Control the Military. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 
1968. 
 
Gallucci, Robert L. Neither Peace Nor Honor: The Politics of American Military 
Policy in Viet-Nam. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1975. 
 
Gardner, Lloyd C., and Ted Gittinger. Vietnam: The Early Decisions. Austin, 
TX: University of Texas Press, 1997. 
 
Gavin, Francis. “The Gold Battles Within the Cold War: American Monetary 
Policy and the Defense of Europe, 1960-193.” Diplomatic History 26:1 
(2002): pp. 61-94. 
 
____. Gold, dollars, and power: the politics of international monetary relations, 
1958-1971. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004. 
	   272 
Gelb, Leslie H. and Richard K. Betts. The Irony of Vietnam: The System 
Worked. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1979. 
 
Gibbons, William C. The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: executive 
and legislative roles and relationships, Part II. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1986. 
 
Goldstein, Gordon M. Lessons in Disaster: McGeorge Bundy and the Path to 
War in Vietnam. New York, NY: Henry Holt and Co., 2008. 
 
Gray, Colin S. “Strategy in the nuclear age: The United States, 1945-1991.” In 
Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox and Alvin Bernstein. The Making of 
Strategy: Rules, States and War. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994. 
 
Guan, Ang Cheng The Vietnam War from the Other Side: The Vietnamese 
Communistsʼ Perspective. London, UK: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002. 
 
Halberstam, David. The Best and the Brightest. New York: Ballantine Books, 
1969. 
 
Hammer, Ellen J. A Death in November: American in Vietnam, 1963. Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press, 1988. 
 
Harrison, Benjamin T. and Christopher L. Mosher. “John T. McNaughton and 
Vietnam: The Early Years as Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1964-
1965.” History 92:308 (October 2007): pp. 496-514. 
 
Heath, Jim F. John F. Kennedy and the Business Community. London, UK: 
University of Chicago Press, 1969. 
 
Hendrickson, Paul. The Living and the Dead: Robert McNamara and Five 
Lives of a Lost War. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1996. 
 
Herring, George C. America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 
4th ed. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2002. 
 
____. “The Wrong Kind of Loyalty - McNamara's Apology for Vietnam.” 
Foreign Affairs (May/June 1995). Available online: 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/50985/george-c-herring/the-wrong-
kind-of-loyalty-mcnamara-s-apology-for-vietnam. Retrieved December 
16, 2014.  
 
Herspring, Dale R. The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations 
from FDR to George W. Bush. Lawrence, KS: University Press of 
Kansas, 2005. 
 
	   273 
Hess, Gary R. “Jessica Chapman. Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, 
the United States, and 1950s Southern Vietnam.” H-Diplo Roundtable 
Review 15:12 (November 2013). Available online: http://h-
diplo.org/roundtables/PDF/Roundtable-XV-12.pdf. Retrieved December 
16, 2014. 
 
____. “The Military Perspective on Strategy in Vietnam.” Diplomatic History 
 10:1 (January 1986): pp. 91-106. 
 
____. “The Unending Debate: Historians and the Vietnam War.” Diplomatic 
 History 18:2 (Spring 1994): pp 239-264. 
 
Hilsman, Roger. The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs. 
New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1971. 
 
____. To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of 
John F. Kennedy. New York, NY: Doubleday, 1964. 
 
____. “Vietnam: The Decisions to Intervene.” In Jonathan R. Adelman ed. 
 Superpowers and Revolution. New York, NY: Praeger, 1986. 
 
Hitch, Charles J. and Roland N. McKean. The Economics of Defense in the 
Nuclear Age. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1960. 
 
Michael J. Hogan and Frank Costigliola. America in the World: The 
 Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941. Cambridge, 
 UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
 
Hogan, Michael J. and Thomas G. Paterson ed. Explaining the History of 
American Foreign Relations 2nd Edition. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004 
 
Hunt, David. “Dirty Wars: Counterinsurgency in Vietnam and Today.” Politics 
& Society 38:35 (2010): pp. 35-66. 
 
Huntington, Samuel P. “American Ideals versus American Institutions.” 
 Political Science Quarterly 97:1 (Spring 1982): pp. 1-37. 
 
_____. “Defense Organization and Military Strategy.” The Public Interest 75 
 (Spring 1984): pp. 20-46. 
 
_____. The soldier and the state: the theory and politics of civil-military 
 relations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957. 
 
Huntington, Samuel P. and Andrew J. Goodpaster. Civil-Military Relations. 
Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977. 
 
 
	   274 
Isaacs, Arnold Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia. Baltimore, 
 MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. 
 
Ives, Christopher. US Special Forces and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam: 
Military Innovation and Institutional Failure, 1961-1963. London, UK: 
Routledge, 2007. 
 
Jacobs, Seth. Americanʼs Miracle Man in Vietnam: Ngo Dinh Diem, Religion, 
Race and U.S. Intervention in Southeast Asia. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2004. 
 
Jervis, Robert. “The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War.” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 24:4 (December 1980): pp. 563-592. 
 
____. “The Politics of Troop Withdrawal: Salted Peanuts, the Commitment 
Trap, and Buying Time.” Diplomatic History 34 (2010): pp. 507-16. 
 
Johnson, Griffith. “Western Europe and the American Balance of Payments.” 
 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 246 
 (July 1963): pp. 110-120. 
 
Jones, Captain Douglas N. “Economic Aspects of Military Assistance.” Air 
University Review 16:1 (Nov/Dec 1964): pp. 42-46. 
 
Jones, Howard. Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and 
JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 
2003. 
 
Jones, Matthew. After Hiroshima: the United States, race and nuclear 
weapons in Asia, 1945-1965. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010. 
 
Kaiser, David. American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the 
Vietnam War. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000. 
 
Kaplan, Lawrence S., Ronald D. Landa, and Edward J. Drea. The McNamara 
Ascendancy: 1961-1965. Vol. V, History of the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006. 
 
Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1991. 
 
Kaufmann, William W. The McNamara Strategy. New York, NY: Harper & 
Row, 1964. 
 
Kelly, Francis John. Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961-1971. 
Vol. CMH Publication 90-23. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 
1989. 
 
	   275 
Khong, Yuen Foong. Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and 
the Vietnam Decisions of 1965. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1992. 
 
Kinnard, Douglas. The Certain Trumpet: Maxwell Taylor and the American 
Experience in Vietnam. McLean, VA: Brasseyʼs, 1991. 
 
____. “Eisenhower and the Defense Budget.” The Journal of Politics 39:3 
(August 1977): pp. 596-623. 
 
____. The Secretary of Defense. Lexington, KY: The University Press of 
Kentucky, 1980. 
 
____. The War Managers. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007. 
 
Kolko, Gabriel Vietnam: anatomy of war, 1940-1975. London, UK: Allen & 
Unwin, 1986. 
 
Krepinevich, Andrew F. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore, MD: The John 
Hopkins University Press, 1986. 
 
Lary, Hal B. Problems of the United States as World Trade and Banker. 
NBER: 1963. Available online: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c1908.pdf. 
Retrieved December 16, 2014. 
 
Leffler, Melvyn P. “Defense on a Diet: How Budget Crises Have Improved 
U.S. Strategy.” Foreign Affairs (November/December 2013). Available 
online: http://fam.ag/132TXkn. Retrieved November 2, 2014. 
 
____. A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman 
Administration and the Cold War. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1992. 
 
Lewy Guenter. America in Vietnam New York. Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 1978. 
 
Logevall, Fredrik. Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the 
Escalation of War in Vietnam. Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1999. 
 
____. Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of Americaʼs 
Vietnam. New York, NY: Random House, 2012. 
 
Lundestad, Geir. The United States and Western Europe since 1945: from 
“empire” by invitation to transatlantic drift. Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 2005. 
 
	   276 
McFarland, Keith D. and David L. Roll. Louis Johnson and the Arming of 
America. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005. 
 
MacGregor, Morris J. Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965. 
 Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1985. 
 
McGrath, John J. The Other End of the Spear: The Tooth-to-Tail Ratio (T3R) 
in Modern Military Operations. Fort Leavenwroth, KS: Combat Studies 
Institute Press, 2007. 
 
McMaster, H.R. Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam. New York, NY: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 1997. 
 
Maslow, Abraham H. The Psychology of Science: A Reconnaissance. Google 
 ebook available online: http://goo.gl/XgyKp. Retrieved November 2, 
 2014. 
 
Masure, Matthew. “Exhibiting Signs of Resistance: South Vietnamʼs Struggle 
for Legitimacy, 1965-1960.” Diplomatic History 33:2 (April 2009): pp. 
292-313. 
 
May, Ernest R. ed. American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC68. Boston, 
MA: Bedford/St. Martinʼs, 1993. 
 
____. “The U.S. Government, A Legacy of the Cold War.” Diplomatic History 
16:2 (1992): pp. 269-277. 
 
Mearsheimer, John J. “McNamaraʼs War.” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 49:6 
(July/August 1993). Available online: 
http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0020x1.pdf. Retrieved December 
16, 2014. 
 
Mecklin, John. Mission in Torment: An Intimate Account of the U.S. Role in 
Vietnam. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965. 
 
Melson, Charles D. and Wanda J. Renfrow. Marine Advisors: With the 
Vietnamese Marine Corps. Quantico, VA: USMC History Division, 2009. 
 
Meltzer, Allan H. U.S. Policy in the Bretton Woods Era. St. Louis, MI: Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 1991. 
 
Mikesell, Raymond. The U.S. Balance of Payments and the International Role 
of the Dollar. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1970. 
 
Miller, Edward. Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate 
of South Vietnam. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013. 
 
	   277 
Miller, Richard M. Funding Extended Conflicts: Korea, Vietnam and the War 
on Terror. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007. 
 
Miller, Robert H. “Vietnam: Folly, Quagmire, or Inevitability?.” Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 15 (April 1992): pp. 99-123. 
 
Moyar, Mark. Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
 
Mrozek, Donald J. Air Power and the Ground War in Vietnam: Ideas and 
Actions. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1988. 
 
Nardi, Major Philip P. “The Foreign Military Sales Policy of the Kennedy 
Administration.” The DISAM Journal  (Winter 1995/1996): pp. 67-77. 
 
Navy, Information Office of the U.S. The Navy in Vietnam. Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968. 
 
Navy, U.S. Department of the. The Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1973: An 
Anthology and Annotated Bibliography. Washington, D.C.: USMC, 1985. 
 
Newman, John M. JFK and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for 
Power. New York, NY: Warner Books Inc., 1992. 
 
Nguyen: Lien Hang Nguyen. Hanoiʼs War: An International History of the War 
 for Peace in Vietnam. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina 
 Press, 2012. 
 
Novick, Peter. That noble dream: the objectivity question and the American 
 historical profession. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
 1988. 
 
Olson, James C. Stuart Symington: A Life. Columbia, MI: University of 
 Missouri Press, 2003. 
 
Palmer, Gregory. The McNamara Strategy and the Vietnam War. Westport, 
CT: Greenwood Press, 1978. 
 
Parker, Major Jay M. The Colonelsʼ Revolt: Eisenhower, the Army and the 
Politics of National Security. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1994. 
 
Paterson, Thomas G. Kennedy's Quest for Victory. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1992. 
 
Pfaff, William. “Mac Bundy Said He Was “All Wrong”” The New York Review 
of Books (June 10, 2010). 
 
	   278 
Pfeffer, Richard M. No More Vietnams? The War and the Future of American 
Foreign Policy. New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1968. 
 
Piller, Geofrrey. “DODʼs Office of International Security Affairs: The Brief 
Ascendancy of an Advisory System.” Political Science Quarterly 98:1 
(Spring 1983): pp. 59-78. 
 
Pool, Walter S. The JCS and National Policy, 1950-1952. Washington, D.C.: 
Office of Joint History, 1998. 
 
Prados, John. “Phoenix and the Drones.” Passport 43:3 (January 2013): pp. 
36-39. 
 
Preble: Christopher Preble. John F. Kennedy and the missile gap. DeKalb, IL: 
Northern Illinois University Press, 2004. 
 
Preston, Andrew. “Review: Virtual JFK: Vietnam If Kennedy Had Lived.” 
 Michigan War Studies Review 19 (May 2011). Available online: 
 http://www.miwsr.com/2011-019.aspx. Retrieved December 16, 2014. 
 
_____. “The Soft Hawksʼ Dilemma in Vietnam: Michael V. Forrestal at the 
 National Security Council, 1962-1964.” The International History 
 Review 25:1 (March 2003): pp. 63-95. 
 
_____. The War Council: McGeorge Bundy, the NSC, and Vietnam. 
 Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006. 
 
Rabe, Stephen G. The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy 
Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America. Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1999. 
 
RAND Corporation. Report: Limited War Patterns, Southeast Asia. Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 1962. 
 
Rearden, Steven L. The Formative Years: 1947-1950, Vol. I, History of the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense. Washington, D.C.: OSD Historical 
Office, 1984. 
 
Reeves, Richard. President Kennedy: Profile of Power. New York, NY: Simon 
& Schuster, 1994. 
 
Rockoff, Hugh. Americaʼs Economic Way of War. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012. 
 
Roherty, James. Decisions of Robert S. McNamara: A Study of the Role of 
Secretary of Defense. Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 
1970. 
 
	   279 
Rosenzweig, Phil. “Robert S. McNamara and the Evolution of Modern 
Management.” Harvard Business Review (2010): pp. 87-93. 
 
Rovere, Richard H. and Arthur Schlesinger Jr. The MacArthur Controversy 
and American Foreign Policy. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 
1965. 
 
Ruiz-Palmer, Diego. “Big Lift.” AirFan: Le magazine de lʼaéronautique militaire 
internationale. 419 (October 2013): pp.16-25. 
 
Ryan, David. US Collective Memory, Intervention and Vietnam: The Cultural 
Politics of US foreign Policy since 1969. London, UK: Routledge, 2014. 
 
Schwab, Orrin. A Clash of Cultures: Civil-Military Relations during the Vietnam 
War. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006. 
 
____. Defending the Free World: John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson and the 
Vietnam War, 1961-1965. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998. 
 
Selverstone, M.J. “It's a Date: Kennedy and the Timetable for a Vietnam 
Troop Withdrawal.” Diplomatic History 34:3 (2010): pp. 485-95. 
 
Shapley, Deborah. Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert 
McNamara. New York, NY: Little Brown & Co., 1993. 
 
Sheehan, Neil. A Bright Shining Lie. London, UK: Picador, 1990 
 
Sohmen, Egon. “International Monetary Problems and the Foreign 
Exchanges.” Special Papers in International Economics 4 (April 1963). 
Available online: https://www.princeton.edu/~ies/old_series-win.htm. 
Retrieved December 16, 2014. 
 
Sorley, Lewis. A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of 
America's Last Years in Vietnam. New York, NY: Mariner Books, 2007. 
 
Spanier: John W. The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959. 
 
Spector, Ronald H. Advice and Support: The Early Years, the U.S. Army in 
Vietnam. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983. 
 
Stanton, Shelby L. The rise and fall of the American Army: U.S. ground forces 
in Vietnam, 1965-1973. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995. 
 
Stavins, Ralph, Richard Barnet, and Marcus Raskin. Washington Plans an 
Aggressive War. New York, NY: Vintage, 1971. 
 
	   280 
Stuart, Douglas T. Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law 
That Transformed America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2008. 
 
Summers, Harry G. On Strategy: the Vietnam War in Context. Honolulu, HI: 
University Press of the Pacific, 2003. 
 
Sutherland, R.J. “Cost-Effectiveness and Defence Management; Mr. 
McNamara's Pentagon.” Paper presented at the ORD Informal Paper, 
Ottawa, 1966. Available online: 
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2008/forces/D12-11-11-
1E.pdf. Retrieved December 16, 2014. 
 
Taylor, General Leonard B. Financial Management of the Vietnam Conflict, 
1962-1972. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1974. 
 
Tertrais, Hugues. Le piastre et le fusil: le cout de la guerre dʼIndochine, 1945-
1954. Paris, FR: Comité pour lʼhistoire économique et financière de la 
France, 2002. 
 
Thompson, Nicholas. The Hawk and the Dove: Paul Nitze, George Kennan, 
and the History of the Cold War. New York, NY: Henry Holt & Co., 2009. 
 
Van Atta, Dale. With Honor: Melvin Laird in War, Peace, and Politics. 
Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2008. 
 
Van Creveld, Martin. “Why Iraq Will End as Vietnam Did.” (November 18, 
2004). Available online: http://www.lewrockwell.com/2004/11/martin-van-
creveld/why-iraq-will-end-as-vietnam-did/. Retrieved December 16, 2014. 
 
Van Staaveren, Jacob. USAF Plans and Policies in South Vietnam: 1961-
1963. Washington, D.C.: USAF Historical Liaison Office, 1965. 
 
Weidman, Steven J. Resurrecting Phoenix: Lessons in COIN Operations 
Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2006. 
 
Wells, Samuel F. Jr. “Sounding the Tocsin: NSC68 and the Soviet Threat.” 
International Security 4 (Spring 1979): pp. 116-58. 
 
Willbanks, James H. Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South 
Vietnam Lost Its War. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2008. 
 
Yarmolinksy, Adam. “Book Review: The Oppenheimer Case by Charles 
Curtis.” Harvard Law Review 69 (1956): pp. 1345-1352. 
 
____. “Bureaucratic Structures and Political Outcomes.” Journal of 
 International Affairs 23:2 (1969): pp. 225-236. 
 
	   281 
____. Case Studies in Personnel Security. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of 
 National Affairs, 1955. 
 
____. “Civilian Control: New Perspectives for New Problems.” Indiana Law 
Journal 49:4 (Summer 1974): pp. 654-672. 
 
____. “Cold War Stories.” Foreign Policy 97 (Winter 1994/1995): pp. 158-170. 
 
____. The Military Establishment: Its Impacts on American Society. New York, 
NY: Harper & Row, 1971. 
 
____. “The Military Establishment (Or How Political Problems Become Military 
 Problems).” Foreign Policy 1 (January 1971): pp. 78-97. 
 
____. “Some Lessons of Vietnam.” The Round Table 62:245 (1972): pp. 85-
 91. 
  
____. “The Strength of Government by McGeorge Bundy.” Policy Sciences 
1:1 (Spring 1970): pp. 152-154. 
 
____. The U.S. Military and Foreign Policy. Chicago, IL: Centre for Policy 
 Study, 1967. 
 
Adam Yarmolinsky and Gregory D. Foster. Paradoxes of Power: The Military 
Establishment in the Eighties. Bloomington, IL: Indiana University Press, 
1983. 
 
Adam Yarmolinsky, Ernest May, Graham Allison “Limits to Intervention.” 
 Foreign Affairs 48 (January 1970): pp. 245-261. 
 
Young, Marilyn. Bombing Civilians: A Twentieth-Century History. New York, 
NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 2009. 
 
____. The Vietnam Wars: 1945-1990. New York, NY: Harper Collins, 1991. 
 
Zeiler, Thomas W. “The Diplomatic History Bandwagon: A State of the Field.” 
 The Journal of American History 95:4 (March 2009): pp. 1053-1073. 
 
 
 
Unpublished Secondary Sources 
 
Barlow, Jeffrey G. “President John F. Kennedy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” 
PhD dissertation, University of South Carolina, 1981. 
 
Klimas, Joshua E. “Balancing Consensus, Consent, and Competence: 
Richard Russell, the Senate Armed Services Committee & Oversight of 
	   282 
America's Defense, 1955-1968.” PhD dissertation, Ohio State University, 
2007. 
 
McMaster, H.R. “Distrust, Deceit, and Disaster: Lyndon Johnson, Robert 
 McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Americanization of the 
 Vietnam War.” PhD dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1996. 
 
Young, Stephanie C. “Power and the Purse: Defense Budgeting and 
American Politics, 1947-1972.” PhD dissertation, University of California, 
Berkeley, 2009. 
 
 
 
	   283 
Appendix 1: Charts and figures 
 
Figure 1: References to Balance of Payments Considerations in Federal 
Reserveʼs Statements788 
 
 
Figure 2: South Vietnamʼs share of the MAP program according to the 
CPSVN 
 
 
                                                
788 Through text mining, the chart describes references in the “Record of Policy Actions” of the 
Federal Open Market Committee to key terms, such as “gold outflows,” “trade deficits,” and 
“balance of payments”. Eichengreen, “From Benign Neglect,” pp. 57. 
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Figure 3: Vietnam and South Koreaʼs share of the MAP program (in %)789 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
789 Arguably, the traditional narrative on the U.S. in Vietnam has looked at this chart and 
minimized the importance of the financial commitment to Vietnam in the years up to 1963 
relative to later years. However, the important part is that from the vantage point of 1963, the 
financial commitment was coming close to equaling that in Korea and that already seemed 
alarming.  
0	  0.05	  
0.1	  0.15	  
0.2	  0.25	  
0.3	  0.35	  
0.4	  
1959	   1960	   1961	   1962	   1963	   1964	   1965	  
Vietnam	  as	  %	  MAP	  South	  Korea	  as	  %	  MAP	  
